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Preface 
 
by Ann McKechin M.P. Glasgow North  
 
On 17PthP August this year, ICL Tech Ltd and ICL Plastics pled guilty to a number of 
charges under Health & Safety legislation in relation to the explosion at the Stockline 
Factory in Glasgow on 11PthP May 2004 which killed 9 employees and left many seriously 
injured.  
 
As the local constituency M.P. the events surrounding that day in 2004 and the 
desperate search for survivors which followed are ones that I and many others in the 
local community will never forget.  However despite the fact that over three years have 
elapsed this is only the start of the long search for answers as to why such a 
devastating event could have occurred in the centre of a major city in 21PstP century 
modern Britain.  As a society we must not forget that for the workers, victims and 
families the trauma and grief still continues.  That is why this Report is so vital in 
showing with great clarity what I believe is the overwhelming case for a full judicial 
public inquiry led by one of Scotland’s senior judges. 
 
From the start it was clear that the criminal charges brought to court would not provide a 
full explanation.  As yet, the families of those who were killed and the employees who 
survived have still to have access to the huge amount of evidence gathered by the 
Crown Office and HSE or the ability to question the key players about the events on the 
day itself and in the months and years beforehand when many suspect that obvious 
warning signs were missed. 
 
There are very worrying claims from a variety of sources that the history of health & 
safety practice in the factory was far from satisfactory over many years.  The employees 
were not unionised and a significant number of them have stated that safety concerns 
were routinely ignored by company directors. 
 
The structure of the building itself which was constructed over 150 years ago as a mill 
has led to questions about its suitability for industrial processes involving gas, 
dangerous chemicals, dust and extreme heat – if the building had been a standard 
single storey factory unit, the level of death and injury would have been significantly less 
as most of the victims were working in the second floor office.  These fears have been 
heightened by statements about a number of significant alterations to the building’s 
fabric over the last 25 years apparently without statutory consents and the weight of 
equipment on old wooden floors. 
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There are also many questions to be asked about HSE’s involvement with the factory – 
why their own risk assessment criteria did not require more frequent inspections; why 
they allowed the firm to self-certify the rectification of defects noted in their previous 
visits; and why the condition of the building and its equipment did not lead to further 
inquiries.  Their treatment of the whistle blowing call by one former employee, Laurence 
Connolly, just a year before the explosion which I believe was handled very badly, also 
needs to be fully examined along with the protocols or lack of them used by HSE to 
protect such workers. 
 
This disaster is set against a background in which over the last ten years, the rate of 
fatal injury at work in Scotland has with the exception of one year, remained significantly 
higher than the U.K. average. Shockingly, over the period from 2001/02 to 2004/05, the 
number of fatal injuries to workers actually increased by 29% in Scotland compared to a 
decrease of 12% for the UK overall.  Scotland faces a different legal environment for 
prosecuting health & safety offences but not a better one.  Prosecutions must be made 
through the Procurator Fiscal office rather than being taken directly to court by HSE 
staff.  P.F. offices face great challenges in coping with a very wide workload and 
perhaps it is not surprising that there is few staff that has great experience in this area 
of law or is able to give it the degree of priority it requires if enforcement is to act as a 
proper deterrent. In addition the fines issued by Scottish courts are usually significantly 
lower than their English counterparts – in 2004/05 the average fine was a mere £4,846.  
We need firstly to see dedicated P.F. staff in every regional office working closely with 
HSE staff to build up a thorough working knowledge of these problems and secondly, a 
recognition by the Scottish judiciary that the current level of penalties is contributing to 
the problem rather than tackling it. 
 
Over the last three years I and my colleague, Patricia Ferguson MSP for Maryhill have 
worked closely with the Stockline Support Group set up by the STUC and ably 
administered by Ian Tasker, Assistant General Secretary.  Throughout that time the 
group members and many others in the local community have repeatedly asked that we 
ensure that such an event can never occur again.  Only a full public inquiry, already 
supported by thousands of ordinary people across Scotland and 120 members of 
Parliament at Westminster, including our new First Minister, can give them the justice 
they deserve and let Scotland address its shameful record on protecting vulnerable 
workers. 
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Executive Summary 
 
 
Introduction 
 
• On 11 May 2004, nine workers were killed and more than thirty-three injured in 
an explosion at the ICL Plastics plant of Grovepark Mills in Maryhill, Glasgow, This was 
the worst health and safety incident in Scotland since Piper Alpha in 1988 when 167 
lives were lost, and the worst on mainland Scotland since the 1960s. 
 
• This report has been produced by a multi-disciplinary team of academics and 
experts with specialist knowledge in the fields of occupational health and safety, 
finance, employment rights, architecture, corporate accountability and industrial 
relations. Their intention was not to duplicate or mirror the official investigation but to 
examine issues and raise questions that might be neglected or under-explored by that 
investigation. 
 
• The principal aims of the research team and their report were as follows:  
 
- to understand as fully as possible the circumstances and contexts within 
which the disaster occurred. These include the company, its regulation, 
structure and financing, its work practices, employment relations, built 
environment and health and safety practices. 
 
- to ensure that the experiences of those workers and ex-workers, who 
wanted their voices to be heard, were fully documented. Workers’ 
experiences can be a vital source of knowledge in the prevention of future 
disasters. Workers’ silence has all too often led to a lack of justice: legal, 
social and economic.  
 
- to build up a picture of what working life was like inside the factory. 
 
- to consider the role played by inspection, regulation and enforcement 
agencies that directly and indirectly determine the policies and practices of 
companies such as ICL Stockline. 
 
 
Overall Contexts 
 
• One recent estimate suggests that globally as many as 5,000 people die daily 
from work-related injuries and illnesses. The Health and Safety Executive’s (HSE’s) 
figures – an underestimate – reported 593 UK work-related deaths for 2004-5.  
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• Despite these statistics little importance is often attached to this serious social 
problem of industrial illness and injury.  Explanations for this include legislative and 
regulatory weakness and a health and safety deficit in workplaces where workers lack 
collective empowerment through trade unions.  
 
• Contributing to this health and safety deficit has been the reluctance to 
criminalise employers who commit safety offences.  
 
• The very language (and concepts) used is part of the problem.  Terms such as 
‘human error’ or ‘normal accidents’ suggest wrongly that industrial accidents are either 
normal and unavoidable occurrences, or attributable to the actions of individual workers, 
thereby masking broader realities such as employer-driven cost cutting, lack of worker 
representation and consultation and/or regulatory failure.  
 
• Over many years the HSE has recorded significantly higher rates of fatal and 
major injuries for Scotland as compared to the UK as a whole.  For example, between 
1996/7 and 2005/6 Scottish employees have averaged 58% higher rates of fatality than 
the UK overall. Scottish workers are thus at greater risk. 
 
• HSE’s attempts to explain this ‘Scottish anomaly’ have produced unsatisfactory 
conclusions.  Alternative explanations include weaknesses in the inspection and 
prosecution of safety offenders.  To illustrate this – at the time of the Stockline disaster 
the HSE reportedly had only 68 inspectors to police 600,000 out of about 3 million 
workplaces, in a UK-wide context where inspection has been de-prioritised.  
 
• In Scotland, the impact of the de-emphasis of enforcement has been aggravated 
by lower levels of fines on safety offenders, of prosecutions resulting from workplace 
deaths/serious injuries and of investigations resulting from work-related illness.  While in 
England and Wales, eight company directors and five companies have been convicted 
of manslaughter, no director or company has ever been convicted of a homicide offence 
following a work-related death in Scotland. 
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Research Methods  
 
• The Research Team used ‘action research’ methods, based on the participation 
of a group of seven ICL Stockline workers and ex-workers representative of different 
sections/functions in the plant.  Both ‘risk mapping’ and ‘body mapping’ exercises were 
used whereby workers provided unrivalled evidence of working conditions, potential 
hazards and symptoms of ill-health. In-depth worker interviews provided further 
invaluable data.  
 
• Ethical research protocols - including written consent, confidentiality and the 
anonymisation of contributions - were adhered to throughout the research process.  The 
one exception to the anonymised interviews was that freely given by Laurence Connolly 
Snr who wished to make public his experiences, particularly in his dealings with the 
Health and Safety Executive.  
 
• The worker-centred research approaches were combined with methods used by 
academics drawing on their areas of expertise, including finance and accounting, 
industrial relations, the built environment, regulation and health and safety.  
 
 
ICL Stockline: Company Structure, Workplace/Workforce Profile and Employment 
Relations 
 
• As the parent company, ICL Plastics has control over all six companies within the 
group, including ICL Tech.  ICL Plastics and ICL Tech were the two companies named 
in the criminal charges.  
 
• Scrutiny of the accounts registered at Companies House suggests that Campbell 
Downie, as the majority shareholder of the entire group and a Director of five of the six 
companies, was the dominant controlling figure for the whole group. 
 
• There is little doubt that the parent company (ICL Plastics) was cash rich as can 
be seen from the following table.  
 
 
Financial Year ended Cash holding 
30PthP November 2003 £897,511 
30PthP November 2004 £455,187 
30PthP November 2005 £749,950 
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• At the global policy and financial levels Campbell Downie appeared to exercise 
total control. At an operational level authority for the day-to-day running of the factory 
was delegated to the Managing Director, although even here Downie was heavily 
involved in operational matters.  The evidence from workers’ testimonies suggests that 
Downie attended the premises on a daily basis, walked through the workshops regularly 
and took most operational decisions.  Ultimately, the style and substance of decision 
making and the exercise of authority appears to have rested with the Downie family.  
 
• Workers report an authoritarian style of management from the top down and a 
long-standing and overt hostility to trade unionism.  The following quotes relate to 
reported attempts to establish a trade union in the plant.  
 
And the MD at the time, Frank Stott, said more or less that if it ever 
happened whoever was responsible would not be there for long.  Something 
along those lines…(W4) 
 
Anti-union. Stewart McColl was anti-everything. It was him.  He was the most 
important thing to him.  He was everybody.  He was the lawyer, jury and 
judge. He was the lot.  He told you what he done.  He made the verdict. (W4) 
 
• More broadly, employment relations were characterised by an absence of 
consultation with the workforce on either a formal or informal basis.  
 
 
• There were no procedures for raising pay levels nor for deciding who should 
receive bonuses and at what levels.  Workers complained of heavy-handedness, 
arbitrariness and favouritism by management in terms of pay determination.  
 
If you had the balls to ask for a pay rise you would go for it but you would 
know the answer anyway. It was irrelevant. I don’t think [the pay rise you 
received] was about the work you were doing. I think if they liked you and 
you didn’t cause any problems you got something. If you were a problem you 
got nothing. (W1) 
 
• Grovepark Mills was a four-storey building.  Beneath the ground floor was a 
basement which contained a large number of steel supports (ACRO props).  The 
ground floor and its annex contained many processes and much machinery, including 
the fabrication sections, coating shop, compressor room, shot blasters, electric and gas 
ovens, pallet and powder storage, gas tanks, heaters and despatch.  The first floor 
contained various store rooms, racks, pallets, lockers, tools, forklift trucks, CNC milling 
machines, ovens and a canteen.  The second floor contained the general offices of ICL 
and Stockline.  The third floor housed more storage areas containing inter alia paper 
records, exhibition stands and a boiler.  Above this floor was a flat roof. 
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• Fabrication consisted of batch production of variable volume.  Orders could be 
repeats or could consist of one-off products.  Consistent with these jobbing production 
methods production seemed to involve taking all the work that was offered, irrespective 
of whether the productive resources could cope with the demands.  Around a dozen 
employees worked in the main fabrication area with a couple more working in an 
outbuilding.  Plastic sheets would be cut to size or were pre-cut and then worked upon 
in various ways – sawed, placed in the oven for formatting or finishing, machined, 
cemented or welded together.  
 
• Six workers were employed in the coating department where incoming parts 
would be blasted with fine aluminium powder, de-greased using Genklene, coated and 
then cooked in gas ovens to harden.  
 
• Two workers were employed in despatch and the remainder of 50+ workforce 
were employed in various ancillary and managerial roles and in the offices.  
 
• Cost-minimisation was a central imperative linking production, market niche, 
managerial style, employment relations and labour utilisation.  Workers reported 
increasing pressure to improve productivity through intensified monitoring. 
 
• Symptomatic of the company’s preoccupation with minimising costs was the 
decision taken to reduce some workers’ holiday entitlement, triggered ironically by a 
mistaken interpretation of the European Working Time Directive at the time of its 
introduction in 1998, as this worker reported.  
 
See when the holiday thing came out – you must get a minimum of 20 days holiday a 
year – we were actually getting 28 days and they started cutting it to 20 days…They 
gave us this form to sign, and I refused to sign it. I said, ‘I don’t get 20 holidays a 
year, I get 28 days’, and I gave it back. So he then came up with a draft that was 
even worse’. (W2)  
 
 
Hazards in the Plastics Industry and at ICL/Stockline   
 
• The health hazards facing plastics workers, recognised for several decades, 
include skin, neurological and respiratory problems and these are documented in the full 
report.  In addition to diverse chemical hazards, plastic workers often face other dust 
hazards, noise and vibration hazards, hot and cold working conditions, manual handling 
and machinery hazards and poor welfare arrangements.  
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• By 1997 occupational health professionals had documented a wide range of 
chemical and physical hazards attached to materials, processes and machinery in the 
plastics industry, leading to recommendations that proper medical surveillance and 
workplace controls (including adequate ventilation and exhaust systems, regular air 
monitoring and properly fitted personal protective equipment - PPE) be put in place.  
From worker accounts and the evidence encapsulated in HSE correspondence and 
statutory notices, it is difficult to identify such effective measures in place in the plant.  
 
• The unavailability of records and data on what substances were used at ICL 
Stockline, on engineering controls and personal protective equipment, despite requests 
by the Research Team to the HSE, means that it is not possible for us to ascertain with 
certainty exactly what levels of exposure to what substances occurred at the plant.  
Nevertheless, as we document, worker accounts provide factual insight.  
 
• Many of the chemicals used at ICL Stockline presented potentially serious 
threats to human health, e.g. methylene chloride, dichloromethane, styrene, 
trichloroethylene.  Worker testimonies indicate that, in many different respects, such 
substances were not controlled at various times at all by engineering methods.  In 
several instances there were no extraction or proper local ventilation systems available.  
Workers report that initially they were provided with no protective equipment and then 
later only with masks or gloves but with no information, instruction, training or 
supervision regarding their appropriate use.  
 
• The Research Team did access a report by Glasgow Technical Services 
produced immediately after the disaster which listed the chemicals and materials they 
could identify on the site.  These include hazardous substances which could present a 
range of acute and chronic, short-term and long-term adverse effects to those exposed.  
 
• Most significantly, we have an extensive set of accounts by workers who list a 
wide range of symptoms they experienced when carrying out various production 
processes and when exposed to dusts and fumes in hot and poorly ventilated 
workrooms.  Workers even reported the presence of asbestos.  
 
• The risk mapping exercise enabled us to build up a physical and organisational 
picture of a workplace, processes and material to identify where hazards existed, what 
risks were attached to those hazards and the impact of those hazards on workers.  
 
• Workers identified risks throughout the building.  For example -  
 
You had dust and fumes from all the ovens – you had the wee sort of – this is going to 
sound silly – you know the clean room?  (laughs)  The Wendy House.  It was one of 
the most disgusting places in there, it was so filthy, but they called it the clean room.  
This is what they called it didn’t they?  It was the clean room.  Nobody ever used it, it 
was full of junk.  Paper and dust and all that. (W3) 
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Right next to my office there was a blaster for any parts that came in, they would get 
blasted off before they got dip-coated and when the blaster door was open the dust just 
went everywhere. There was no extraction for it. The only extraction was the main 
entrance where the goods would come in.  There wasn’t any fan or anything like that to 
extract the dust.  Me, personally, I felt as if it affected my respiratory system.  And there 
were other chemicals, I mean, when you went into fabrication you could taste it as 
soon as you walked in, you know, all this stuff was airborne. (W4) 
 
• The lack of effective extraction appeared to have been a particularly serious 
problem in the fabrication and coating sections and was related to the presence of dust 
(from plastics or MDF) and fumes (including those from solvents or cleaning agents).  
 
We used to come in and cut MDF. There was only one saw that had an extraction on it. 
(W2) That didn’t work properly. (W3) There were no windows in the place. There were 
two vents on the roof but x got them blocked up because they were letting too much 
heat out. (W2)  
 
When I look back on it now, the chemicals I was working on, the shot blasting, I was 
breathing in the actual blasting. When you blast stuff the shot turns to powder and you 
have to open the door to take the bit out that you have blasted. So you opened the door 
to the blaster and all this stuff came scooting out. There was supposed to be an 
extractor inside the thing but I don’t think it was working right. (W1) 
 
…the electro-static was just like a powder you did was you put your electrical charger 
on it and then you just spray powder and it’s attracted to the component and then it was 
drawn out, up into a ducting and round the ducting into a box outside. Obviously this 
was just a home-made box, basically a wooden box, and it must have been when the 
fan was on you got to a point when no more air could get in. So everything was coming 
out of the sides of the box and blowing back in through the roller shutter door into the 
factory. (W4) 
 
• Other related risk relate to potential exposure to hazardous chemicals and to 
fumes burnt off during the curing process from the ovens.  
 
My concern was that the chemicals were openly used. Some people would be using 
different chemicals at more or less every bench. And when some of the ovens were on 
with no extraction, that was another complaint. I felt my eyes with the heat and the 
fumes building up – it was almost unbearable. (W1) 
 
It was really horrendous. F. Didn’t bother about PTFE [flu] and he didn’t tell us when he 
was putting parts in the oven to cure them. It was only when we smelt the fumes and 
shouted, ‘F, have you put something in the curing?’ and he would go ‘Aye’. Wee I. 
would go like, ‘Get out of the road until it’s cured’. When the oven cools down it means 
that the fumes are going to stop. (W5) 
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• The ovens themselves were regarded by workers as hazards.  One had been 
fabricated from parts of a bin lorry but even this was regarded as less of a problem than 
the condition of another oven. 
 
I think they got one of these skips you’ll see at the back of supermarkets. If you have 
boxes you put them in, press a button and it squashes into it, you know that sort of 
thing. They converted it into an oven. [It was converted] in-house by Mr McC. They got 
gas people to bring gas ovens in. (W2) 
 
But that isn’t as sinister as it sounds…I would have been more concerned about the 
other oven. If somebody was to say to me about the ovens, the one that was home-
made and the bought one, I would have been a lot more concerned about the bought 
one, because it was from the dark ages. I don’t know how old it was. The door did not fit 
properly. You could put your hands round about the door. So this thing wasn’t sealed. 
The door rattled all over the place. And what they used to do was this door would lift up 
and then they would drag the parts out and spray it on the front trolley while the oven 
door was open and the flames were there. And what they used to do in the winter 
because there was no heating at all in there…was put the gas ovens on and have the 
doors open while they were working…in the coating shop it went from one extreme to 
the other – it was either so hot you couldn’t breathe, because of all of the different ovens 
(gas and electric) or it was absolutely freezing. (W4) 
 
• Workers described signs and symptoms consistent with exposure to some of the 
substances listed above and the known adverse effects.  The most commonly cited 
were effects on the respiratory system, but these were often experienced in combination 
with a range of other complaints/symptoms.   
 
Just trying to get a deep breath, trying to fill my lungs to capacity was pretty hard. My 
eyes got affected by I don’t know what it was, but when I started in there I found my 
eyes going yellow. I went to the eye clinic and I can only describe it as like my skin 
peeling from my eyeball. Like a film. I would try and take it away and I would put my 
finger in it or a cotton bud and it was just peeling off the eyeball. I would say [that I had 
been working there] about eight or nine months, something like that. I was pretty fit 
when I started there but I felt as if my health went downhill. (W4) 
 
Well, personally, I had tightness in my lungs. Then I started getting pneumonia-like 
illnesses and then I started getting pains in my lower back which would probably have 
been my liver or kidneys. My back is sore just now, my back is killing me…I had 
asthma, but since I’ve not been there I’ve recovered from that and use my inhaler very, 
very seldom. (W2) 
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The first time I got it [PTFE flu], it started at my ankles and crept up my legs. It’s a 
feeling that you are not well, that you are getting the flu…It comes up, up, up and then 
you feel stiff, you start to sweat and you start to get the shakes. And see when you get 
the shakes, you are going like that, you can’t stop yourself. Basically I was told it was 
because I smoked. It always me and I. that got the PTFE [flu]. And one day the two of 
us got it at the same time…It makes you feel you just want to go to your bed. And that’s 
what I done when I went home. It wears off after a couple of hours but the effect of it is 
horrendous. I. will tell you. If you ever speak to I. about it, I’m telling you, he’s caught it 
that many times. I’ve had it maybe three or four times but I’ve maybe had the symptoms 
of it and not realised I’ve got it. Some days I didn’t feel well. I think that probably what it 
was. I caught PTFE [flu] but not the full PTFE. And I felt quite a lot of times during the 
day. (W5) 
 
 
The Management of Health and Safety at ICL Stockline  
 
• Workers’ testimonies constitute a powerful indictment of the general approach to 
health and safety management taken by management at ICL Stockline.  They reveal the 
routine disregard of health and safety legislation and statutory regulations, including 
serious breaches of COSHH regulations.  There are many graphic examples of this 
negligence, of which the following complaint following exposure to chemicals is quite 
typical.  
 
But I was working with this stuff [gold paint supplied by Trimite] one day – I never had 
any gloves on – and all this paint was getting stuck to my fingers and up my nails and 
in my hair. I never thought of looking at the actual tin that [this fellow worker] was using 
and it was only when I seen a skull and crossbow on the tin that I thought, ‘There’s 
something wrong with the stuff we are using’. So I took a closer look and I complained 
to Bill Masterton that I was getting a tingling feeling in my hands. I complained for 
weeks and weeks. Bill’s like this, ‘Och, it’s just work, go and wash your hands every 
time you are finished using it. I said ‘But I’m still getting the tingling sensation’ [after I 
wash my hands]. So I read the actual thing on it and it says, ‘the downside effect of this 
paint is if it comes into contact with your skin is that you could get a tingling sensation, 
which is irreversible. Irreversible on the tin! I’m like that ‘I’ve got this and it’s 
irreversible’. So I pointed that out to Bill. I said, ‘Look at the back of that tin, you should 
have told me before I started even touching that paint that I had to have gloves on, or 
special gloves, and see the smell of this stuff’. (W5) 
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• Working with some of the machinery proved quite dangerous.   
 
…what happened was the machine was just so old it had cracked. So I was using a 
sword blade like that, it hit the table, the sword blade shattered and it went in there in 
my hand. So it caught an artery and it was skooshing blood all over the place...I ended 
up in the Western Coronary Care because my heart went into shock because I bled so 
much. (W2) 
 
• Presaging the now identified cause of the disaster, workers reported that they 
were aware of serious problems that had emerged with regard to the gas pipes.  
 
Somebody came in and condemned the gas pipes. For about a week or two we had no 
gas. The thing is we were led to believe it was the Health and Safety (Executive) 
because I know for a fact that somebody did complain because they were having odd 
job men [working on them]…one of the guys actually phoned the Health and Safety and 
pointed out that they had odd job men working on the gas pipes, shouldn’t it be 
somebody who is CORGI registered working on the gas pipes. I’m not 100% sure if they 
came in, if they contacted them or what they did, but there was talk they came in around 
that time as well. (W2) 
 
They built the oven themselves…And then they had to get people in for the gas burners 
and I think that’s what it was. I think it was them that noticed that something was wrong. 
They condemned. They actually cut the gas off. They said, under whatever regulations 
they work under, that they found dangerous pipes, so they were going to disconnect 
them. So they disconnected them and left. Then what happened was it was like the two 
handy men in the place, they were called out. They started working on them to sort the 
leaks. So it was like a spray they got and what they did was they would put the gas on 
and they went along the pipes spraying it all and identifying leaks. And then they would 
fix them. But the pipes were never replaced (W4) 
 
• Apparently belated attempts were made with regard to health and safety practice, 
but these did not lead to action over vapours gasses, dust, temperature extremes or the 
effects of chemical hazards.  In the words of one worker, they amounted to instructions 
such as, ‘Keep the place tidy! Get things up on the walls!’.  
 
I think that after all the problems he [McColl] was having with health and safety he was 
trying to ensure that was happening. Now he was trying to implement some things, but it 
was just cosmetic…He would put up signs saying “You must wear goggles”, “You must 
wear ear protection”, “You must wear gloves”, “You must wear visors”. But if you’ve not 
got them how can you wear them? If you walked in the place and you would see all this 
stuff – it was cosmetic (W2). 
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• Employers have legal responsibilities to ensure the provision and exchange of 
information and information and instructions that enable employees to be properly 
informed about risks and health hazards and to provide appropriate training.  For 
example, under the Health and Safety (Consultation of Employees) Regulations, in 
circumstances where there is no trade union recognition, employers must ensure that a 
system for consulting workers on health and safety is in place.  The regulations allow for 
the company to choose between a system of consultation through safety reps elected 
by the workforce or a system of direct consultation.  
 
• Given that there were no elected safety reps at ICL Stockline, it was incumbent 
on management to directly inform the workforce on information from the accident books 
and any assessments made under COSHH regulations.  Workers’ testimonies provide 
clear evidence that ICL Stockline’s organisation of H&S representation and consultation 
fell well short of legal compliance.  For example, contrary to the minimal legal 
requirement, management apparently failed to provide its workers with a prepared 
statement of general policy.  
 
There was absolutely nothing [in the way of formal consultation between employer and 
employees] no health and safety committee…If I remember right, there was a notice on 
the wall about Factory Acts or something, you know, but that was about it really. If the 
company had a policy regards safety or [specific hazards] in all the years I was there 
nobody ever said to me anything about it. (Interview Laurence Connolly Snr. 16 January 
2006) 
 
• The health and safety training, instruction, supervision and communication 
systems and practices appear to have been seriously deficient.  
 
• Contrary to the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations (1999) 
and the COSHH regulations, no risk assessment was undertaken by management 
during the years of employment according to the knowledge and recollection of the 
workers’ interviewed.  No workers were recalled ever having been involved in the 
specific process of risk assessment.  On at least one occasion employees put specific 
requests to management under the regulations.  
 
I asked for them [the documentation that the company was required to keep under 
COSHH regulations] because I was not well. I went up to them and said ‘Could I get 
copy of the COSHH assessments of these sheets’?  ‘What do you want them for’? ‘Well, 
it’s just to help my doctor in case one of these [chemicals] has gone to my lungs’. ‘I’ll 
have to see Peter’. ‘Right, no bother’. ‘Peter will get them organised for you’. He never 
did it so I badgered and badgered him. ‘Oh, these things take a couple of days to run off 
a copy’. That was over three years ago. 2001, probably around August/September. And 
he never gave me them. (W7)  
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• The key piece of legislation in relation to the use of protective equipment in the 
workplace is the Personal Protective Equipment at Work Regulations (1992). PPE 
should be appropriate for the task and for the substances to which it is applied. Yet, 
notwithstanding the obvious hazards, all the workers interviewed insisted that 
management for many years had neglected to provide important items of protective 
equipment.  Telling evidence comes from Laurence Connolly.  
 
If you worked on a timescale and me being there 13 years, once I started to complain 
then one or two things did start to creep in. Like you were given a mask [but this was 
after] about 10 years. But I might as well have been given a Halloween mask because I 
didn’t know what I was using and I didn’t know if the mask was any good for it. I think it 
did make a difference because I felt before I had the mask and I was using the 
chemicals, I used to go out sometimes feeling sickly, feeling light-headed, not feeling 
too well, and when I wore the mask I didn’t have these symptoms. You know, not as 
bad, as there were some days I did, but not as bad. It would depend on what chemicals 
you were using. So I did feel the mask did help but I don’t think it eliminated it because 
a lot of times you could be in there and I might be six feet away and have my back to 
people working with chemicals…you would have your mask on but I wouldn’t know what 
chemicals you were working with, so I would be only six feet away from these chemicals 
behind me, with no protection. (Interview Laurence Connolly Snr. 16 January 2006)  
 
• The equipment that was latterly provided often proved to be inadequate.  
 
Then they gave us gloves and they weren’t even chemical gloves. They used to melt, all 
the fingers used to fall off them. Put the gloves on and you would be working with 
whatever and then maybe you would be using the cement for the glue and the finger 
had been stuck to the part…So they just made life awkward. More hassle. They were 
just melting onto your hand. (W2) 
 
• Perhaps the most telling observation regarding the lack of protective equipment 
is provided by one of the workers interviewed. 
 
I don’t know how much of the footage that you saw of the actual day the blast 
happened. If you ever get a chance to see any of that you look and see how many 
people came out there with safety equipment. A fireman commented, ‘Did everybody 
say “Oh there’s a blast, wait until I take all this safety gear off before I run out”’. Nobody 
came out with anything on, absolutely nobody. When a building blows up you don’t have 
time to go and change. You will see, I think, x and y had a pair of cotton overalls. (W4) 
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Regulation – Health and Safety Executive  
 
• The HSE failed to recognise the nature of industrial relations at the plant and the 
potential problems that employees might face if management discovered that 
they had approached HSE with complaints about health and safety.  This failure 
is summed up by the readiness with which HSE inspectors revealed the identity 
of a worker in full view of the very same managers he had complained about.  
This episode revealed at best a staggering naivety on the part of HSE and, at 
worst, collusion with management that risked compromising workers’ 
employment status. 
 
• HSE failed to recognise the importance of keeping lines of communication open 
with workers as well as with management.  Laurence Connolly’s testimony 
demonstrates HSE’s failure to have communicated with workers either before or 
after regulatory contacts with ICL/Stockline.  This failure meant that workers were 
denied important information gathered by HSE relating to their employers’ 
compliance with the law and relating to the risks to which they were being 
exposed.  HSE’s abject failure in this respect therefore disempowered workers in 
their efforts to improve health and safety conditions at the plant. 
 
• HSE inspections seemed, according to this testimony, unable to comprehend the 
complexity and gravity of the hazards that workers were exposed to in the plant.  
Thus, it appears that key features of the risks that workers were exposed to (air 
quality and the integrity of purpose built equipment in the plant) were barely 
investigated.  The need for a more comprehensive approach to the ongoing 
inspection of safety critical features of safety management and the management 
of hazards is supported by the evidence provided by workers in this report.  Only 
comprehensive testing of known process hazards and full communication with 
workers would have improved HSE’s ability to identify the key problems at the 
plant. 
 
• The ability to identify health and safety problems during HSE ‘walk-through’ 
inspections would certainly have been limited by the advance warning that pre-
ceded visits and afforded management the opportunity to carry out a quick health 
and safety make over.  
 
• All those features of HSE’s approach to regulating safety at ICL/Stockline stem 
from the ‘compliance’ regulatory philosophy adopted by HSE outlined in the 
introduction to section 6 below in which the trust and co-operation of 
managements is the primary aim of the regulatory process.  This brief exploration 
of the regulatory issues relating to ICL/Stockline reveals the fundamental 
contradiction that exist in system of regulation that is heavily biased towards the 
protection of managements’ right to manage, even where this involves a serious 
compromise of workers’ safety and health.   
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Building controls 
 
• The question remains as to why such a factory - which was clearly demonstrating 
symptoms of structural stress under increasing live loading conditions - was 
allowed to accommodate a variety of hazardous processes with a high explosion 
risk?  
 
• The anecdotal evidence from the workforce points to the management adopting a 
"running repairs" strategy to floor joist deflections and cracking brickwork, rather 
than undertaking a detailed structural assessment of the buildings capability to 
support live loads from material storage.  The reports that the ground floor had 
been "held up" with temporary ACRO props (scaffolding poles) for many years, 
provides further proof of this somewhat haphazard approach to structural safety’. 
 
• Where there is a risk of explosion a framed structure is now required to ensure 
that in the event of such, the removal or displacement of an external brickwork 
panel will not result in similar progressive structural collapse. 
 
• If relatively major structural works have in the recent past been carried out to the 
factory, why is there no evidence of a Building Warrant? 
 
• Did the management carry out any risk assessments as to whether the building 
structure could support the additional loadings from palletised materials and new 
processes? 
 
• Why were the repairs to the areas of the building that were clearly showing 
structural stress (floor deflections) of a makeshift nature? 
 
• Given that these structural problems were evident to many of the workforce why 
did the management not engage a structural engineer to undertake a use and 
condition survey? 
 
• Why was a factory, which was clearly demonstrating symptoms of structural 
stress, allowed to accommodate a variety of hazardous processes with a high 
risk of explosion? 
 
• Who was primarily responsible for ensuring that the structural integrity of the 
factory was regularly assessed and what statutory/executive agency is 
responsible for ensuring such inspections occur? 
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• Dr Stirling Howieson reported, ‘After further investigations it appears that in 1993 
an application for a Building Warrant (no. 1993.1310) was submitted to cover 
"storm damage" to the ICL factory. It does not appear that any warrant was 
however either issued or discharged (normally signifying completion of the works 
to the agreed standard).  There is reportedly a file note saying that storm repairs 
do not require a warrant.  I have requested that Building Control confirm that this 
is the case, in writing.  No drawings can be found either at Building Control or at 
the Mitchell Library’.  Building Control have no records of any warrant 
applications and thus any significant alterations to the factory (slappings for fork 
lifts etc) undertaken over the last 25 years, as reported by the workers would 
have been "illegal".  If this work had been done properly and professionals 
employed to undertake calculations it would have increased the likelihood of an 
Architect or Structural Engineer being allowed the opportunity to view the building 
and identify any shortcomings in the structural integrity re: the imposed loadings/ 
beam deflections and 'Akro' props in the basement.  Any alterations appear to 
have been done without any specialist engineering input that would have 
calculated the loads on the new steel/concrete RSJs/lintels. 
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A Worker’s Experiences of the Regulation of Safety at 
ICL/Stockline 
 
In this extended interview a worker, Laurence Connolly Snr., recounts in full his 
involvement with the HSE, beginning with the initial contact he made with the body 
when he raised concerns regarding the health and safety practices at ICL and workers’ 
exposure to hazardous substances.  It is important to emphasise that this is not the 
testimony of an embittered malcontent.  Laurence was a committed and skilled worker 
who had served ICL Stockline for approximately 15 years, leaving the company’s 
employment only three weeks before the disaster.  
 
While in other sections of the report it has been necessary to preserve the anonymity of 
respondents, Laurence made clear his willingness to be identified.  The interview is 
reproduced as a verbatim transcription except where indicated where minor 
amendments have been made in the interests of clarity and in order to facilitate the flow 
of the testimony.  
 
‘Well, they (the HSE) had been in before I got in contact with them.  I didn’t know 
why they were in, we never ever got told why these people were in, they were 
just people, get the place cleaned up, people coming in we were told.  It wasn’t 
till after that we knew who they actually were.  I couldn’t remember the exact 
dates [I first made contact] but for me it was when Laurence [his son and fellow 
worker] started taking not well and it seemed to be every time he came back to 
work, the work made a couple of errors or something and he would be back off 
sick again and things like that.  That was when I started looking into it, you know, 
the environment, the chemicals and the different stuff’. 
 
‘I found out through my contact with the MP, Anne McKechin, that the HSE had 
actually been in prior to me complaining and they had actually set some sort of 
notice on them, an improvement notice.  None of us knew anything about that, 
that was all sort of news to us.  But that had been a couple of years prior to me 
contacting them.  I think it was 2003 [June 2003].  It was actually through her I 
got the letters and the dates and stuff, it was actually her that passed them on to 
me.  [The improvement notice was] to do with chemicals at first.  It was 
something to do with chemicals, something to do with the COSHH regulations.  I 
don’t know exactly why or what they had to improve on or whatever.  It was 2003 
when I got them involved, that’s what it was, and it was like a couple of years 
before that, round about 2000/1, now when I think about it [the HSE’s earlier 
involvement].’ 
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‘I didn’t even know, as I was saying to you, that Health & Safety were coming in 
or anybody was coming in, it was like the day before we were told “clean up, get 
the place tidy, put things away, hide things away out of the road” for somebody 
coming in.  But they didn’t always tell us who it was, it wasn’t maybe till likes of 
the people had been in, done their visit – as far as we were concerned it might 
just have been a new customer and he was wanting to have a look round the 
building just to see what it was like and see what we did.  But then it would 
maybe be the day after that we would find out that was the Health & Safety were 
in, that was the Insurance people that was in, that was a customer that was in.  It 
would only be after the people visited that we would actually find out who they 
were.  We would never find out before who they were.’ 
 
Laurence’s contact with HSE began in 2002 due to concerns about the health of his 
son, a fellow worker at ICL/Stockline. 
 
‘I decided to get the HSE involved because of my son’s ill-health.  That was the 
start of it.  My son took not well and he took pneumonia and then he came back 
to work and then took it again and just had constant ill-health.  I asked in the 
work, you know, about the stuff they were using and different things because, for 
me, there seemed to be a link.  Every time he came back from work he took not 
well again.  I couldn’t find out anything in the work so I started looking on the 
Internet and I started finding out some bits and pieces myself.  And then when I 
started reading it, it became very frightening because a lot of the problems that 
Laurence has had and still having, you could actually read through these data 
sheets on all these chemicals and it’s telling you some of the effects that they 
can have on you.  At the same time, they are telling you that you should be 
wearing certain types of masks, certain types of gloves, impervious overalls, all 
these sort of things.  We never got anything like that.  The way it worked in the 
coating shop you got a pair of overalls and a pair of boots.  This was just a plain 
pair of cotton overalls.  We didn’t get any protective clothing whatsoever.  I mean, 
if I went to work I used to go to ASDA and buy three quid denims because they 
were ruined after a couple of weeks.  A pair of steel toe-capped boots. Then 
gloves appeared, sort of latex gloves, but when you went near any of the 
chemicals the fingers used to fall off.  They used to actually dissolve so they 
were actually more a hindrance than anything else.  They were more problems 
than not having them’.  
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‘To start with I phoned them up hoping to get some advice but I never really got 
any.  This was somewhere around the middle of 2002.  I don’t know how many 
times I actually did phone them.  I mean, Laurence (my son) was phoning them 
as well.  So between the two of us there might have been a dozen, two dozen 
phone calls.  I don’t know.  We just wouldn’t let go, we just wouldn’t leave it and 
eventually we did, in my opinion, shame them into coming in.  It wasn’t a case of 
me phoning up and saying “I find a problem” and them saying “We’ll have a look 
at this and see what we can do for you”.  This went on for months. I had to keep 
contacting them and then there was that day, all of a sudden there was “Get this 
fumes cabinet built” and I got stuck in it.  Then [in June 2003] two Inspectors 
walked in that day and that was how I found out the Health & Safety had come 
in’.  
 
Not only did Laurence have no warning of the HSE visit that had been prompted by his 
contacts, but, without his permission, he was revealed as a whistleblower by the HSE 
inspector during the visit. 
 
‘One of them asked me my name and I told them.  I was in the cabinet at the time 
and the Inspector said to me, “You’re the one who phoned, I’m x and gave me 
their card and said to me that if there’s any more problems in future just to give 
them a ring.  The MD and sort of acting manager (Stewart McColl and Ian 
Mavers) were there at the time. I was gobsmacked that I had been identified.  I 
had absolutely nothing to say at that point in time.  I was just shocked’.  
 
From the outset, HSE had tried to persuade Laurence not to remain anonymous and to 
allow them to give his name to management.  After some pressure, and because of the 
seriousness of the health problems he was experiencing, Laurence’s son decided to 
allow HSE to use his name.   
 
‘The thing was confidentiality was one of the problems I had trying to get them to 
come in.  They said it would be a lot easier for them if they had a name that they 
could give to the company.  And what actually happened was, because of 
Laurence’s ill health, he decided that the only way he was going to find out 
anything was to give his name.  He actually gave them permission to use his 
name.  It’s in one of the letters.  They [management] decided, in their wisdom, 
that that was me. Stewart McColl just smirked.  He had a wee sort of grin.  He 
never said anything, which I’m quite sure he wouldn’t have done in front of them.  
Mavers - it didn’t seem to really make any difference to him’. 
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The assumption that the complaint was made by Laurence caused unanticipated 
tensions in his relationship with management. 
 
‘McColl’s general attitude towards me totally changed, you know, from 13 years 
of never once getting warned about my work, never once questioned about 
anything that I had done, more often than not the only question I would be asked 
was “I wonder if you could help us, do you know about this, do you know about 
that”?  Then all of a sudden it changed and it was a case of anything they could 
find wrong, you know, they sort of started nit-picking and it could be the silliest of 
wee things.  You would get a sheet of material through and it would have a chip, 
and this was coming from Stockline, nothing to do with me, but I would get the 
blame because it was chipped.  And I’m saying “Wait a minute, I’ve not done 
anything to that yet”.  “You must have cut it” and I’m saying “It’s a sheet of 
material, I haven’t touched it”’. 
 
‘It was just silly things.  I ended up arguing one day with Nicky Downie [who] 
ended up as a sort of manager, perhaps Workshop Manager or some title like 
that.  He decided that he was going to have a go at me about my work and I just 
wasn’t for that.  I mean, I had worked in there for 13 years and I had worked in 
other places as well.  20 years experience.  If I had done something wrong and 
somebody was saying like “You made a mistake there, you did this, you did that” 
then fair enough, I’ll stand and I’ll take the medicine.  But I had done nothing 
wrong and I wasn’t having it’.  
 
‘I think other people expected this to happen.  People knew what Stewart McColl 
was like and I think they just expected it.  It was total nit-picking. I couldn’t get my 
holidays when I wanted, it didn’t matter when it was, it was always clashed with 
somebody else or something.  They put a chart up on the wall, so I checked the 
chart, nobody is off, I’ll take that, then he is going to change the chart because I 
put in for my holidays, he is going to change the groupings.  Things like that’.    
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‘A couple of things occurred [that led to the HSE becoming involved]. One winter 
the heating was terrible, really, really bad, and one day I got dragged up to the 
office for some reason, and Stewart McColl, MD, decided to have a go at me 
about health & safety in the place.  And he said to me “Tell your pals down the 
stair that they don’t need to worry about how cold or how warm it is in there, it’s 
within the regulations”.  I didn’t understand what he meant.  So I goes down the 
stair and I was talking to one of the guys and I was saying to him “He just had a 
go at me about the heating in the place” and he went “Oh, that’s probably my 
fault”.  I said “What do you mean?”  He said “I phoned the Health & Safety about 
the temperatures in here and told them the place was freezing”.  So, going on the 
assumption of that, the Health & Safety phoned him and told him that one of his 
workers had complained and that was why he had a go at me.  There were one 
or two coincidences.  I mean, as I was saying to you about the fumes cabinet 
thing, I was there 13 years and never did they ever attempt to give us any sort of 
fumes cabinet to do any of the gluing or cementing.  Then all of a sudden it 
became number one priority for the two builders to get this thing built.  So, within 
an hour of me getting put in the place, two people came in from the Health & 
Safety and asked me personally “Was this better for me?”.  So, you know, I 
mean, it’s strange how these things happen, likes 13 years of getting nothing and 
then all of a sudden you get this fumes cabinet’.  
 
 
Laurence reported a lack of consultation between HSE and workers at the plant. 
 
‘There was no communication. The only way I found out about the visits was 
when I actually started speaking to Anne McKechin and she started sending 
letters to them and she was getting responses from them. They would never call 
a meeting with the workforce and say ‘We had a visit from the HSE four months 
ago, and they’ve asked us to do x, y and z, and we have done this now’.  They 
would never do anything like that.  They would never consult the workers 
regarding any working practice or anything.  There was no consultation with the 
workers regards health & safety, working practice or anything.  Nothing.  The 
only time they consulted the workforce was if they got a new job and they didn’t 
know how to do it and they would try and nip your brains about how to do the job.  
That’s the only time.  That’s the only way they would consult the workforce’.  
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The lack of consultation with HSE inspectors was of particular importance, due to the 
lack of communication by management of the outcomes of HSE visits. 
 
‘But we never received any communications from the company or the HSE 
before or after their visits. I tried after the visit of the Health & Safety, and even 
after I left the place to get information. I mean, I still kept, up to within maybe a 
week of the disaster, I was still phoning the Health & Safety trying to get them to 
tell me if it was safe for me, if these chemicals were doing me any harm.  And not 
once did that ever get anybody from the Health & Safety to respond and tell me if 
the chemicals. Even after I left the place I still, you know, I tried to contact 
[named HSE Inspector] and I tried maybe within the three weeks of my leaving, 
up to the disaster, maybe three or four times I phoned the Health & Safety in that 
period and [this Inspector] was either at meetings or she was out or she was this 
or that and she never ever returned my calls’. 
 
The only time that he did experience the HSE approaching him at ICL/Stockline was 
when they revealed his identity to management and asked about the complaint he had 
made. 
 
‘The only thing the HSE Inspectors asked me when they visited was, “Was it 
better for me?” when that fumes cabinet was built.  That was all they asked me. I 
don’t know if they were speaking to anybody else. To my knowledge they 
didn’t speak to anybody else and they didn’t call a meeting of the workforce. I 
don’t know what the HSE inspectors asked management on their visits. I don’t 
know if they asked about consultation between management and the workforce. I 
don’t know if they asked the company because the company wouldn’t tell us. And 
subsequent to that, in the correspondence between Anne and HSE, there’s no 
mention of that.  As far back as 2000/01, which is referred to, although they are 
not on inspection reports, there’s nothing about any form of consultation’.  
 
Apart from this meeting, the only contact Laurence had with HSE was following a 
request he made under the Freedom of Information Act.   
 
‘The only time that they have actually tried to speak to me was after I put a letter 
in asking for details under the Freedom of Information Act. Then they did send 
me a letter saying that because all the information had been sent to the police, 
they did not have any to give me.  Two weeks after that my son told me “Look, 
I’ve just had a letter from my lawyer” and in it there were all the details about me 
and the visit they had made.  Bits had been blanked out, so it was very hard to 
read but it did have my name on it and other names.  So I actually phoned 
Stewart Campbell’s office in Edinburgh and tried to speak to him because I 
wasn’t happy about this.  On the front of the letter they stated that the Data 
Protection Act was the reason why they blanked out people’s names but they 
had sent my details with my name to somebody else.  Although it might be my 
son’s lawyer it was definitely about me.  And the Health & Safety, in their letters, 
they did refer to me as Senior and him as Junior’.  
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‘So I contacted Stewart Campbell’s office and he was away on holiday at the 
time.  So then I tried to contact Stewart North at the HSE in Glasgow.  Within 
about half an hour of me phoning my mobile phone rang and it was Stewart 
North.  He said “I hear you have been trying to contact me”.  I said “Oh it’s not 
before time, I’ve been trying to contact you for months now”.  And he went “We 
have been trying to get a hold of you and we couldn’t get you”.  I said “Well, how 
long did you try today, how many phone calls did you make today to try and get 
me?”.  He went “One”.  I said “Funny how half an hour ago I phoned Stewart 
Campbell’s office and within half an hour of me phoning you phone me.”  He said 
“Oh it’s about your complaint.  All we were trying to do was do you a wee favour”.  
I said “But a couple of weeks ago you sent me a letter telling me you didn’t have 
any information.”  “No, we don’t have”.  I said “How can you send that out”.  “I’ll 
have to look into this and I will get back to you but I would like to apologise”.  But 
he never ever did get back to me.  Somebody in there had made a mess of it and 
they were just trying to sort of see what I was going to do about it.  That was it.  
That’s the only time I’ve ever got any response out of them, when I phoned 
Edinburgh.  Any time I phoned the Glasgow Office they weren’t in, couldn’t talk, 
they don’t know.  That was all you ever got’.  
 
[As a result of the HSE’s involvement] if there were any changes they were very 
minor, if anything, you know.  Stewart McColl was, I would say, in the last sort of 
few years, it’s not that he was safety-conscious, he was a great one for putting 
up signs for safety first, you know, wear gloves, wear this, wear that, wear the 
next thing.  I would say it was more like a cosmetic thing, you know.  There were 
lots of signs all over the place and for somebody walking in, whether it be a 
customer or whoever, then they would see all these safety signs or whatever. 
When he took over as the MD of – see he used to just be in charge of Stockline – 
but then he took over as ICL and that gave him sort of control of the whole place, 
the day to day running of it.  Then he started to make things look better, if you 
know what I mean, a wee bit tidier and a bit cleaner’.  
 
‘I would say even in the coating shop, a lot was cosmetic as well.  I mean, the 
practices didn’t change, you know.  Before Stewart McColl took over they were 
doing the same jobs as when he was there.  You know, there wasn’t a change in 
the working practice, if you know what I mean.  It might have looked different. 
The thing was if you walked through the coating shop and there could be a 
canister there, and all the different things that could go wrong, that paint or 
whatever it was could be lying there, lying opened with whatever solvents lying 
about it.  But then if there was an Irn Bru bottle then he would go absolutely 
bananas.  It was things like that.  Chemicals could lie all over the place and that 
wasn’t a problem.  But if you had a bottle of water or a bottle of Irn Bru on your 
bench then that was a major health and safety issue’.  
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‘After the HSE visits things they did put in some storage cupboards, but they 
were never locked or anything – you could do whatever you wanted with it.  I 
could take a 5 gallon drum [of x] out of the cupboard, and I could leave that lying 
on my bench.  If there was a bottle of Irn Bru beside it he would come down and 
go bananas about the bottle of Irn Bru “Get that in the bin”. This didn’t change 
after the HSE visits’.  
 
Laurence’s recollection was that the ‘walk throughs’ made by HSE Inspectors on their 
visits were brief and lacked thoroughness.  
 
‘How do you look at something individually?  Do you actually stop and have a 
proper look?  You might have a glance and look at something on the way past.  
How many of the HSE inspectors knew that one of the ovens used to be a bin 
lorry?  They must have walked past that.  If they knew that was a bin lorry, I’m 
quite sure they would have said “Wait a minute, that’s a bin lorry”.  They might 
have done something.  Did these people actually know what they were looking 
for? The last time I saw the Health & Safety come in, it was in a wee room and 
that’s the only place I saw them.  If they were outside and they had a look at 
machinery I wouldn’t see them doing that because of the layout of the building.  It 
was like, if they were beside you, you could see what they were doing, but then 
they would move on to another part of the building, or they might not have gone 
into another part of the building, you wouldn’t know, just because of the layout of 
the building.  You would only see them where you were working. They were in 
our department for two minutes, that was all, absolutely minutes.  They weren’t 
there for any length of time’. 
 
‘To my knowledge the HSE never did an investigation of air quality. But that was 
one of the things I had asked them.  When I spoke to the Health & Safety, when I 
started to read up on a lot of these chemicals, a lot of them will tell you about [the 
importance of] the point of extraction, you know, or general extraction.  Well, we 
didn’t have any extraction in there whatsoever.  So I asked the Health & Safety 
about this.  So they knew prior to coming in. To my knowledge they never 
attached or used a meter or monitored the air quality’. .  
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In the 10 month period between June 2003, when this HSE inspection took place and 
April 2004, when LC left ICL’s employment, Laurence was not contacted by the HSE. 
There were, to the best of his knowledge, no further visits made by the HSE to the 
factory and no obvious attempt to ensure the effectiveness of the fumes cabinet.  
 
‘I still wasn’t happy and I contacted Anne [McKechin] who was still in the process 
of trying to get some details or answers or whatever out of them.  She was just 
getting letters that weren’t really telling them anything at all. In that period I 
contacted the HSE a couple of times and said that I wasn’t happy.  I said “Why 
won’t anybody tell me was it safe, was it not safe or whatever?”  I had asked 
them a few different things but they never ever contacted me.  I can’t remember 
them ever sending me any letters or anything or explanations. I wanted to know 
about the chemicals, which had been the whole idea of me contacting them to 
start with. I think one time somebody said to me that the proper things were in 
place or something along these lines.  Well, I pointed out that I had read all the 
data sheets which called for at the point of extraction and impervious gloves and 
other different things.  I said “There is no way that any of that was in use the day 
that you came in so how can you say that the proper practices are in place?”  But 
I never got a response to that. Between when I left in April [2004] and May, when 
the disaster happened, I contacted Health & Safety because I was just livid with 
them and I wanted answers.  I contacted them and – nothing’.  
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An Independent Report on the ICL Plastics Plant in Maryhill 
Glasgow  
 
 
Introduction 
 
On 11 May 2004, nine workers were killed and more than thirty-three injured in an 
explosion at the ICL Plastics plant of Grovepark Mills in Maryhill Glasgow.  This was the 
worst health and safety incident in Scotland since Piper Alpha in 1988 when 167 lives 
were lost and the worst on the mainland (in Scotland) since the 1960s.  A poignant 
insight into the human cost of the disaster is provided by the document which lays 
charges against ICL Tech Limited and ICL Plastics (31 January 2007) and which details 
the terrible roll call of casualties as follows:  
 
‘…Peter Ferguson, Thomas McAulay and Stewart McColl received injuries from 
which they died, James Aitken was severely injured to his permanent 
disfigurement, Alan Byrne was severely injured to his permanent disfigurement, 
William Aitkenhead was injured, Gordon Bell was severely injured to his 
permanent disfigurement, Alan Byrne was severely injured to his permanent 
disfigurement, Nicholas Downie was severely injured to his permanent 
impairment, permanent disfigurement and to the danger of his life, Alan 
Donaldson was injured, Monica Flynn was severely injured to her permanent 
impairment, Daniel Fraser was injured, William Gifford was severely injured, 
Daniel Gilmour was severely injured to his permanent disfigurement, David 
Hamilton was severely injured, Martin Hamilton was severely injured to his 
permanent impairment and permanent disfigurement.  Derek King was injured, 
Archibald Lindsay was severely injured to his permanent impairment, Christopher 
McGinlay was injured, James McGoldrick was severely injured to his permanent 
impairment, Ian Mavers was injured, William Masterton was severely injured to 
his permanent impairment and to the danger of his life, Tammy Nelson was 
severely injured to her permanent disfigurement, Charles Roberston was injured 
and Mathew Wylie was injured, and all were exposed to the risk of death and 
David Andrews, William Chapman, Robert McMillan and Anthony Northcote were 
exposed to risk of injury and death, all said persons being employees of ICL 
Tech Limited (Section 1, iv)’ and  
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‘…Margaret Brownlie, Annette Doyle, Tracey McErlane, Timothy Smith, Ann 
Trench and Kenneth Murray received injuries from which they died, Linda Kinnon 
was severely injured to her permanent impairment, permanent disfigurement, 
Nicole Eaglesham was severely injured to her permanent impairment, permanent 
disfigurement and to the danger of her life, Stacey Eaglesham was injured, 
Charlene Howarth was severely injured to her permanent impairment, Sheena 
McColl (now O’Brien) was severely injured to her permanent impairment and to 
the danger of her life, Claire McShane was severely injured to her permanent 
impairment and permanent disfigurement, John Turner was severely injured to 
his permanent impairment and to the danger of his life and Elizabeth Logie was 
severely injured to her permanent disfigurement, and all were exposed to risk of 
death and Joyce Russell, James Anderson, James Baxter, Patrick Feggans, 
David Forde, Linda Johnston, Jason Stewart and Robert Warren were exposed 
to risk of injury and death (Section 2, iv).  
 
The gravity of the disaster led soon afterwards to the announcement that an 
investigation would be jointly conducted into its causes by the Health and Safety 
Executive, the Procurator Fiscal and Strathclyde Police.  However, at this stage calls for 
a Public Inquiry into the disaster were rejected.  
 
It was against this background that a group of academics and experts with specialist 
knowledge in the fields of occupational health and safety, finance, employment rights, 
architecture, corporate accountability, industrial relations and human resource 
management, took the decision to conduct independent research into the circumstances 
surrounding the disaster.  The intention was not to duplicate or mirror the official 
investigation but to examine issues and raise questions that might be neglected or 
under-explored by that study.  What was the fuller rationale for this independent 
research? 
 
• To understand as fully as possible the circumstances and contexts in which 
the disaster occurred.  These include the company and its regulation, its 
structure and financing, its work practices, its management style and 
employment relations, the built environment and crucially its health and safety 
policies and practices.  
• To ensure that the experiences of those workers and ex-workers who wanted 
their voices to be heard were fully documented.  Historically, when workers 
have been the victims of catastrophic injuries and illnesses, their voices have 
been ignored or marginalised.  This neglect is more than a matter of 
peripheral concern since the failure to account for workers’ experiences cuts 
out a vital source of knowledge that can prevent future disasters.  Further, the 
silencing of workers has all too often led to a lack of, or limited justice – legal, 
social and economic.  
• To build up a picture of what working life was inside the factory. 
• To consider the role played by inspection, regulation and enforcement by 
agencies that directly and indirectly determine the policies and practices of 
companies such as ICL Stockline.  
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The following report is the outcome of research undertaken from 2004 to 2006.  Whilst 
the findings presented here are derived from various methods and approaches, the core 
of the evidence and analysis is drawn from ex-workers’ testimonies and experiences.  
 
The report is structured as follows.  
 
Section 1 sets the context for the study, outlining health and safety failures in Scotland 
in the two decades since Piper Alpha.  
 
Section 2 details the research methods which underpin the report, principally 
participatory action research including risk-mapping and body-mapping.  These were 
accompanied by semi-structured and exploratory interviews.  These worker-centred 
approaches were supplemented by archive research, scrutiny of official documents, an 
examination of company accounts and research into building controls and the role of 
regulatory agencies generally. 
 
Section 3 profiles the company structure and finance before sketching an outline of the 
workplace and providing some insight into the nature of work and labour processes and 
employment relations.  
 
Section 4 is concerned with the hazards associated with the plastics industry in general 
those that workers were exposed to at the Maryhill factory in particular.  
 
Section 5 explores the management of health and safety at ICL Stockline, drawing 
substantially upon the transcribed evidence of workers’ experiences.  
 
Section 6 considers the role of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) - its 
responsibilities, its policies and its known actions in respect of ICL Stockline.  There 
follows the direct testimony of a worker’s experiences of informing the HSE of his 
concerns with health and safety practices at ICL Stockline and the subsequent 
responses of that agency.  
 
Section 7 discusses other regulatory bodies and issues, including building control and 
ICL Stockline’s practices in relation to these.  
 
Section 8 provides conclusions and suggests recommendations.  
 
In the interests of locating ICL Stockline in the context of Scottish health and safety 
failures and of demonstrating the research team’s rigorous methods of study it has been 
necessary to begin the report with two rather lengthy but important introductory 
chapters.  Should the reader wish to proceed directly to the data on ICL Stockline then 
they may wish to commence at Section 3. 
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TSection 1 Overall Context – Health and Safety Failure in 
Scotland Since Piper AlphaT 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Health and safety issues only rarely capture the attention of the media.  When they do, 
it is usually because of a tragic incident and then typically only for a short time until 
more ‘important’ news takes precedence.  Yet, despite the lack of reliable global 
estimates, there is every indication that the extent of work-related deaths, injuries and 
illnesses is staggering.  The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimate that each 
day 6,000 work deaths occur globally and over 2 million such deaths a year 
(www.hazards.org/wmd).  For the UK, the Health and Safety Executive’s (HSE) figures, 
an underestimate, reported for the year 2004/05 a total of 593 work-related fatalities 
which included 172 employees, 51 self-employed and 370 members of public (Health 
and Safety Executive, 2007a).  These figures do not include the much larger number of 
occupationally-caused and occupationally-related deaths. 
 
These global and domestic figures raise the question as to why so little importance is 
attached to this serious social problem of industrial injury and illness.  For a long time 
critical researchers (Carson, 1985) have pointed to legislative and regulatory weakness 
and the imbalance in the relationships between employers and employees as root 
causes.  Where workers are unable to exercise their rights and are not collectively 
empowered through trade unions the health and safety deficit is evident.  Evidence 
suggests that twentieth and twenty-first century regulatory approaches to health and 
safety in the UK have added to this deficit, because of an implicit bias against the 
criminalisation of employers who commit safety offences (Beck and Woolfson, 2000). 
 
Part of the problem are the concepts and language used.  Terms such as ‘human error’, 
‘normal accidents’ or ‘systems failure’ suggest that industrial accidents are either as 
normal and unavoidable occurrences, or attributable to the actions of individual workers.  
While some of these approaches may have a limited role to play in pinpointing certain 
causes of accidents, there is a real danger they mask the broader realities of employer-
driven cost-reduction, corner-cutting, lack of worker representation and consultation and 
regulatory failures which are all too often the real contributory causes of injury and 
illness at work. 
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1.2 The Scottish Situation 
 
In the last three decades Scotland has experienced a number of major industrial 
disasters, including the Piper Alpha platform explosion which resulted in 167 tragic and 
avoidable deaths during the night of July 6PthP 1988.  However, Scotland’s status as a 
health and safety black spot is not related to the occurrence of major industrial disasters 
alone.  Over many years, the HSE has recorded significantly higher rates of rates of 
fatal and major injuries for Scotland as compared to the UK as a whole.  Importantly, 
these higher rates are not the product of Scotland’s offshore oil industry, which is not 
included in the HSE’s comparative statistical reports (Health and Safety Commission, 
2006: http://www.tuc.org.uk/h).  Overall the Health and Safety Commission’s annual 
reports suggest that across all industries Scottish employees have experienced on 
average 57.5% higher rates of fatal injuries than the rest of the UK during the reporting 
periods from 1996/97 to 2005/06; with rates ranging for most years from 40% to more 
than 100%.  These figures are closely mirrored by the HSE/HSC’s reported rates on 
serious injuries.  It is important to note that the true picture for major injury rates 
probably greatly exceeds reported rates due to the greater propensity for under-
reporting of injuries in Scottish workplaces (Health and Safety Executive, 2007b).  
Although research has shown that even the HSE/HSC’s fatality figures significantly 
underestimate the true incidence of workplace fatalities (Tombs, 1999), there is no 
reason to assume that fatality underreporting significantly distorts the relative position of 
Scottish as compared to British fatality rates.   
 
Figure 1.1 depicts fatality rates per 100,000 employees for Scotland and Great Britain 
for the period from 1996/97 to 2005/06 for all industries derived from the HSC’s 2006 
report.  The focus is on employees which means that injuries to the public and the self-
employed are excluded.   
 
 
Figure 1.1 All industry fatality rates per 100,000 employees for Scotland and Great 
Britain 
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Figure 1.1 shows that, with the exception of the 2003/04 reporting year, Scottish rates 
for fatal injuries have exceeded those for Great Britain as a whole.  Accordingly, the 
greatest discrepancy in fatality rates occurred in the next to most recent year of 2004/05 
when the Scottish employee fatality rate reached 1.4 per 100,000 employees (with 33 
fatalities) which was more than double the 0.6 rate for Great Britain as a whole (with 
165 fatalities).  Overall there is clear evidence that, in terms of fatality rates, Scottish 
workers are at greater risk than those in Great Britain as a whole. 
 
 
1.3 The Politics of the Scottish Anomaly 
 
Today the legislative responsibility for health and safety is reserved to Westminster with 
related areas, such as health, transport, education and justice being devolved to the 
Scottish Executive. In Scotland the HSC/E has formalised its relations with the Scottish 
Parliament through a Concordat and the establishment of a Scotland Director.  This 
Director has operational responsibility for the Field Operations Directorate in Scotland 
and, more generally, advises on relations with the Scottish Executive.  
 
In investigating the issues of health and safety in Scotland in 2004, the Select 
Committee on Work and Pensions (House of Commons, 2004) noted that,  
 
HSE considers that the comparative figures for rates of accident, injury and ill-
health for England, Scotland and Wales reveal anomalies.  Fatal injury rates, for 
example, are higher in Scotland than for the rest of Great Britain, although so far 
no definitive reasons have been found for this.  On the other hand, rates of self-
reported illness are lower. HSE is exploring these anomalies. 
 
Disregarding both the extent of the discrepancy and the urgency of this situation, the 
committee continued,  
 
Evidence to the Committee was that there had been positive developments in 
Scotland such as the Safe and Health Working pilot.  However, it was also 
suggested that there was much to be gained from an increased emphasis on 
joint resource planning, risk prioritisation and programme working.  The 
Committee recommends that this process would be assisted if HSE actively 
promote joint resource planning, risk prioritisation and programme working 
across the devolved legislatures in Great Britain. 
 
 
It has been difficult to pinpoint the effects of these ‘positive developments’.  In 2004, the 
Committee had available HSE reported figures for fatalities and major injury rates for 
Scotland and Great Britain which show no discernable pattern of convergence between 
Scottish rates and those of Great Britain. 
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Similarly, efforts by the HSE to pinpoint the causes of the Scottish anomaly have, at 
best, produced ambiguous results.  The HSE commissioned studies into the Scottish 
anomaly in 2000, which resulted initially in two studies, R62.079 and R.63.053 
undertaken by the Institute of Employment Research at the University of Warwick.  
Specifically, the HSE tasked the researchers with the following remitsTP1PT, 
 
R62.079 Analysis of National Injury Data 
Background 
With the impending arrival of devolution, it is likely that increased attention will be 
given to statistics on work-related injuries for Wales and Scotland.  The overall 
injury rates in Wales and Scotland are higher than in Great Britain and in many 
cases the injury specific rates are higher.  The reasons for this are unknown. 
Objectives: 
1) To establish a set of demographic, social and economic variables which are 
relevant in the context of varying injury rates across Great Britain. 
2) To develop appropriate probability models explaining the relative effects of 
these variables in the constituent countries of Great Britain. 
 
andTP2PT  
 R63.035 Econometric Analysis of Riddor Data 
At the aggregate level, trends in accident rates will be affected by a whole range 
of factors, including the socio-political, technological, institutional and economic.   
However, precise empirical relationships are lacking.  This makes it difficult to 
assess whether year-to-year movements in accident rates are the result of 
changing economic conditions or underlying safety.  The ability to distinguish 
between the two would clearly be of value to the HSE in targeting its actions and 
developing proportionate responses to accident rates. Objectives: 
1) To construct a cross-section time-series panel dataset of RIDDOR fatal 
accidents and economic variables. 
2) To use panel datasets to estimate statistical models relating to fatal accident 
rates to economic variables [sic]. 
 
                                                 
1 http://www.hseresearchprojects.com/projectsearch.aspx?id=395  
2 http://www.hseresearchprojects.com/projectsearch.aspx?id=410  
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According to the HSE’s interpretation of the findings of these studies, Scotland’s higher 
fatality and injury rates can be explained on account of the different industry mix of 
Scottish employees, or in other words, do not point at any specific institutional 
problems.  However, when commissioning a further study on the construction industry 
(RR443 - An analysis of the significant causes of fatal and major injuries in construction 
in Scotland) the HSE qualified this view this by stating thatTP3PT, 
 
Research (R62.079 & R.63.053) by the by the Institute of Employment Research 
at the University of Warwick shows that differing rates of non-fatal injury between 
regions and countries in Great Britain can be almost fully explained by the 
industries, occupations or other characteristics of the working populations.  This 
does not, however, explain differences in rates for particular sectors and does 
not examine difference for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). 
 
Rather than providing an in-depth look at the problems experienced by workers in the 
construction industry, this study (RR443) reverted to the HSE’s already established line 
of argument in which discrepancies in accident rates are attributed to the occupational 
characteristics of the workforce.TP4PT  
 
The findings indicate that the most significant factor in explaining the difference in 
accident rates is the differing occupational make up of Scotland and the rest of Great 
Britain.  There are proportionally many more manual (at risk) workers in Scottish 
construction than in the rest of Great Britain.  As a result, it appears that the overall 
accident rate is higher in Scotland.  However, arguing, as the HSE does, that Scotland 
has relatively greater numbers of employees in industries such as agriculture and 
construction which appear to carry a greater risk of health and safety failure, is unlikely 
to explain why Scottish workers are far more likely to suffer fatal or major injuries. 
 
                                                 
3  http://www.hseresearchprojects.com/projectsearch.aspx?id=1528 
4 http://www.hse.gov.uk/RESEARCH/rrhtm/rr443.htm  
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1.4 The Causes of the Scottish Anomaly - Alternative Views 
 
Academic literature provides a wide range of explanations for the divergence of 
accident rates across different workplaces.  These explanations include factors such as 
different patterns of subcontracting (Hillage, et al, 1998), employee skill levels and 
employer control over tasks (Dwyer and Rafferty, 1991), the balance of power between 
employer and employee and the role of organised labour (Nichols, 1986, 1990; Nichols 
et al 2007; Toms 1990; Reilly Paci and Holl, 1995) as well as the resources available to 
health and safety inspectorates (Toms, 1990).  Together these theoretical approaches 
point to a conglomerate of interlinking factors which, being sometimes inadequately 
described as safety culture, relate to aspects which regulate the interaction between 
employers and employees at work.  This political economy of work and safety includes 
aspects, such as the degree to which employers cut corners, violate safety rule and 
deviate from best practice, together with the degree to which employees lack the power 
to counteract these behaviours.  Most of these factors are beyond simplistic statistical 
analysis. 
 
However, in as far as the Scottish anomaly is concerned, there are a number of 
parameters which may well account for its very significant deviation from the UK’s 
overall safety performance.  One element would appear to be the weaknesses, as 
documented, with respect to inspection and the prosecution of safety offenders.  At the 
time of the Stockline disaster, the Health and Safety Executive was reported as having 
only 68 inspectors employed in Scotland to police 81,000 factories and workplaces.TP5PT  
This figure was widely cited in the press as an indication of the limited priority the HSE 
had attached to policing Health in Safety in Scotland, despite the nation’s dismal safety 
record.  What is less known is the fact that the HSE had, for many years, placed 
increasingly less emphasis on inspection and policing.  This attitude has been reflected, 
most recently, in a ministerial response to House of Commons questions regarding HSE 
inspectionsTP6PT:  
 
1. In marshalling HSE’s inspection resource, HSE seeks to target poor 
performers.  The key criteria in establishing the frequency of inspections are the 
risks presented by particular duty holders, premises or industries and the ability 
and willingness of duty holders to manage those risks.  Where the risk is low and 
duty holders’ ability high, visits are less frequent than where the risk is high and 
duty holders are failing to manage those risks.  In targeting the inspection 
resource in this way, HSE believes it has the greatest impact on reducing work-
related deaths, injuries and ill health. 
                                                 
5 Sunday Mirror (2004) One Safety Inspector for 1000 Factories 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4161/is_20040516/ai_n12894419
6
  House of Commons Hansard, Written Answers for 25 Jan 2007-08-16 
Uhttp://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.com/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070125/text/70125w0016.htm 
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2. In 2003, HSE ceased to set targets for the number of inspection contacts.  
Such targets encouraged short visits to low risk places, whereas the Health and 
Safety Commission’s strategy for workplace health and safety 2010 sought a 
sharper focus on injury and ill health priorities, and more substantial contacts with 
a carefully selected range of duty holders.  Over the last five years or so, the 
actual time HSE inspectors have spent interacting with and encouraging duty 
holders has increased by 23 per cent. 
 
3. Important as inspection is, the frequency of inspections is not a particularly 
useful metric.  The Health and Safety Commission’s strategy fully recognises the 
importance of inspection, and the threat of enforcement, as a powerful motivator 
for improved standards.  But to be most effective, they need to sit alongside other 
interventions, such as encouraging partnership working, communications, and so 
on. 
 
This ministerial response highlights a deeply problematic attitude towards inspection 
activities on a number of levels.  Firstly, if the ‘frequency of inspections is not a 
particularly useful metric’ then there is a real danger that the number of those available 
to conduct inspections is also considered unimportant.  Secondly, while the idea of 
targeting inspections towards high risk workplaces may be theoretically appealing, it is 
less clear how these workplaces can be identified in the first place if the number of 
inspections and inspectors is inadequate.  Most reportable accidents are, by HSE’s own 
admission, not reported and it seems likely that those employers least concerned about 
safety may also be least concerned about reporting.  Thus this ensures they remain out 
of view from an enforcement-light agency.  Thirdly, as concerns the idea that 
inspections should be combined with other interventions, such as encouraging 
partnership working and communications, there is a very real danger that an emphasis 
on collaboration will undermine the ability to police particularly those workplaces have 
failed to meet basic safety standards.    
 
Recent data suggests that UK-wide the HSE is indeed increasingly de-emphasising its 
role as a health and safety enforcement agency.  Thus the HSE’s own data reports a 
UK-wide fall of  enforcement notices from 11,335 in 2003/4 to only 6,383 in 2005/06.TP7PT 
 
In Scotland this lack of focus on enforcement is aggravated by a number of additional 
factors, including the comparatively lower levels of fines imposed on safety offenders; 
the lower level of prosecutions resulting from workplace deaths and serious illnesses; 
and the smaller levels of investigations resulting from work-related illnesses.  As 
regards fines, reports available on the HSE webpage records an average level of fine 
per case for 2002/03 in Scotland of £7,143 as compared to Great Britain with £9,395.  
For the year 2003/04 this divergence has narrowed to £13,534 for Scotland as 
compared to £14,303 for Great Britain.  However, preliminary HSE figures for 2004/05 
indicate a renewed divergence in penalty levels with an average fine for Scotland of 
£11,761 and £18,765 for Great Britain.TP8PT  
                                                 
7
PT Health and Safety Commission (2006) Health and Safety Statistics 2005/06 
Uhttp://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/overall/hssh0506.pdf 
8
PT Health and Safety Executive (2006) Health and Safety Offences and Penalties 2004-2005 
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Perhaps even more discouraging are the levels of enforcement action taken by the HSE 
in Scotland over time.  As concerns the number of offences prosecuted by the HSE in 
Scotland, the HSE records 233 prosecutions in 2001/02; 268 in 2003/04; 152 in 2004/05 
and only 108 in 2005/06 (provisional data).  This data is closely mirrored by the number 
of convictions which reached 137 in 2001/02; 110 in 2003/04; 77 in 2004/05 and only 54 
in 2005/06 (provisional data).  Similarly, the total number of HSE enforcement notices 
(comprising improvement, deferred prohibition and immediate prohibition notices) 
issued in Scotland declined from 1378 in 2002/03; to 1263 in 2003/04 and further to 992 
in 2004/05 (the latest available figure).TP9PT 
 
Research conducted by the Centre for Corporate Accountability (CCA) indicates that 
only 26% of deaths resulted in prosecutions in Scotland, compared with 46% in the 
Midlands area of England.  For major injuries the CCA reports that in Scotland only 25% 
of these resulted in investigation of which 9% resulted in prosecutions.  According to the 
CCA, Scotland also ranked last for investigating work-related illnesses with an 
investigation rate of 24% as compared to 65% in the MidlandsTP10PT.  This statistic should 
be particularly frightening in light of Scotland’s industrial heritage and, in particular, the 
fact that Scotland includes the area with the highest standardised mortality ratio (SMR) 
from mesothelioma in Great Britain.  As regards mesothelioma, the HSE’s own 
statistical analysis reports an SMR in excess of six times the average for Great Britain 
for West Dumbartonshire as well as significantly elevated SMRs for East 
Dumbartonshire, Fife, Glasgow City, Inverclyde and Renfrewshire.TP11PT    
 
Additional research by the CCA conducted in 2003 indicates that only two company 
directors/senior managers in Scotland have been convicted of health and safety 
offences of which one of the only received an 'admonishment' and the other received a 
£1,000 fine.  This compares with 27 directors/senior managers convicted in England 
and Wales of health and safety offences over the same period.  Similarly, while in 
England and Wales, eight company directors and five companies have been convicted 
of manslaughter, no director or company in Scotland has been convicted of an 
equivalent homicide offence following a work-related death.TP12PT 
                                                                                                                                                             
Uhttp://www.hse.gov.uk/enforce/off0405/off0405.pdfU and 
TUhttp://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/regions/scotland.htmUT for the very latest figures 
TP
9
PT Uwww.hse.gov.uk/statistic/regions/tables/regenf.xlsU 
TP
10
PT Sunday Herald (2004) In Safe Hands 
Uhttp://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4156/is_20040523/ai_n12588936U 
TP
11
PT Health and Safety Executive (2001) Mesothelioma Mortality in Great Britain: An Analysis by 
Geographical Area 1981-2000, HSE Information Services 
Uhttp://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/causdis/area8100.pdfU 
TP
12
PT Centre for Corporate Accountability (2003) Corporate Criminal Accountability in Scotland 
Uhttp://www.corporateaccountability.org/press_releases/2003/10OctScot.htmU 
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1.5 Industrial Accidents and Corporate Culpability 
 
Scotland’s history of industrial accidents continues to be associated with the world’s 
worst offshore disaster, the Piper Alpha incident.  However, both offshore and onshore, 
Scotland has experienced many multi-fatality disasters.  In July 1990, six workers died 
in an offshore helicopter crash when a Sumburgh-based Sikorsky S61N helicopter 
plunged into the sea after apparently hitting a crane while trying to land on the Brent 
Spar helipad.  The crash killed two crew and four passengers with seven surviving the 
incident.TP13PT  The same year saw the death of six fishermen off Shetland when the 
Inverness-registered vessel Premier was overcome by a wave.TP14PT  In 1992 eleven 
employees were killed when a Super Puma helicopter, which was taking workers from 
Shell’s Cormorant Alpha platform, 100 miles north-east of Shetland, to the Safe 
Supporter "flotel" 200 yards away, crashed shortly after take-off.TP15PT  Some of the worst 
instances of workplace tragedies occur in Scotland but are finessed out of its workplace 
deaths’ tally because they are ‘off shore’. 
 
The Cormorant Alpha disaster illustrates the obstacles victims and survivors face when 
seeking justice in the wake of an industrial ‘accident’ (Beck and Woolfson, 2005).  
During later inquiries about the accident, evidence emerged that the helicopter 
passengers had had serious safety concerns and had been reluctant to take the 
helicopter flight that night, but had eventually boarded the helicopter under pressure.  
Following initial attempts to embark on litigation against Bristow in the UK, the relatives 
brought their suit against Shell and Exxon to the courts of Texas and Louisiana.  Shell 
sought and obtained interim interdicts in Scotland and injunctions in England, against 
the bereaved families. This included some 63 individuals in all.  The purpose of these 
restraining orders was to prevent the families from pursuing an award for higher levels 
of compensation in the American courts as against the courts of England and Scotland. 
Violation of this court order, Shell warned, could result in the families which in this case 
also included young children, being “subject to bodily imprisonment”.  In the end, when 
faced with the imminent prospect of US court proceedings going ahead, Shell proposed 
an out-of-court settlement which was reached in early 1996, nearly four years after the 
disaster.  The size of this settlement is undisclosed.  What is known is that the 
imposition of ‘gagging clauses’ effectively left unanswered vital questions which might 
have determined any corporate culpability. 
 
                                                 
13
PT The Shetland Times (1997) Headline Events Over the Years 
 www.theshetlandtimesltd.co.uk/125years/years.htm 
TP
14
PT see [12] 
TP
15
PT The Scotsman (2002) 400 Deaths in 33 Years 
         http://news.scotsman.com/topics.cfm?tid=472&id=771822002    
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1.6 Summary 
 
In sum, it is important to acknowledge the ways in which the discussion surrounding 
health and safety issues, particularly in relation to major incidents, have been ‘de-
problematised’.  The use of phrases and concepts such as ‘human error’, ‘accidents’ or 
‘systems failure’ have profoundly influenced public perceptions of industrial ‘accidents’, 
casting them as either normal or unavoidable occurrences, or as being attributable to 
the actions of individual workers.  This has served to deflect attention from the deeper 
causes of health and safety incidents and occupational ill-health as derived from the 
economic and industrial relations contexts in which workers are frequently 
disempowered.  
 
The fact that official statistics show higher fatality rates for Scotland indicates that 
Scottish workers are at greater risk than those across the UK as a whole.  Yet, 
explorations by the HSE of this ‘anomaly’ have produced ambiguous results and there 
remains a general failure to have identified the root causes.  Academic research has 
provided diverse explanations for the variability of accident rates across workplaces, 
whether sectorally, geographically or otherwise.  As far as Scotland’s exceptional fatal 
injury rates are concerned, a number of factors may well be more important than others, 
including the documented relative weaknesses in inspection and prosecution of safety 
offenders.  It is within these contexts that the circumstances surrounding the ICL 
Stockline disaster should be considered.  Prior to presenting research findings we 
describe in some detail the principles and research methods that have guided our 
investigations.  
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Section 2 Research Methods 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
The report has been prepared partly because no broad and independent investigation of 
the Stockline disaster has yet been conducted.  Most of the methods used in the report 
can be utilised by any worker or community group wishing to research health, safety 
and other environmental concerns that they have.  
 
We have drawn on a review of relevant published and ‘grey’ literature – ‘unpublished’ 
material that may exist on the web and in places other than library bookshelves - 
relating to the management, finance, operation and health and safety of workplaces 
within the plastics industry.  We have also used particular methods to explore conditions 
within the Stockline company and the Glasgow plant.  Research methodology relates to 
the underlying theory and analysis of how research does or should proceed.  Research 
methods relate to the techniques used to gather and analyse data.  The ICL Stockline 
study drew on a participatory action research methodology that is briefly explained 
below and used mixed methods to collect and analyse data including interviews, risk 
mapping activities, analysis of reports on working conditions, accounts, building 
consents and physical structural changes in the plant.   
 
Central to this report is evidence from the testimonies and experiences of ICL Stockline 
workers.  The ICL Stockline Support Group, composed of victims who survived the 
disaster and of relatives of deceased workers, was formed in July 2004.  Members of 
the Research Team, who have produced this report, were invited to a meeting of the 
Support Group in August 2004.  At this meeting, the ways and means of investigating 
events at the Maryhill factory leading up the disaster were discussed and several of the 
approaches used in the report were outlined for those present, as were the aims of such 
a report.  In addition, written information about these approaches, including risk 
mapping and lay epidemiology, was handed out.  An open invitation was extended to 
those present to discuss their experiences in groups and interviews.  A self-selecting 
group took up that invitation.  This group comprised a broad cross-section of those who 
had worked at the plant, some for up to two decades, in a variety of locations/functions 
including fabrication, coating, dispatch and maintenance.  Many had considerable 
experience of the plant’s operations and working practices as well as changes that had 
occurred there over several years.  Altogether, seven employees were interviewed, four 
of whom participated in subsequent risk and body mapping sessions.  
 39
This group then met with the ‘academic experts’ to discuss in detail how the research 
would be carried out and were informed that the report would be put into the public 
domain.  Consent forms were signed by those wishing to participate (see Appendix 3).  
The confidential nature of the data, so collected, was also explained.  The data were to 
be anonymised except with regard to one interview where the interviewee gave explicit 
consent for his name to be disclosed (see 6.2 below).  Thus, with this sole exception 
where workers have been quoted in the body of the report they have been anonymised 
according to a simple nomenclature (Worker1 – W1, Worker2 – W2 and so on).  The 
data in the form of the original taped interviews and the transcriptions of those 
interviews has been kept securely on University premises.  Only the research team has 
had access to the data collected.   
 
 
2.2 TAction Research (AR), Participatory Research (PR) and 
Participatory Action Research (PAR) 
 
Action research is not itself a research methodology, but rather 'an orientation to 
inquiry'.  The term 'action research' covers a wide range of methods including co-
operative inquiry, participatory action research, action science, action inquiry and 
appreciative inquiry.  Each of these methods has relevance for use within both 
organisations and communities.  The emphasis is on collaboration between all those 
involved in the inquiry, so that the knowledge developed in the inquiry process is directly 
relevant to the issues being studied.  Thus action research is conducted by, with and for 
people, rather than research on people” (Cathy Sharp, Research for Real and Eileen 
Francis VECTOR for Centre for Human Ecology and the Scottish Civic Forum, August 
2003).  
 
The Stockline study has used action research and has been prepared with the 
participation of people employed, or formerly employed, at the factory.  Meetings were 
held in the homes of the participants and other locations.  Small focus group 
discussions and individual interviews were conducted.  Working with these participants 
was a  multidisciplinary group of academic experts in accountancy, architecture, 
corporate crime, industrial relations, occupational health and safety and welfare rights, 
who formed a cross-institutional, multi-disciplinary research team. 
 
PAR can draw on such methods as rapid appraisal, community, lay and worker 
epidemiology and citizens’ juries.  We have used lay and worker epidemiology: that is, 
worker and ex-worker investigation and documentation of both day to day and critical 
events in the plant.  This has been supplemented by risk mapping methods (described 
and illustrated more fully in later chapters) combined with semi-structured interviews.  
These methods have produced rich and often unique data.  Acknowledging, 
understanding and respecting that there are different types of legitimate evidence we 
have recorded varied but often complementary approaches to evidence based 
occupational health and safety practice that this report sought to explore.  
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Conventional participatory research operates in the context of ‘lay/worker/community’ 
activity for the collective good.  In the work environment this approach has a part to play 
in the process of vetting substances, processes, materials, buildings, factories and other 
types of plant and installations.  In the past in the UK and within Scotland, we have 
witnessed many examples of either complacency or over-confidence or both by 
scientists, regulators and politicians when dealing with potential occupational risks and 
problems.  Their inability to deal with uncertainty, their failure to take data gaps 
seriously when carrying out risk assessments, their failure to go beyond very narrow risk 
assessments and skewed cost-benefit analyses which constantly favour capital over 
community and workers had severe detrimental consequences.  The failure to 
recognise, research or act on research - when potential problems were flagged - 
occurred with Piper Alpha, Zeebrugge, BSE, asbestos.  These illustrate the large scale 
and the major consequences of such over-confidence or sometimes failure of courage 
to tackle powerful commercial interests.  
 
The Stockline workers frequently flagged a range of major problems within their 
workplace and their voices were apparently often ignored by employers, regulators and 
enforcers.  The PAR approach records those voices.  Such voices have often been lost, 
silenced or muted in official enquiries of workplace disasters in Scotland such as Piper 
Alpha or the semiconductor industry.  
 
Daily, some communities and some continents live with the consequences of the failure 
of narrow scientific and limited or absent regulatory approaches – whether in Clydebank 
from asbestos-related diseases, Bhopal in India where many thousands of people were 
damaged or killed by a pesticide manufacturing plant failures, the Ukraine from the 
Chernobyl nuclear reactor disaster.  Lay/worker/community action on health issues can 
highlight these failures and bring important precautionary approaches to effectively bear 
on decision-making as well as inform solutions and the factors which might facilitate or 
inhibit the application of such new knowledge.  
 
Research and the methods used to research many disasters are not conducted in a 
vacuum.  Research may be framed and skewed in ways that distort or suppress 
findings. Industrial development through beneficial inward investment for industries may 
introduce one potential source of bias into some research.  The influence of 
corporations that may resist worker and community action research is another 
especially when company sponsored research produces findings that favour 
companies.  Better and ‘democratic’ research models and practices do exist such as the 
action-research projects used in Clydebank to explore asbestos-related diseases and 
their impacts on workers, ex-workers, their carers and communities.  Other examples 
such as the work of Phase Two also demonstrate the effectiveness and policy impact of 
worker and community-based actions (Smith et al 2006). 
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2.3 Risk Mapping 
 
Workers and communities may be ideally placed to identify physical, chemical, 
biological and management system hazards in the workplace and the likely risks 
associated with those hazards.  They can map the physical and social environment in 
which they work; they can map the adverse effects that work may have upon the worker 
(body mapping) and they can map where their workplace is located in terms of factors 
that promote or damage well being and physical and mental health (global mapping) 
(Keith et al 2001. ILO 2002 and, in the UK, groups of women in Boston, Lincolnshire 
and the Women’s Environment Network breast cancer survey mapped hazards and 
risks in communities in partnership with local people, and illustrated how communities 
themselves, sometimes supported by NGOs, can explore possible health issues and 
ways to promote health (WEN, 1999).  Again, there is a case for acknowledging a 
variety of evidences, this participatory research is one aspect, of what can become a 
polarised picture, of  strategies informed by partnerships of evidence that are required 
to tackle health and safety risks.  The Sheffield Occupational Health Advisory Service 
(SOHAS) projects located workers and lay advisors in GP surgeries to uncover the tip of 
work-caused and work-related occupational diseases’ iceberg and they were able to 
map specific occupations against companies and industries.  Such research has 
exposed major under-reporting of occupational cancer, angiosarcoma from vinyl 
chloride monomer, occupational asthma and other workplace diseases (Hazards 
magazine) 
 
These ‘participatory’ studies have also used well-established and new traditional 
research methods such as Geographical Information Systems (GIS) but their roots lie in 
the risk mapping activities of workers in a Fiat plant in Italy many years ago.  The maps 
so prepared rely on worker/community knowledge of processes and procedures rather 
than managerial and ‘expert’ assessments which may reflect theoretical evidence rather 
than the real practice of processes and chemical usage.  Again differing public health 
theories underpin differing approaches to risk and to epidemiology.  Prudent decision-
makers who use lay epidemiology approaches are searching for health data to 
demonstrate that there are no major risks associated with hazards: the burden of proof 
lies with the owner-employer-manufacturer-government to show processes are ‘safe’.  
In contrast to the expert hierarchical view of evidence, this approach is informed but not 
dictated by science and scientific methods and recognises both the value and the limits 
of our scientific knowledge.  
 
Gaining more comprehensive evidence entails opening up the research process to 
ensure communities and workers can contribute to and influence any changes proposed 
as a result of the research undertaken.  However, this strategy carries potential political 
and economic costs for business.  The benefits of participatory research can be 
considerable.  For instance such research may play a role in exposing unrecognised 
levels of disease or through studying subjective symptoms in an effective way.  These 
could include multiple chemical sensitivity (MCS), syndromes, work related upper limb 
disorders and repetitive strain injuries, asthma aetiology and occupational stress.  
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These are conditions common in the general population which could be elevated in 
particular work groups as are result of occupational factors, but otherwise remain 
hidden from view among the background population cases, or more commonly linked to 
lifestyle factors like smoking – for example, obstructive airways disease, heart disease 
or lung and other cancers in workers in dusty jobs. 
 
The Stockline workers used mapping to explore exactly such problems.  All are now 
being explored by participatory research.  These methods may be cost effective or low 
cost ways of identifying a wide range of exposures to possible disease causes and 
outcomes through interactive approaches.  They are able to deal with rapidly changing 
situations and almost automatically they increase capacity of communities and workers 
to involve themselves in public health.  This is because the methods recognise and use 
knowledge and experience of communities in identifying particular health risks.  Such 
methods also help to inform solutions and provide new approaches to conceptualising 
knowledge, enhancing the potential for action outcomes from research findings.  Finally 
they raise awareness of policy-makers linked to an identification of key local concerns 
(Loewenson et al, 1995; Loewenson, 1999). 
 
There are of course weaknesses attached to participatory research.  For instance the 
assumption that there is an identifiable community perspective is problematic and this 
may mean that no precise quantification of a particular problem can be identified.  There 
could be inaccurate or incomplete or partial perspectives provided on an issue bearing 
in mind that there is a major difference between lay perceptions and lay epidemiology.  
Lay perceptions of public health problems could include misconceptions about the 
nature, causes and prevention of disease. However, none of these problems are unique 
to participatory research 
 
 
2.4 Evidence-based Occupational Health and Safety? 
 
‘Evidence-based practice’ aims to underpin and promote effective decision-making. 
Evidence may constitute professionals' statistical, engineering, toxicological or 
epidemiological reports from randomised control trials or health services research.  But 
evidence can also be qualitatively derived from the user/community perspective. 
 
There are some fundamental differences between quantitative and qualitative research 
methodologies: namely how the world is viewed and therefore how it might be studied.  
Quantitative and qualitative methodologies are not directly comparable but rather these 
approaches and the research methods and tools they inform may be assessed as being 
more or less useful to the Stockline enquiry that we have conducted.  Similarly, criteria 
of methodological rigour applied to all research to promote good, trustworthy evidence 
must be appropriate to the research methodology adopted.  For qualitative approaches 
this includes locating research activity as a value-laden social event in itself and 
requires investigators to make their own value positions explicit and to actively 
interrogate the influences this may have on the evidence produced.  The concept of 
'value-free' scientific research is not tenable.  
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2.5 Epidemiology 
 
Epidemiology has been defined as “The study of the distribution and determinants of 
health and disease related conditions in populations.  It is concerned with both epidemic 
(excess of normal expectancy) and endemic (always present) conditions…  The basic 
premise of epidemiology is that disease is not randomly distributed across populations” 
(Shenker. M. in LaDou 1997).  The ‘epidemiology’ of the Stockline workforce has been 
neglected and worker concerns about their health that merited serious investigations 
were dismissed by many organisations and individuals.  This is important as the focus 
and methodologies of much research may potentially skew pharmaceutical, 
toxicological and even epidemiological evidence on public health problems and their 
proposed solutions.  The researchers on and participants in this ‘lay epidemiology’ 
project have received no funding from any company, organisation or NGO of any sort.  
The work has been done in their own time. 
 
The science of epidemiology, viewed as so critical to the development of ‘academic’, 
rigorous and high status public health medicine, has replaced clinical case studies as 
the most effective and credible method for identifying disease clusters.  From this 
perspective clinical cases are viewed as statistically limited sources of information.  
However, non-epidemiological data. linked to clinical cases or observations, have 
sometimes resulted in very effective actions.  For instance the links between exposures 
to soot and cancer came from Percival Potts’ clinical observations and case reports in 
the late 18PthP century.  The links between exposure to vinyl chloride monomer and the 
rare liver cancer angiosarcoma came through primary care physicians near a US 
chemical plant connecting clinical cases.  Such sentinel events should lead to 
precautionary approaches to hazards but, as the European Environment Agency has 
documented, such a principle has constantly been ignored at the cost of the lives and 
health of many workers (EEA 2001).  As evidence presented later in the report 
demonstrates, if such a principle had been adopted, many of the occupational safety 
and health problems identified at Stockline would have been solved. 
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2.5.1 Lay Epidemiology 
 
Lay epidemiology is "the process by which lay persons gather statistics and other 
information and also direct and marshal the knowledge and resources of experts in 
order to understand the epidemiology of diseases" (Brown 1989).  In the 1920s and 
1930s the physician Sir Thomas Legge and first medical inspector of factories was an 
early user of ‘sentinel’ events to trigger investigations of health hazards, (Legge 
1934:25-29).  He used observational data from workers to identify hitherto relatively 
unknown risks.  For instance, he visited a docks site where the dockers themselves had 
linked work with a hard wood to cases of ill-health in their members when no physician 
had done so.  This showed that lay assessments should not be dismissed as simply 
subjective and worthless.  Lay epidemiology can draw on qualitative and quantitative 
research methods in order to generate comprehensive, rich data.  The uses of the 
technique are many and varied and do not simply relate to the investigation of a health 
hazard or to confirm or disconfirm scientific evidence about correlations and causes of 
diseases.  They also contain important community, individual, political and social 
elements (Watterson 1994b, Popay and Williams 1994 and 1996). 
 
Lay epidemiology may inform communities about public health problems and solutions.  
By involving communities in public health policy and the monitoring of practical policy 
implementation lay epidemiology has the potential to sustain and empower communities 
and individuals in an organisational and possibly social context.  The approach also has 
potential to help change attitudes to disease causation, disease prevention and the 
effectiveness of public health measures.  In addition it may possibly serve to educate 
professionals, through lay groups, about new or different public health perspectives.  It 
is part of a campaign for positive change.  Such campaigns based on worker initiated or 
worker led research, like those mentioned earlier on Clydebank with regard to asbestos 
and through Phase Two with the semiconductor industry have led to improvements and 
sometimes changes for workers and shaped future research. 
 
Lay epidemiology studies can include tools, mechanisms, techniques and methods that 
appear ‘easy’ but are not and may be complex in terms of data gathering.  Different 
types of data are generated and used differently.  They may generate similar data to 
that used by epidemiologists and toxicologists but often this is not the case and they 
could be more comprehensive, experiential, up to date, relevant and better informed.  
They can be qualitative – records and histories may provide supporting information in 
conventional epidemiology whereas in this study it represents core data. 
 
Quantitative methodological concerns regarding the rigour of research including validity 
of recall, reliability and verifiability, issues about location and length of exposure and 
exposure levels in conventional epidemiology are shared with lay methods.  However, 
records of incidents, accounts of exposures, details of suspected adverse effects may 
all be more richly documented in lay epidemiology with the participants' perceived 
experience acknowledged as their reality unlike other sorts of epidemiological study. 
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Data collection in lay, community and worker studies may also be presented in forms 
readily recognised and accepted by conventional epidemiologists.  Lay epidemiology is 
relatively cheap to do, draws on local data, can utilise people pooling knowledge 
encompassing a socio-participative/participative model.  It nurtures transparency in 
study design, execution and analysis and in this context it is an open process that is 
inclusive, potentially empowering and recognises uncertainty.  It is a positive process 
which will usually create many benefits with the potential to go beyond the rhetoric of 
transparency and empowerment as it is embedded in community practice. 
 
Lay epidemiology complements and may triangulate with other methods and reflects 
current international and national agendas relating to WHO Charter on Environment and 
Health and the involvement of local communities in their health care.  Lay epidemiology 
may focus on small groups and the evidence does not lend itself to traditional concepts 
of sample population generalisability but can offer the analytical generalisability of 
concepts and insights of qualitative paradigms.  Yet small studies may produce quite 
original and important data which can provide real benefits in terms solving problems, 
engaging communities and creating structures through which wider public health 
debates and policy formulation can be conducted.  As with conventional epidemiology 
there are perennial problems of identifying random/causal clusters.  Health 
professionals may resist and sometimes oppose any discussion of the issues raised 
and there may be a lack of good data on exposures although communities can produce 
experiential evidence about the reality of exposures rather than assumed projections. 
 
Lay epidemiology has the potential to produce knowledge that meets the needs of 
communities and NGOs whose priorities may be quite different to those of the 
established scientific community.  For instance operationalisation of the precautionary 
principle often requires information about data gaps rather than ‘data rich’ but 
‘information poor’ masses of statistical/epidemiological data.  Lay epidemiology may or 
may not be totally excluded from conventional epidemiological studies.  A continuum of 
both approaches ranging from solely conventional to research controlled, conducted 
and delivered by lay groups is set out in the table below.  In most instances, the type of 
lay epidemiology studies that have been conducted fall into categories 2-5. 
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Types of lay epidemiology 
 
1. Epidemiologists design, carry out, analyse and present the study 
2. Epidemiologists design, study and train and use lay staff to carry out surveys in a 
study.  Epidemiologists analyse and present data. 
3. Epidemiologists invite lay people to contribute to design of study protocol.  Lay 
staff carry out questionnaire surveys, interviews.  Epidemiologists analyse, 
present data. 
4. Epidemiologists invite lay people to contribute to study design.  Lay people carry 
out surveys.  Epidemiologists, with lay people, analyse and present results. 
5. Lay people identify problem and invite epidemiologists to investigate the problem.   
Back to (1) 
6. Lay people identify problems, involve epidemiologists.  Joint protocol is drawn 
up.  Back to (3) and (4) 
7. Lay people identify problem, involve epidemiologists.  Joint protocol.  Lay people 
and epidemiologists jointly investigate problem, analyse results.  Joint 
presentation of results. (Watterson 1999; 2000) 
 
 
2.6 Semi-structured and Exploratory Interviews 
 
Complementing the action research approaches adopted, and outlined in the previous 
section, were more conventional academic methods.  Principally this involved in-depth 
interviews with workers and ex-workers, either individually or in pairs.  However, 
underpinning this recognisable specific technique in data gathering we have been 
informed by oral history methods, which have proved most helpful in enabling us to use 
the accounts and testimonies of ICL Stockline employees as an indispensable source to 
reconstitute the what working life in the factory was like through the meanings attributed 
by participants.  
 
 
2.6.1 Oral History Approaches  
 
In the 1960s and 1970s oral history widened its scope to include non-elite groups such 
as racial and ethnic minorities, women, labour activists and workers more generally 
(Liddington and Norris, 1978; McCrindle and Rowbotham, 1979; Armstrong and 
Beynon, 1977).  Oral historians provided glimpses into the lives of those who generally 
did not, or could not, record their own stories and revealed insights into their lifestyles, 
work routines, values and beliefs.  This new social history focused particularly on the 
meanings participants attached to events, phenomena and experiences (Portelli, 1981: 
99).  The unique value that oral testimony bestows in the pursuit of knowledge is that 
accounts tell us not just what people did, but what they wanted to do at the time and 
their reflections upon past events and experiences.  Portelli’s emphasises that ‘memory 
is not a passive depository of facts, but an active process of creations and meanings’ 
(1981: 101).  
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Through recording the first hand accounts of variety of storytellers, oral history methods 
have the potential to democratise the historical record (Schopes, 2004: 2; Thompson, 
2000: 9).  By moving beyond the use of written records researchers have a multiplicity 
of sources at their disposal which assist in the reconstruction of the past.  Accordingly, 
as Thompson (2000: 6) noted, 
 
Reality is a complex and many sided; and it is a primary merit of oral history that, to 
a much greater extent than most sources, it allows the original multiplicity of 
standpoints to be recreated…It provides a more realistic and fair reconstruction of 
the past, a challenge to the established account.  
 
The collection of oral history (or histories) requires researchers to cross the artificial 
boundaries between the academic institution and the world outside and also between 
the professional and the ordinary member of the public.  The histories are the product of 
the interviews and are a collaborative endeavour as interviewers comes to learn from 
the ‘subjects’.  The reconstruction of the past becomes a more inclusive process and 
provides the potential for participants and researchers to gain from the process.  The 
process of being asked to record their lives or experiences of certain events can provide 
participants with a sense of dignity and self-worth through handing on information to 
future generations and contributing to knowledge (Hubbard, 2000: 4).  There is a power 
or clarity within oral testimonies that derives from the fact that only those who have 
experienced particular events or phenomena can truly explain what the reality was like 
and inform our collective understanding of the past.  
 
 
2.6.2 Interviews – Semi-structured and Exploratory 
 
The qualitative method of data collection maximises the opportunity for ‘subjects’ to 
state uniquely what they have they have experienced, to provide opinions and 
perceptions and to give examples and reveal attitudes (Kent, 1993).  Of course, within 
qualitative research there are a multitude of techniques available but the interview is the 
most widely used because of its flexibility and its ability to produce data of depth and 
clarity.  Specifically, the researchers’ general approach was to see the interviews as 
both semi-structured and exploratory.  In other words, each of the workers interviewed 
was prompted to answer a series of questions relating to the nature of work, the tasks 
they performed, the hazards they encountered, the workplace and the built 
environment, employment relations, key events and incidents that they had experienced 
or witnessed.  The questions were grouped logically around these themes and events in 
order that workers could more easily follow the progression of the interview.  
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At the same time, this semi-structured schedule was not rigidly applied. Workers were 
encouraged to deviate from the structure in order to expand upon their recollections, 
and researchers were sensitive to workers responding in such a way as to open up new 
lines of inquiry.  Accordingly, interviews were simultaneously exploratory and 
researchers ‘thought on their feet’ pursuing areas that had not been – indeed could not 
be – anticipated in advance of the interviews.  In other words, as a research team we 
were aware of the danger of retaining too close a control over the interview which might 
prevent the capture of data that would broaden our understanding of the realities of 
working life at ICL Stockline.  
 
Thus, we operationalised Kvale’s (1983: 174) injunction to ensure that the purpose of 
the qualitative interview is to capture descriptions of the participant’s life and to gain an 
understanding of the meanings they attach to particular experiences.  Such a purpose 
can only be achieved if the participant is allowed to inform the researcher of how best 
such aims can best be realised.  To repeat, the governing principle was that the 
participant is best placed to describe their life and explain how they derive meaning 
from a given experience.  As such the researchers acted as a ‘guides’ rather than 
‘controllers’, an approach consistent with the notion of the interview as an interactive 
process rather than a ‘top down’ fact gathering exercise (Anderson and Jack, 1991: 25; 
Bozzolli, 2002: 149).  
 
 
2.7 Methods of Financial Analysis 
 
In order to find the publicly available financial information we went to Companies House.  
All limited companies in the UK are registered at Companies House, an Executive 
Agency of the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR).  
 
The main functions of Companies House are to:  
• incorporate and dissolve limited companies;  
• examine and store company information delivered under the Companies Act and 
related legislation; and  
• make this information available to the public.  
 
Our financial analysis concentrated on the financial year before the explosion, the year 
of the explosion and the following year (the most up to date year on record).   
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ICL Plastics Limited and the companies which it controlled submitted three types of 
reports to Companies House.   
 
1 363s Annual Return.  This typically contains the following information- 
• the name of the company;  
• its registered number;  
• the type of company it is, for example, private or public;  
• the registered office address of the company;  
• the address where certain company registers are kept if not at the 
registered office;  
• the principal business activities of the company; 
• the name and address of the company secretary;  
• the name, usual residential address, date of birth, nationality and business 
occupation of all the company's directors;  
• the date to which the annual return is made-up (the made-up date).  
(and if the company has share capital, the annual return must also 
contain:  
• the nominal value of total; 
• the names and addresses of shareholders and the number and type of 
shares they hold or transfer from other shareholders.  
 
2 The Current Appointments Report 
 
3 The Unaudited and Abbreviated Accounts 
Abbreviated accounts of a small company must include:  
• the abbreviated balance sheet and notes;  
 
 
From these documents we were able to ascertain the key players involved as well as to 
garner limited financial information from the Balance Sheets. 
 
 
2.8 Built Environment and Building Regulatory Research 
 
Dr Stirling Howieson of the University of Strathclyde initially became involved when 
contacted by the BBC (Frontline Scotland).  He was asked for his opinion of the 
structural system and whether it was possible that the building had collapsed under its 
own weight or the weight of the materials being stored.  He was also shown the 
testimonies of many workers claiming that the building had been displaying several 
signs structural stress.  It was also reported that the building had in the recent past been 
the subject of major alterations; it was reported that a slapping – ‘entrance‘ had 
occurred on the first floor to facilitate a new fork-lift loading bay.  Such work would have 
required a Building Warrant.  A search was then undertaken of both the archives held 
by GDC Building Control (after 1981) and the Mitchell Library (before 1981).  
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2.9 Conclusion and Ethical Considerations 
 
The methods used to explore Stockline have been well documented and well tested.  
They provide a valid and rigorous way of researching the subject and at the same time 
engaging with those most affected by such incidents.  As described under 2.6 above, 
the necessary ethical steps were taken in the study to obtain informed consent of those 
participating and to protect their anonymity and confidentiality.  
 
A final comment should be made regarding the importance this study has attached to 
worker testimonies as a source of informed data.  We concur fully with the observation 
made by Francis Green in an important recent study of work intensity. Green (2005: 3) 
argued that,  
 
for understanding the world of work, these informants are in an unrivalled 
position: they are the ones doing and experiencing the work, and for many 
aspects of work no other observers can generate more reliable information. 
 
 
Note 
 
"In a letter dated 9th June, 2005, HSE declined our Freedom of Information request for 
all HSE documentation held in relation to ICL/Stockline.  The request was declined with 
reference to sections 30 and 31 of the Freedom of Information Act which allow for data 
to be withheld if legal proceedings are ongoing.  Throughout the period that we 
researched this report we therefore had no access to HSE documentation or records of 
regulatory contacts with the plant.  It should also be made clear that this report did not 
seek to influence the outcome of the criminal case against the ICL companies.  Indeed, 
we have delayed publication of findings until the case had been concluded to avoid 
prejudicing the outcome of the case.  This report investigates the circumstances 
surrounding the explosion on the 11th May 2004 from an entirely different perspective 
than the criminal investigation.  As a comprehensive, worker-led investigation into the 
working conditions that were evident in the years and months leading up to the 
ICL/Stockline tragedy it presents evidence that take a broader sweep of the relevant 
management, workplace and regulatory contexts rather than the immediate criminal 
causes of the explosion." 
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Section 3 Company Structure, Workplace Profile and 
Employment Relations 
 
 
3.1 Information about the Company from Companies House 
 
Companies House records were searched at various times for the most up to date 
filings.  Three types of filings (Unaudited Abbreviated Accounts, Current Appointments 
Report and 363s Annual Return) were analysed for each part of the company for three 
financial years ending 30PthP November 2003, 2004 and 2005.  Since charges were 
brought against ICL Tech Limited and ICL Plastics Limited, we concentrate on those 
two parts of the company. 
 
3.1.1 ICL Tech 
 
ICL Tech Ltd is incorporated under the Companies Acts with registration Number 
SC54592.  It was incorporated on 26PthP November 1973 as I.C.L. Technical Plastics Ltd, 
changing its name to ICL Tech Limited on 19PthP August 1999.  The latest information 
available on the company from Companies House was filed in July 2006 (363s Annual 
Return).  At that date the sole director of the company was Campbell Hetherington 
Downie and the Company Secretary was Lorna Grace Downie.  
 
The 363s Annual Return Form also revealed that of the 18,002 issued shares, 15,000 
(86%) were owned by ICL Plastics Ltd, 3,000P16P by ICL Plastics Limited and 2 by 
Campbell Downie.  The two spellings of “limited” (Limited and Ltd) could be indicative of 
the opacity in the public information available about this company.  The two different 
spellings seem to indicate two different companies (one owning 15,000 shares and the 
other 3,000 shares).  Indeed the addresses given in the 363s return for each 
shareholder are different.  ICL Plastics Ltd address is given as Grovepark Mills, Hopehill 
Road, Glasgow, G20 7NF and ICL Plastics Limited is given as 12 Woodside Place, 
Glasgow, G3 7QN.   Yet a search of Companies House reveals that there is an ICL 
Plastics Limited and its registered office is 80 St Vincent Street, Glasgow G2 5UB. 
 
Regardless of any confusion which might be caused by the public documents, the 
ultimate parent company of ICL Tech Ltd is ICL Plastics Limited (see below). 
 
The latest filed accounts of ICL Tech Limited were for the year ended 30PthP November 
2005.  These accounts state that the company is entitled to exemption from audit under 
Section 249A (1) of the Companies Act 1985.  They also note that they are abbreviated 
accounts which were prepared in accordance with the special provisions of Part VII of 
the Companies Act 1985 relating to small companies and with the Financial Reporting 
Standard for Smaller Entities (effective June 2002).  In short, the accounts of a 
company which pleaded guilty to four health and safety breaches legally produced 
abbreviated and unaudited accounts.   
                                                 
TP
16
PT These 3,000 shares had been owned by Frank Stott. 
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ICL Tech Ltd is part of a group of companies, whose structure can be represented by 
the following Diagram. 
 
Diagram 1: Structure if the ICL Group of Companies  
 
 
 
 
3.1.2 ICL Plastics 
 
As the parent company, ICL Plastics has control over all six companies within the group 
including ICL Tech.  ICL Plastics was incorporated on 17PthP November 1961 with 
registration number (SC36982).  ICL Plastics is subject to the same charges in 
connection with the explosion in May 2004. 
  
In the year to 30PthP November 2003, the company had four directors, Lorna Downie, 
Campbell Downie, Margaret Brownlie and Stewart McColl. Both Margaret Brownlie and 
Stewart McColl lost their lives in the disaster.  In the two following years, Lorna and 
Campbell Downie remained the two sole directors with Lorna Campbell also acting as 
Company Secretary. 
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In the most recent return to Companies House filed December, 2006, the 363s Annual 
Return shows that there were 35,300P17P issued shares.  The dominant shareholder is 
Campbell Downie who owns almost 68% of the shares.  The second largest 
shareholder is RA Ferguson who owns the majority of the remaining shares (28%). 
 
The most recent accounts available at Companies House for ICL Plastics Limited (for 
year ended 30PthP November 2005) are, like the accounts of ICL Tech Limited, 
abbreviated and unaudited.  They are signed off by Campbell Downie.   
 
While it might be argued that full annual report and accounts are fairly opaque, the 
information in abbreviated accounts is significantly less than their full counterparts.  For 
example, the abbreviated accounts of ICL Plastics Limited do not contain profit and loss 
accounts.  Moreover, ICL Plastics qualifies for exemption from preparing group 
accounts on the grounds that it is a small sized group.  The accounts for ICL Plastics 
Ltd therefore refer only to the parent company and it is impossible to tell how inter-
company transactions are dealt with.   
 
It is impossible to tell from the accounts of all the companies in the group, which were 
prepared on an “historic cost” basis, how much the assets (land, buildings, equipment 
and so on) are currently worth.  Some of the land potentially occupies prime real estate.  
In particular, the land on which Grove Park Mills was situated would have lucrative 
development potential. 
 
One figure in the accounts which is stated at current value is cash. The accounts 
demonstrate that ICL Plastics owned significant amounts of cash. 
 
 
Financial Year ended Cash holding 
30PthP November 2003 £897,511 
30PthP November 2004 £455,187 
30PthP November 2005 £749,950 
 
 
The latest accounts also reveal that by the end of November 2005 “the amounts and 
allocations of insurance recoveries have yet to be fully specified” with respect to the 
event on 11 May 2004. 
                                                 
TP
17
PT CH Downie 23,992; JH Downie 4; NC Downie 4; RA Ferguson 10,000; JS McColl 1,300 
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3.1.3 Conclusions from the Financial Information 
 
Overall there are four strong messages which can be taken from the accounts. 
 
• The accounts are highly suggestive that Campbell Downie was in control of 
the whole group of companies.  He was a director in the parent as well as 
each part of the company except Brisbay.  Nicholas Downie was a director of 
Brisbay.  In terms of ownership, Campbell Downie was the majority 
shareholder owning almost 68% of the shares.   
 
• There is little doubt that the parent company was cash rich.  Moreover, it 
owns potentially valuable land.  Any suggestion that ICL was in too precarious 
a financial position to pay adequate compensation to the workforce, would be 
unethical.  Moreover, it is clear from the parent company accounts that it is 
expecting a payout from their insurers.  The likely amount of this does not 
appear in the accountsP18P. 
 
• In terms of documents which provide accountability and transparency to 
stakeholders, the accounts are poor.  It is difficult to ascertain how much 
salary was paid to the directors.  While the accounts do not show any 
dividends being paid to the shareholders, directors who were also 
shareholders could have received generous salaries, as could have the 
Company Secretaries. 
 
• The issue of small company audits are raised   Stuart Riddell, head of ACCA 
Scotland wroteP19P that audit ‘is both a valuable discipline and a guarantor of 
good financial housekeeping internally, and the best source of comfort for 
external stakeholders’.  It could be argued that in the case of ICL Plastics, the 
accounts were indeed of little comfort to stakeholders.  Riddell also was 
concerned that ‘one of the main dangers in abolishing the statutory audit is a 
distinctly higher risk of fraud’.  While there is no suggestion of fraud in the ICL 
Plastics group, the case remains that a lack of auditing could leave 
companies open to such accusations. 
 
 
                                                 
TP
18
PT From the two day hearing at the High Court in Glasgow, it appears that the company received £420,000 from 
their insurers.  This figure has not been verified by the authors. 
TP
19
PT Stuart Riddell,  As I See It Raising The Annual Audit Threshold Is A Mistake,  The Scotsman, June 6, 2003, 
Friday, Pg. 27  
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3.2 Management Structure and Workforce Composition 
 
The extent to which Campbell Downie exercised personal control over the parent 
company and its subsidiaries seems to be confirmed by the evidence presented above 
in Section 3.1.  It seems clear also that he maintained close control over the operations 
of the factory.  The evidence from workers’ testimonies suggests that Campbell Downie 
attended the premises on a daily basis, walked through the workshops regularly and 
took most decisions of any significance regarding the operations.  Indeed, Downie’s 
remit, according to testimonies, would extend to matters such as pay determination or 
spending money on new equipment.  
 
In these circumstances of Downie’s highly personalised control, authority was delegated 
to the position of the MD, latterly Stewart McColl who, according to worker accounts, 
extended this apparently authoritarian managerial style to the day-to-day running of the 
factory.  As the evidence indicates (see particularly section 3.8), management was 
hostile to trade unions and employment relations were characterised by an absence of 
consultation with the workforce on either a formal or informal basis.  
 
Other managerial positions included Ian Mavers, who is reported as apparently having 
responsibility for health and safety, Nicholas Downie, Margaret Brownlie (as company 
secretary) and Bill Masterton (manager of the coating shop).  Over 50 were employed at 
ICL/Stockline, a total distributed amongst the various departments and sections as 
follows; 12 in fabrication, 7 in coating, 2 in despatch, around a dozen in various ancillary 
positions and the remainder in the offices.  
 
 
3.3 Layout of the Building 
 
Grovepark Mills was a four storey building.  Beneath the ground floor was a cellar or 
basement.  Evidence from worker testimonies indicates that the basement contained 
the shot blasting machinery and that a large number of steel supports (ACRO props) 
were situated here (see section 7.4).  The following diagrams (not to scale) of the other 
floors were created in the course of the risk-mapping exercise on the basis of 
information provided by ex-workers.  In this section, we provide brief descriptions of 
each of the floors – what they housed and their activities – while detailed consideration 
of their potential hazards is considered in below (Section 4.5).  The ground floor and its 
annex contained many processes and much machinery including the fabrication 
sections, coating shop, compressor room, shot blasters, electric and gas ovens, pallet 
and powder storage, gas tanks, heaters, various offices and dispatch.  
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Diagram 2: Ground Floor 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 3: Annex 
 
 
The first floor contained a variety of store rooms, racks, pallets, lockers, tools, forklift 
trucks, CNC milling machines, ovens, a canteen, a sink, toilets, an additional room with 
a second lathe and grinding and milling equipment.  
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Diagram 4: First Floor 
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Diagram 5: Second Floor 
 
 
 
 
The second floor contained the general offices of ICL and Stockline, the personnel 
offices, accounts, computer rooms, storage space, toilets, a meeting room and a large 
open area.  The third floor housed more storage areas - including more tools – a paper 
store, plastic exhibition stands and paper records.  At one time there used to be an 
electrician’s room on this floor which then became a store room for Andy Galloway’s 
materials.  A gas boiler was also situated on this floor.  Above this floor there was a flat 
roof.  
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Diagram 6: Third Floor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4 Manufacturing Processes 
 
Academic studies have attempted to classify small and medium sized firms according to 
various criteria.  Following Scott et al’s (1989) classification, ICL/Stockline undoubtedly 
falls within the ‘low technology’ category which, as the authors emphasise, follows a 
relatively predictable pattern of low wages and few opportunities for the development of 
employees.  There was a consensus amongst the workers that the principles driving 
management priorities were two-fold - the minimisation of costs and the maximisation of 
profits.  As one worker expressed succinctly, 
 
They were looking to get the production out as quickly as possible and as soon 
as possible, no matter at what cost. (W1) 
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3.4.1 Fabrication 
 
Fabrication took place in what the workers describes as an annexe, or attachment on 
the side of the old building.  Fabrication consisted of batch production of variable 
volume, ranging from the most common small runs lasting only a few hours or over a 
day, to the infrequent larger quantities lasting several days or weeks.  Variability could 
mean that orders could be repeats or alternately could involve one-off products.  In the 
words of one fabrication worker, 
  
Generally, it was all different things.  You could be working with different 
materials, anything from a tank for a fire brigade, for the inside of a fire 
engine to some wee, tiny things, you know, like a cassette case.  There 
wasn’t a single product.  It was really just whatever the customer was 
looking for. We did thousands of different things (W2).  
 
The consequence of this dominant pattern of short batch production was that workers 
usually did not know from day to day what they would be working on.  
 
The products changed on a daily basis; you could be doing machine 
guards one day, sheets the next, stuff for Marconi and GEC.  You could 
even be doing half a dozen different things even in the one day.  It was 
not very often that we did high volume stuff.  We did work for hospitals, 
the oil industry, the computer industry, the car industry.  We were making 
safety guards for machines in other industries, which was a bit of a joke, 
when there were no guards on some of our machines! (W2) 
 
Characterised by these jobbing production methods company policy at ICL/Stockline, in 
common with many small firms, appeared to involve taking all the work that was offered, 
irrespective of whether the production system could cope with the demands.  In this 
sense, the outcome was that ICL/Stockline approximated Lawlor’s (1988) depiction of 
this type of undertaking, as a ‘do-it-all plant which satisfied no strategy’. 
 
Around a dozen worked in the main fabrication area on the one shift, from 8am to 5pm.  
A couple more were attached to fabrication worked in an outbuilding where there was a 
vacuum forming machine and a CNC router. 
 
The fabrication process began with sheets of plastic material, which were either cut to 
the required size or remained a full sheet of dimensions such as 10x6 or 8x4.  These 
sheets would then be worked upon in various ways - sawed to a specified size, placed 
in an oven to format, machined, cemented or welded together – depending on the 
particular material and the nature of the product.  Other cutting processes took place in 
the fabrication section, including the cutting of MDF.  Chemicals were used to bond, or 
cement, pieces together.  It was not just in the coating shop that ovens were used.  In 
fabrication, electric ovens were employed to finish off the product. 
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3.4.2 Coating 
 
Six were employed in the coating department, in which a number of specific processes 
took place.  First, incoming parts would be blasted with fine aluminium powder, prior to 
being dip-coated.  Second, the parts would be degreased using a chemical whose 
proprietary name is Genklene (Trichlorethane).  Third, products would be coated. 
Fourth, they would be cooked in gas ovens to harden. 
 
One long-serving coating shop worker described some of these processes in his section 
of the factory.  
 
[The material coming in] has to be degreased.  What happens is that it 
gets cleaned, and if needed you shot blast them.  The blasting machine 
has got two arms.  You put rubber gloves on, and you put your hands in 
the two holes, hold the hose and look through a window at the part.  You 
press foot pedals and the shot comes out at high pressure.  You’ve got to 
hold on to the hose or it’s away.  And then you turn the part over and 
whack everything you see.  Once you’ve done that you open the door, 
the dust hits your face, you take the part out and see if it is all blasted.  If 
it is then you blow it down with high pressure air to get all the shot off it 
because you can’t coat it when it’s full of shot. (W3) 
 
Once you get the parts shot blasted, you need to put them in the oven to 
heat them up, you can’t spray them cold.  You would heat them up to a 
certain temperature and then you would have this wee box that took the 
temperature of the part.  It has got to be spot on to spray it because if it is 
too cold you will get runs on it and if it is too warm it will burn…when it 
came to the right temperature, you took the tray with the parts on them to 
your spray booth, put in on a pedestal and turned the thing so you could 
spray the whole lot.  [You would spray] standing at a booth, with an 
extractor in that booth. (W3) 
 
 
3.4.3 Despatch 
 
A small department of two workers was responsible for examining materials that came 
into the factory, checking specifications, colour, size, thickness etc.  This department 
was also concerned with sending out parts that were to be subcontracted, and then 
having these parts uplifted and returned to the factory.  These tasks were combined 
with the general housekeeping of the stores areas.  
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3.5 Employment Relations at ICL/Stockline  
 
The absence of consultation - whether formal or informal - with the workforce over 
health and safety issues appears to have been a reflection of the wider industrial 
relations practices.  The conclusions, that the management style was highly autocratic 
and that the overall character of industrial relations stemmed from the legacy of 
personal ownership and control by Campbell Downie, seem inescapable.  Although it 
seems clear that the Downies did divest authority to the Managing Director, who was 
responsible for the day-to-day running of the establishment, it would be mistaken to 
regard the MD as having significant autonomy.  Ultimately, the style and substance of 
decision making, and the exercise of authority, appears to have rested with the Downie 
family.  
 
The consequence was a mode of unilateral workforce management that permitted no 
employee voice, let alone consultation, to say nothing of formalised negotiation. 
Employees provided numerous examples of this managerial style. 
 
 
If you went to Personnel, which is supposed to be personal right, the way 
you had to do it was if you left fabrication you went up onto the first floor to 
fabrication and you went up two flights of stairs, you walked along a wee 
corridor, maybe 10 yards, you went into Personnel.  You would speak to 
Personnel and tell them whatever was wrong, or what you weren’t happy 
with.  So you would say, ‘Cheerio, I’m away downstairs’.  When you got to 
the fabrication door, they would be standing waiting for you coming down to 
send you back up to Stewart McColl’s office because you had been in and 
complained about something. (W4). 
 
 
ICL/Stockline: An Example of Management’s Authoritarian Style 
 
[A manager] died.  Now he had been at my partner’s funeral and when he 
died I took a white shirt and a black tie in to go to his funeral that day and I 
was getting ready to go and Stewart McColl’s secretary came in and said to 
me ‘You’re not going to Colin’s funeral’.  I said, ‘What are you talking about?  I 
have brought a white shirt and black tie in,  [The deceased manager] was at 
my wife’s funeral.  I’m going to respect him for being there’.  I lost the rag with 
her and started shouting…she went back up the stair and told Stewart McColl. 
Stewart McColl said ‘Up the stair’.  I went up the stair and there’s Bill 
Masterton who didn’t know what to say, you know, he is sitting there and the 
secretary is sitting there and I’m sitting in front of him.  ‘Who told you about 
[the manager’s] funeral?  I said, well he went to my wife’s funeral, I thought I 
could go and pay my respects to him because I knew him well’.  ‘No, we need 
you for production, Bill Masterton is going and [another worker] is going, 
you’re not going’.  
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I says, ‘Well, I think you’re out of order Stewart’ and he basically said, ‘No, 
you’re out of order’ and he said ‘That’s my decision, you’re not going’.  I had 
to get up and walk out.  I took a grievance against him.  I didn’t like him for 
what he done to me.  And they all went to the funeral and they all came back 
in.  I had words with Stewart again.  I said, ‘I don’t think that was very fair what 
you done with me’.  ‘Aye, but production comes first’ [McColl replied].  I said, 
‘But a colleague died and we were all talking about it in the work.  What 
Stewart should have done was shut the factory down for a few hours, hired a 
bus and took us to his funeral and then all went back to work again, happy we 
had been to his funeral and paid our respects. (W5) 
 
 
3.6 Cost Minimisation and Labour Utilisation 
 
Clearly, cost minimisation was a central underlying imperative linking the production 
process, market niche, managerial style and labour utilisation.  In terms of the latter, 
ICL/Stockline attempted to introduce job rotation, a form of what is known as functional 
flexibility, in order to contain labour costs. 
 
 
Stewart McColl told Bill Masterton, the manager of the coating shop, that he 
wanted everybody trained to do everything so if anybody was off on holiday 
or off sick somebody else could step in and do all the jobs.  So I started 
spraying [which hadn’t been my job]. (W1) 
 
Workers reported increasing pressure on them to complete production, which they 
believed was the company’s specific response to an increasingly competitive 
marketplace.  This pressure took the form of injunctions by the Managing Director to 
work more efficiently. 
 
There was a push by Stewart McColl…He kept going on about the European 
market and how hard it was to keep the customers happy [and that] we were 
only there to work (W1).  
 
Apart from exhortations to increase effort, workers faced increased monitoring in the 
attempt to raise productivity.  Each was given a sheet on which they were to enter the 
time taken to complete a job, which then provided Stewart McColl with the necessary 
data to challenge individual workers.  This represented a move towards intensification 
and an increase in formal control, replacing some of the more informal practices that 
had previously governed labour utilisation.  Hitherto, as long as production targets had 
been met, it was not considered necessary to micromanage worker output.  Of course, 
this is not to underestimate the degree of hierarchical compulsion and exercise of 
unilateral authority that had always been a part of employee relations, but is to 
emphasise that the prevailing ethos of ‘just get on with it’, reinforced by the authoritative 
culture, had been sufficient to achieve desired levels of output. 
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3.7 Determination of Pay and Terms and Conditions 
 
Concomitant with the unitarist philosophy that underlay employee relations, were an 
individualism and unilateralism that underpinned managerial policy and practice in the 
area of pay and rewards.  There were no procedures for raising pay, nor for deciding 
who would receive bonuses, nor for the level at which additional payments would be 
set.  Workers complained of heavy-handedness, arbitrariness and favouritism by 
management in questions of pay determination.  
 
At the global policy and financial level Downie appeared to exercise total control.  At an 
operational level authority for the day-to-day running of the factory was delegated to the 
Managing Director, although even here Downie was heavily involved in operational 
matters.  Workers recalled a meeting at which management communicated their 
intentions on pay. 
 
Stewart McColl came down one afternoon…with a sidekick who sat in the 
background while he more or less preached.  We were down below and 
he was at the top of the stairs, and was giving the big man talk, ‘There’ll 
be this and that’. (W1) 
There were conditions attached to a pay rise.  Work harder, and ‘you 
must agree to do a certain amount of overtime a year’ and all that. (W5) 
 
 
On occasions, individual workers would approach managers to request a pay increase, 
although some perceived this as a pointless exercise given workers’ perceived 
powerlessness in the face of an inflexible management.  
 
If you had the balls to ask for a pay rise you would go for it but you would 
know the answer anyway.  It was irrelevant.  I don’t think [the pay rise 
you received] was about the work you were doing.  I think if they liked 
you and you didn’t cause any problems you got something.  If you were a 
problem you got nothing. (W1) 
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There was no structured engagement with the workforce in the form of consultation, nor 
any agreed annual pay date when pay would be reviewed or increased.  One worker 
recalled the time when, 
 
Stewart McColl came down himself and he took us all individually into 
Bill’s office and he said, ‘Right, I’m reviewing the pay rises, blah, blah, 
blah and this is what I am intending to give you.  Do you agree with it?  I 
replied ‘But I have got terms and conditions here’.  He said, ‘You work 
harder and you try and do production quicker and you will work so many 
hours overtime a year’.  And I disagreed with him on that and said, ‘I can’t 
do overtime [because of domestic circumstances] which would mean 
being out of the house from 7 in the morning till 8 o’clock at night. (W5) 
 
 
Bonuses were discretionary and, similar to the awarding of pay increases, reflected 
favouritism and capriciousness on the part of management.  
 
When it came to Xmas there would maybe be a bonus.  It would cause 
friction because he [McColl] would give a bonus to some folk and not to 
others and the people he would cut were the people he didn’t like.  It was 
paid into your wages and the amount of bonus people got was different. 
He was the man who would sign, it was at his discretion.  Again it was 
bully tactics. (W5) 
 
It was like, ‘You do it my way or you don’t do it at all’.  That was the way I 
thought Stewart was working.  And if you have not got a trade union what 
can you do? (W1) 
 
The pay of new starts was just above the national minimum wage, but the highest paid 
manufacturing worker was reputed to earn £9.00 per hour gross.  Workers could not be 
certain of the exact levels of pay of their fellow employees, largely because of the lack 
of transparency and openness in the method of pay determination.  However, according 
to the testimonies, most workers were closer to the bottom of the range than the top, 
and for some this was not due to the fact that they were new starts, but because of 
arbitrariness on the part of management.  
 
…if you were in favour you got a higher amount…I never got a week’s 
rise since Stewart McColl came to the place (W2).  
 
Neither did I. (W4) 
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Workers also reported a reduction over time in the amount of money workers could earn 
through bonuses.  Evidently, bonuses, historically, had formed a sizable proportion of 
workers’ pay packets.  However, it was reported that during the period when Peter 
Marshall was Managing Director of ICL Tech the practice of paying relatively generous 
bonuses ceased.  Some workers detected a Machiavellian motive in his appointment.  
 
It changed you know, that was one of the big things.  Peter Marshall was 
the MD, he was only there for two years and I think it was calculated.  I 
really do think he was brought in as an excuse to chop and change and it 
was during this time that the bonuses went.  He tried to change our 
hours.  He tried to do all sorts of different things.  And then they said, ‘We 
had to get rid of him’ and they made out that he was wrecking the 
place…Peter Marshall was put there to do us, right.  He was just a 
puppet that was controlled by Campbell Downie and the rest of them. 
Peter Marshall could make no decisions about anything.  He couldn’t buy 
anything. He couldn’t do anything.  So he was just there to come up with 
this master plan that was going to go wrong and they would jump up and 
say, ‘Look we can’t see any of your bonuses, we can’t see any wage rise 
and we are really, really sorry, but it’s all his fault and we’ll get rid of him’. 
(W4) 
 
Symptomatic of the company’s preoccupation with minimising labour costs was the 
decision taken to reduce holiday entitlement. Ironically, the trigger was the introduction 
to UK employment law of the European Working Time Directive in 1998.  The principle 
underlying the regulations in respect of holidays was that they would provide workers 
with a minimum allowance that, in practice, would lead to an increase in time-off in 
those cases of poorest provision. One worker recalled,  
 
See when the holiday thing came out – you must get a minimum of 20 
days holiday a year – we were actually getting 28 days and they started 
cutting it to 20 days…They gave us this form to sign, and I refused to 
sign it. I said, ‘I don’t get 20 holidays a year, I get 28 days’, and I gave it 
back. So he then came up with a draft that was even worse’. (W2)  
 
In fact, management’s interpretation, that these regulations could be used to dilute 
employees’ existing holiday entitlement, was mistaken.  Section 7 of the regulations 
explicitly states the following, 
 
This entitlement is not in addition to any annual leave given to a worker under an 
employment contract.  One is set off against the other, so that the amount of 
leave a worker gets is whichever of the two kinds of leave is longer.  (Accessed 
at Uhttp://www.dti.gov.uk/er/work_time_regs/wtr7.htm#section7U) 
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In short, to reduce holiday leave entitlement from the provision laid out in an existing 
contract is contrary to the Working Time Regulations.  According to workers, this 
mistaken interpretation of an important aspect of a new set of regulations was not a 
one-off, but a reflection of a more general lack of competence in, and understanding of, 
employment law and appropriate procedures. 
 
Lorna [Downie] just did not have a clue about any sort of rules and 
regulations regarding employment.  She would tell you a pack of lies. 
(W2)  
 
 
3.8 Company Attitudes to Trade Unionism  
 
The fact that no trade union exists at ICL/Stockline is the outcome of several factors.  
The most salient of these is not so much the lack of support for trade unionism by the 
workers, but rather the company’s overt opposition to any form of collective employee 
organisation.  It was reported by longer-serving employees that attempts had been 
made several years previously to form a trade union in the plant.  
 
And the MD at the time, Frank Stott, said more or less that if it ever 
happened whoever was responsible would not be there for long. 
Something along those lines…(W4) 
 
 
Employees contended that this deep-rooted managerial antipathy to trade unionism had 
been sustained over many years by senior management.  When asked the question 
whether ICL Stockline was non-union simply because no union had ever been formed, 
or anti-union, the consensus among the workers interviewed was that it was the latter.  
For example, as this worker graphically explained, anti-unionism was inextricably 
related to the autocratic and highly personalised form of management. 
 
Anti-union. Stewart McColl was anti-everything.  It was him.  He was the 
most important thing to him.  He was everybody.  He was the lawyer, jury 
and judge.  He was the lot.  He told you what he done.  He made the 
verdict. (W4) 
 
 
A number of the interviewees understood that there was a close relationship between 
the failure of management to respond to workers’ concerns and the absence of trade 
unionism.  For example, one expressed the following view. 
 
I don’t know whether it was because there was no trade union in the 
place, you couldn’t complain to a trade union, you know what I mean. 
And basically, if you complained up the stair they would say ‘Just get on 
with it’.  You were basically scared to complain because you got bullied. 
(W5) 
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Section 4 Hazards at ICL/Stockline 
 
This section reports on the hazards associated with the plastics industry in general and 
the hazards workers were exposed to at the ICL/Stockline Maryhill factory in particular.  
The substances and materials used by ICL/Stockline and workers’ experiences of 
exposures to those substance and materials will be considered in detail.  
 
 
4.1 Hazards in the Plastics Industry 
 
Plastics production covers ‘resin manufacture, plastic processing and combustion’ 
(Lewis in Ladou 1997:514).  By 1977, the United States National Institute of 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) guide to occupational diseases included 
dozens of references to the adverse health effects of the plastics industry.  The health 
hazards facing plastics workers have been recognised for several decades and have 
included skin, neurological and respiratory problems (PRI, 1980; Tosti 1993; Lewis 
1999; Wong 1999).  In addition to chemical hazards, plastics workers often face other 
dust hazards, noise and vibration hazards, hot and cold working conditions, transport 
and manual handling hazards, machinery hazards and poor welfare arrangements. 
 
Chronic bronchitis in workers exposed to plastics compounds such as isocyanates and 
phenolics has been well established as has exposure to hepatotoxic chemicals and 
non-specific central nervous system effects linked to organic solvent exposure (Levy 
and Wegman 1995:273,453,593).  High occupational asthma rates have also been 
widely recognised in the UK for plastics making and processing and for those exposed 
to isocyanates (O’Neill 1995: 111).  Others have noted that solvents such as 
trichloroethylene and methyl methacrylate, widely used in the plastics industry, have 
caused peripheral neuropathy (Markowtiz in Rosenstock and Cullen 1994: 495,787).  
There has been some debate about the possible carcinogenicity of methyl methacrylate, 
especially colo-rectal cancer, which was downplayed by an ICI study (Tomenson 2005). 
 
The various chemicals and processes – with over 50 different forms of plastics 
produced into the 1990s- used in the industry, both for thermoset (TS) and 
thermoplastic products (TP), have caused a wide range of diseases (Greenberg 1997: 
373-376).  However, determining which plastics, additives and breakdown products - 
and in what combinations and in what processes and conditions – caused particular 
adverse effects in plastics workers has often proved far more challenging.  The 
production of effective engineering controls to prevent worker exposure to such 
chemicals has also proved highly problematic. 
 
ICL/Stockline made vacuum moulded products by cutting, moulding and finishing sheet 
plastic.  The last stage involved solvent use.  Stockline used TP and TS materials and 
several additives. Peroxides, used as hardeners, can cause skin irritation and MEK 
peroxide was used at ICL/Stockline.  In addition several types of curing agent were 
apparently used at ICL/Stockline. 
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Flame retardants used in plastics present a different set of risks as do filler and 
pigments.  Isocyanates used in polyurethane and other polymer manufacture have long 
been recognised as very serious sensitisers and causes of occupational asthma at very 
low exposure levels indeed and some, like TDI and TDA are now classified as 
carcinogens.  MDI, a potent asthmagen, was apparently used at ICL/Stockline. Polymer 
plastics that are methacrylate-based may cause sensitisation and are powerful irritants 
to eyes, skin and mucous membrane.  Methyl methacrylate was used at ICL/Stockline.  
As early as 1976, internationally used toxicology guides were pointing out the hazards 
of this chemical and indicating preventive measures should include chemical cartridge 
respirators (Plunkett, 1976:273).  Epoxy resins, also used at the plant, were well known 
sensitisers, and suspect carcinogens.  Styrene, a major solvent and monomer in the 
plastics industry was present in commercial products used at the plant too.  Styrene 
affects the CNS, can cause dermatitis and is also known to be genotoxic.  By 1997, 
occupational health professionals had documented a wide range of chemical and 
physical hazards attached to materials, processes and machinery in the plastics 
industry.  One occupational doctor noted in the 1990s that,  
 
…workers this industry face many health hazards and require proper medical 
surveillance and workplace controls.  Specific engineering controls that are 
needed include adequate ventilation and exhaust systems with regular air 
monitoring and properly fitted personal protective equipment. (Greenberg, 
1997:376).  
 
From the accounts provided to us by the ex-Stockline workers and the evidence 
encapsulated in HSE correspondence and statutory notices, it is difficult to identify such 
measures in force, year on year, in the ICL/Stockline plant at Maryhill. 
 
 
4.2 Stockline ‘Plastics’ 
 
The most comprehensive independent data about what substances were used in 
ICL/Stockline, how they were used and with what engineering controls and personal 
protective equipment (PPE) should lie with HSE audits of the plant.  The lack of 
availability of this data is partly due to the apparent destruction of the company records 
in the disaster.  In addition, the HSE declined to disclose information about the plant 
whilst the investigation of the causes of the multiple fatalities and related legal actions 
were under consideration. It is not possible to ascertain with any certainty exactly what 
exposure levels to what substances occurred in the plant.  Where there were 
engineering controls in the plant, again data do not exist over several years to establish 
how effective or ineffective those controls were.  We do, however, possess the worker 
accounts of the state of the engineering controls and some reports from HSE indicate 
where, at a particular moment in time, ventilation systems were or were not in place and 
operating. 
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Many of the chemicals used at ICL/Stockline presented potentially serious threats to 
human health.  As early as 1983, EU guides indicated that those working with 
dichloromethane (methylene chloride), used at ICL/Stockline, should have a complete 
medical history taken and examination conducted to ensure employees did not have 
pre-existing conditions that might be aggravated by exposure to this chemical. Hazards 
in September 1986 flagged the possible carcinogenicity and other effects of this 
chemical.   (Similar undertakings were specified for isocyanates also present at 
ICL/Stockline).  Such tests for dichloromethane would include liver function and nerve 
conduction tests.  This should be followed by at least yearly medical examinations (Roi, 
1983:55-56).  Similar medical exams were advocated for those working with styrene 
and trichloroethylene, again both present at Stockline, in terms of CNS system, skin, 
blood, liver and kidneys.  Selection of safe or less hazardous substances, use of 
effective, well sited and maintained and inspected engineering controls, enclosure of 
hazardous substances and processes, availability of effective, well maintained, well 
fitted and carefully stored PPE all form part of the HSE’s sound hierarchy of decision-
making to control, substances hazardous to health under COSHH and related health 
and safety legislation. 
 
At ICL/Stockline, known highly hazardous substances, materials and processes were 
used and former employees provided accounts that indicate, in many different respects, 
such substances at various times were not controlled at all by engineering methods. 
Indeed in several instances, there was no extraction or proper local exhaust ventilation 
systems available.  Later visits by HSE inspectors reveal that enclosure of some 
dangerous processes to prevent exposure to fumes and dust were entirely absent as 
evidenced by HSE requirements for such enclosures to be introduced.  In several 
instances also, workers were initially provided with no protective equipment and later  
only with masks or gloves but not apparently with associated information, instruction, 
training and supervision to make sense of the decision to purchase and use such PPE 
in a suitable manner.  There is also, from an external health and safety professional 
perspective, little sign in the accounts provided of a systematic approach to health and 
safety within the plant.  We have seen no health and safety manuals, no group or plant 
specific safety policies, and no technical guidance that allow us to assess how effective 
the control of substances hazardous to health was in the plant from the 1970s onwards, 
notwithstanding attempts by the research team to obtain them.   
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What we do have are some data sheets held by the company or available from 
manufacturers and suppliers indicating a range of hazardous substances which could 
present a range of acute and chronic, short-term and long-term adverse effects to those 
exposed to them.  We also have an extensive set of accounts from former workers who 
list a wide range of signs and symptoms that they experienced when operating various 
production processes and when exposed to a range of dusts and fumes often in hot and 
very poorly ventilated workrooms.  Workers also reported the presence of asbestos in 
the building and in manufacturing.  The following segment of a discussion between two 
workers identifies one particular colleague as responsible for cutting asbestos.  
 
They would send ‘Big x’ up the roof, up to the top flat to get asbestos. Mind 
that? (W2) 
 
Aye, cutting asbestos strips up there. Used to send x up to do it. (W4) 
 
Used to send big x up there. (W2) Everyone else told him where to go. (W4) 
 
X used to go up with his bottle of Irn Bru, his alarm clock and his book. And the 
reason he did that was he knew nobody would go up there. (W2) 
 
But the thing was, see when they were doing that asbestos up there the floor in 
the top flat was full of holes and you could actually look down the holes and see 
the people working below you. Seriously! (W4)  
 
This reported use of asbestos raises fundamental questions regarding ICL/Stockline’s 
health and safety practices.  Furthermore, as this section will detail, there is particularly 
serious evidence of acute asbestos exposures in the coating process.  
 
In a plant such as this, it clear that potential exposures to diverse combinations of 
substances associated with a wide range of health effects could have been inhaled, 
ingested or absorbed by production workers.  The nature of the often strenuous work 
activities and high temperatures may have led to particularly high inhalation of fumes 
and dust and possibly greater than expected skin absorption of some substances or 
mixtures of substances. 
 
In addition, we have evidence from workers’ testimonies of a range of serious injuries 
that occurred in the plant as a result of health and safety incidents in the plant over the 
years.  From the evidence in the interviews, it appears that over a decade or more, at 
least 13 employees were admitted to the Western Infirmary for emergency treatment 
and at least 6 people were off with accidents for three days or more; one being off for 
around a year.  
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4.3 Substances and Materials 
 
Glasgow Technical Services produced a report on the site of the factory immediately 
after the disaster and listed the chemicals and materials that they could identify on site 
at that time.  The table below is based on the Glasgow list, correspondence between 
HSE and other parties prior to the major incident and information received from several 
ex-employees.  
 
The conditions of use of the substances in this list appear to have varied considerably 
over the many years of the plant’s existence.  Elsewhere in this section are details of 
the health and safety systems at the plant and the working practices that prevailed with 
regard to using many of the materials in this list.  The working practices, the engineering 
control measures, the training and supervision of operators and the availability and use 
of PPE including RPE that were used in the plant do not, according to observations of 
former employees always tally with the directions laid down in the data sheets and 
apparently reported by the company to agencies such as the HSE in their later visits.  
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Table 1: Substances used at ICL Stockline or those to which ICL Stockline workers at Maryhill could have 
been exposed 
 
Substance Trade/other Name TLV/OES/ 
MEL 
Adverse effects 
1. data sheet/label  
2. Tox ref  
3. HSE  
asbestos – chrysotile  Various Known to cause lung diseases and several 
types of cancer. 
1-butanol Found in Canadian 
Rilprim 2002 
Canadian TLV 2002 
= 20ppm 
See Rilprim appendix below.  Recognised 
at acutely toxic and irritant (Gosselin 1984) 
Calor gas  No specific TLV Explosive 
Diaminodiphenyl methylene 
diamine 
   
Dibutylphthalate  1978, 1985, 1991 UK TLV: 
TWA = 5m/mP3 
STEL = 10mg/mP3P 
Known since at least 1980s to be an irritant 
to nasal passages, upper respiratory tract, 
stomach 
Incompatible with nitrates, strong oxidisers, 
alkalies and acids.  ACGIH TLVs 1999 
noted reproductive effects.  This is a 
synthetic oestrogen 
Dichloromethane or 
Methylene chloride 
 1978,1984, 1991  
UK TLV: 
TWA = 200ppmP 
STEL = 250ppm 
 
 
By 1980s well known that high levels of 
inhalation lead to sleepiness and light 
headedness.  Ingestion led to numbness in 
limbs and tingling and skin contact led to 
irritation, vertigo, worsens angina.  Affects 
CNS, CVS, eyes and skin. 1983 Roi.  
Mutagen and suspected animal carcinogen
n-n Dioxyethyl p-toludin Bayer product   
Diphenyl-methane   ICF TLVs 1975 noted that the effects of 
this chemical were not known but not 
believed to be hazardous because it was 
not volatile 
Diphenyl-methylene-
diisocyanate 
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Substance Trade/other Name TLV/OES/ 
MEL 
Adverse effects 
1. data sheet/label  
2. Tox ref  
3. HSE  
2-ethoxyethanol Found in Canadian 
Rilprim 2002. 
This is an ethylene 
glycol ether 
Canadian TLV 2002 = 5ppm 
(skin) 
See Rilprim appendix below.  NIOSH in 1977 
listed acute and systemic effects of this 
chemical including liver and kidney damage 
and fatigue, lethargy, headaches, nausea, 
anorexia, tremor and anaemia.  Acute toxicity 
hazard.  Affects CNS and kidneys, absorbed 
through skin (Gosselin1984). Adverse 
reproductive effects 
Formaldehyde Present in MDF  IARC human carcinogen.  Irritant to eyes, 
nose, throat, cough, bronchial spasms, 
nausea, vomiting. Asthmagen 
Furfural alcohol  1978 and 1985 UK TLV: 
TWA = 5pmP 
STEL = 10m 
(STEL in UK in 1986 
recommended to be 
increased to 15ppm as it 
was. 1991 - 15ppm also) 
Known since at least 1980s to cause, by 
inhalation, dizziness and nausea.  Diarrhoea 
and vomiting and by skin contact depression.  
Irritant (ACGIH 1999).  Respiratory hazard.  
High toxicity rating.  CNS effects.  Dermatitis.  
Severe bronchitis. 
MDF   Contains wood dust and formaldehyde:  both 
IARC carcinogens.  Offgassing of 
formaldehyde has also been reported to 
cause respiratory problems not only in MDF 
manufacturing workers but also workers 
storing and cutting MDF 
Methylated spirits    
Methylethyl ketone Butan-2-one 1985 and 1991  
UK TLV 
TWA = 200ppmP 
STEL = 300ppm 
 
Irritation and CNS effects(ACGIH 1999) 
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Substance Trade/other Name TLV/OES/ 
MEL 
Adverse effects 
1. data sheet/label  
2. Tox ref  
3. HSE  
Methyl ethyl ketone peroxide 2-butanone 
peroxide, MEK 
peroxide 
NIOSH 2005 0.2ppm 
1978 and 1985  
UK TLV: 
TWA = 0.2ppmP 
STEL = 0.2ppm 
(1991 no TWA given) 
 
toxic to eyes, skin, respiratory system, liver 
kidneys.  May cause cough, throat irritation, 
blurred vision, blisters, scars, abdominal pain, 
vomiting, diarrhoea.  Irritation and CNS 
(ACGIH 1999) 
Methyl isobutyl ketone Found in Canadian 
Rilprim 2002 
Canadian TLV  
50ppm 
See Rilprim appendix below 
Methyl methacrylate  1978 ,1985, 1991 
UK TLV: 
TWA = 100ppP 
STEL = 125ppm 
Irritation and dermatitis 
(ACGIH 1999) 
2-methyl -1-propanol Present in Canadian 
Rilprim P23 V40 
2002 Canadian TLV = 
50ppm 
See Rilprim appendix below 
Monopropylene glycol  No specific TLV. Little 
research is available on 
this chemical 
 
Paint  No specific TLV Painters are exposed to a range of neurotoxic 
and carcinogenic chemicals 
Petroleum naptha Heavy aromatic in 
Canadian Rilprim 
2002 
Canadian 2002 TLV = 
10ppm 
See Rilprim appendix below 
Petroleum distillate Gasoline No specific TLV. 
US ACGIH 1999 
TWA – 300ppm 
STEL – 500ppm 
Irritation an CNS effects (ACGIH 1999) 
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Substance Trade/other Name TLV/OES/ 
MEL 
Adverse effects 
1. data sheet/label  
2. Tox ref  
3. HSE  
Poly-tetrafluoroethylene PTFE 1978 UK TLV: 
Decomposition products.  
No TLV but airborne 
levels should be minimal 
1985, 1991 UK No TLV 
Pulmonary oedema 
(ACGIH 1999) 
1997 USA National Toxicology Programme 
reported evidence of animal carcinogenicity in 
PTFE exposures. 
Propane   Explosive gas 
Styrene Present in Tensol 
70 
Australian NOSHC TLV 
1985 
TWA – 50ppm 
STEL – 100ppm 
ACGIH 
50ppm 
2004 data sheets 
onTensol recommend 
RPE vapour cartridge 
 
NIOSH 1985 classify as hazardous.  Affects 
CNS, respiratory system, eyes and skin.  May 
affect gait, cause drowsiness.  See Tensol entry 
in appendix 
Synthetic resin Polyester resin No specific TLV. 
2004. Australian NOSHC 
dust TLV  
TWA = 10mg/mP3P 
 
Talc  Present in Tensol 
70 2004 
Australian NOSHC TLV 
2004 
TWA = 2.5mg/mP3P 
Respiratory hazard 
Tetrachloroethylene Perchloro-ethylene OSHA TWA 100ppm 
1978 ,1985, 1991  
UK TLV: 
TWA = 100ppP 
STEL = 150ppm 
 
By inhalation, irritant to nose and throat, by 
ingestion causes nausea, flushing face and 
neck, by skin contact causes vertigo, dizziness, 
incoherence 
Can damage liver, kidneys, CNS.  Evidence of 
carcinogenicity (NIOSH 1988).  Irritation and 
CNS 
(ACGIH 1999) 
 77
 
Substance Trade/other Name TLV/OES/ 
MEL 
Adverse effects 
1. data sheet/label  
2. Tox ref  
3. HSE  
Tetrahydrofuran (THF)  200pm in USA late 1980s 
1978 ,1985, 1991  
UK TLV: 
TWA = 200ppP 
STEL = 250ppm 
MSDS.  Flammable.  Precautionary measures 
needed against static discharges.  Irritant, 
narcotic effects can cause kidney or liver 
damage.  Harmful by inhalation, ingestion and 
skin absorption 
glasses, nitrile gloves, effective ventilation 
needed.  Irritation and narcosis (ACGIH 1999) 
p-toluene sulphonic acid 
solution 
Johnburn product   
1,1,1- trichloroethane Genklene or methyl 
chloroform 
USA.: 
TLV: 350 ppm; 1910 
mg/m3 (as TWA);  
450 ppm; 2460 mg/m3 (as 
STEL) (ACGIH 1994-
1995).  
Ataxia.  Dizziness.  Drowsiness.  Headache.  
Nausea.  Unconsciousness.  Dry skin.  
Redness. May affect heart and CNS and 
cause chronic liver damage 
 
Trichloroethylene Trike USA TLV 1985 
ACGIH 50ppm 
Dizziness, drowsiness, headache, weakness, 
nausea.  Affects respiratory system, heart, 
liver, kidneys, CNS and skin.  Listed as an 
animal liver and kidney carcinogen 
Wood dust   Both soft and hard woods listed as 
carcinogens by IARC 
 
(NB Substances italicised in bold relate to chemical active ingredients found in commercial products reportedly used at 
ICL/Stockline) 
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Table 2: Carcinogens 
 
Substance Cancer site 
Asbestos – chrysotile Lung cancer, mesothelioma, kidney . 
IARC Group 1. Known human 
carcinogen 
  
Dichloromethane Lung, liver. IARC 2b carcinogen – 
inadequate evidence of human 
cancers. 
Diesel exhaust IARC Group 2A. probable human 
Perchloroethylene Oesphagus, lymphoma. IARC Group 
2A. probable human 
Petroleum distillate Kidney, leukaemia (linked to 
benzene). IARC 2b carcinogen – 
inadequate evidence of human 
cancers. 
PTFE  
Styrene – styrene oxide IARC Group 2A. probable human 
Trichloroethylene Liver , lymphoma. IARC Group 2A. 
probable human 
Welding fumes Lung related to nickel, cadmium, 
chromium. IARC 2b carcinogen – 
inadequate evidence of human 
cancers. 
Wood dust – soft and hard Nasal cancer 
 
Sources. 
 
International Agency For Research on Cancer. List of Carcinogens. IARC, Lyons, 
France. 
 
Rugo in Ladou J (ed) (2004) Occupational and Environmental Medicine. 4th ed. 
Appleton  Lange . Connecticut. Pp224-261. 
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Table 3: Reproductive health hazards of substances reportedly used at 
ICL/Stockline 
 
Substance Evidence of Reproductive effects 
(F=female;M=male effects) 
Acrylates Inconclusive 
Carbon monoxide Miscarriages, low birth weight babies 
(F) 
Dibutyl phthalate Endocrine disruptor ( M and F) 
Dichloromethane ? sperm damage (M) 
Glycol ethers Various 
Isocyanates Adverse animal effects (M,F) 
Methyl ethyl ketone Insufficient human data 
Perchloroethylene Reproductive hazard (NIOSH) (M) 
Trichloroethylene Decreased libido  (M) at high levels; 
menstrual disorders (F) 
Organic solvents Menstrual disorders, fertility, 
miscarriages birth defects (F) 
Styrene Affects sperm (M).  
 
Sources 
 
Windham and Osario in Ladou J (ed) (2004) Occupational and Environmental Medicine.  
2PndP ed. Appleton  Lange . Connecticut. pp 384-412 
 
Frazier LMF and Hage M (ed) (1998)  Reproductive Hazards of the Workplace. Van 
Nostrand Reinhold. New York and London. 
 
 
Table 4: Immune effects of substances reportedly used at ICL/Stockline 
 
Substance Effect 
Diisocyanates Rhinitis and asthma 
Epoxy resins Rhinitis and asthma 
 
Source: Kishyama in Ladou (2004: 185-207 
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Table 5: Neurological effects of substances reportedly used at ICL/Stockline 
 
Substance Effect 
Methyl acrylate Possible neuropathies 
Organic solvents Chronic behavioural symptoms 
Styrene Chronic behavioural symptoms; 
chronic toxic encephalopathy 
Trichloroethylene Cranial neuropathy (trigeminal 
neuropathy), Demyelination and 
tremor 
 
Sources: Rosentsock and Cullen (1994); Baker in Levy and Wegman (1995) 3PrdP ed.; 
Yuen in Ladou (2007) 4PthP ed.  
 
 
4.4 Risk and Body Mapping 
 
Risk mapping and body mapping are increasingly being used in occupational health and 
safety to build up a fuller picture of workplace hazards, practices, procedures and 
impacts based on worker assessments.  ‘Mapping has been used successfully as an 
occupational health and safety awareness-raising technique; it has had more limited, 
but successful use as a research tool’ says Dr Margaret Keith, a leading international 
expert on mapping.  The ILO and other international organisations have developed the 
technique since 2000 to assist workers to use participatory action research to identify 
and address health and safety problems in their workplaces.  Body mapping is a well 
established technique used over many decades in conventional occupational health 
practice to build up a picture of the impact of work on the bodies of workers in terms of 
reported and recorded occupational and occupationally related diseases and injuries. 
As Keith (2004) has noted, 
  
Mapping can be a valuable tool for data collection in an occupational health and 
safety participatory action research study.  The overall process proved to be 
empowering, enlightening, and effective.  
 
As noted, the HSE declined to provide the authors of this report any documentation 
about their recent visits to the ICL/Stockline plant or the methodologies used in such 
site visits to identify hazards and risks.  We understand that after the disaster, Glasgow 
Technical Services were provided with risk assessments and COSHH sheets given by 
the company to HSE on its recent visits.  Such sheets and assessments, according to 
the employees we interviewed, were not made available to the workers. 
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4.5 Risk Mapping 
 
Risk mapping may therefore relate to building up a physical and organisational picture 
of a workplace, processes and materials to identify where hazards existed, what risks 
were attached to those hazards and what the employees recall about the impact of 
those hazards on themselves and workmates.  Mapping could provide a picture of a 
workplace at a moment in time, over a day or even over a number of years.  What is 
provided by the accounts given below of some ICL/Stockline employees is a 
consolidated collective view of the plant over several years starting when they began 
work at the plant and ending just before the disaster.  The material relates to their 
observations and assessments of the plant health and safety and work organisation.  
 
 
The Basement 
 
All the employees we spoke to were aware of the cellar which contained the shot 
blasting machinery.  They were also aware of the state of the cellar and, to their 
knowledge, were not aware that any HSE inspector had visited the cellar.  In the cellar 
were various support devices for the floor.  As one of the workers noted about the shot 
blast operator,  
 
Big G. was in a hell of a state.  He used to work that all the time.  And you used 
to hear big G. up in the toilet coughing his guts up. (W2) 
 
 
The Ground floor 
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As noted above, the ground floor and annex contained many processes and much 
machinery: the fabrication sections, coating shop, a degreaser which apparently used 
trichloroethylene and ‘genklene’, compressor room, shot blasters, electric and gas 
ovens, pallet and powder storage, gas tanks, heaters which did and did not work, 
various offices, drills, polishers, sanders, areas where solvents were used, dispatch 
rooms.  A wide range of chemicals and materials were used or present across the floor 
and in the structure, including solvents, MDF, metals and asbestos.  Dust and fumes 
were present. Extraction on the sanders, degreasers and solvent processes varied from 
good to very poor. As one worker observed about the ovens 
 
You had dust and fumes from all the ovens – you had the wee sort of – this is 
going to sound silly – you know the clean room?  (laughs)  The Wendy House.  It 
was one of the most disgusting places in there, it was so filthy, but they called it the 
clean room.  This is what they called it didn’t they?  It was the clean room.  Nobody 
ever used it, it was full of junk.  Paper and dust and all that. (W3)  
 
With regard to the wider effect of the shot blasting activity in the early days in the 
factory, one worker noted, 
 
Right next to my office there was a blaster for any parts that came in, they would 
get blasted off before they got dip-coated and when the blaster door was open the 
dust just went everywhere.  There was no extraction for it.  The only extraction was 
the main entrance where the goods would come in.  There wasn’t any fan or 
anything like that to extract the dust.  Me, personally, I felt as if it affected my 
respiratory system.  And there were other chemicals, I mean, when you went into 
fabrication you could taste it as soon as you walked in, you know, all this stuff was 
airborne. (W4) 
 
The accounts of the workers elsewhere in this report document the adverse effects of 
many of these substances more fully.  The workers indicated that just one pair of gloves 
had been made available when using equipment such as the degreaser.  This is 
important because gloves used with degreasing chemicals quickly saturate, lose their 
effectiveness and can hold solvents against the skin.  Hence the need for a regular 
supply of clean glove liners and so on as well as rim ventilation.  Workers in the coating 
shop also ate and drank in the shop.  It is clear from the risk map of the ground floor 
that workers in many sections on that floor were exposed or could potentially have been 
exposed to dust and fumes problems, to heat and cold.  For example, those using the 
polishers, sanders and drills would have been potentially exposed to the highest dust 
levels but conditions were such in other areas of the ground floor that meant many other 
workers would be exposed to various dusts used in the product manufacturing process. 
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Annexe 
 
 
 
 
In some parts of the ground floor, according to the employees, there was no effective 
heating, no windows and no effective cleaning.  These sorts of problems would not 
necessarily requite sophisticated occupational hygiene monitoring devices but would be 
obvious in a walk through survey if all parts of the factory building had been visited.  The 
workers recall the presence of an accident book in the plant but cannot recall any 
incidents other than injuries being recorded such as, ‘near misses’ or ‘dangerous 
occurrences’.  There were a number of injuries in the plant that required hospital 
treatment at an Accident and Emergency department. 
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First Floor 
 
 
 
The first floor contained a variety of store rooms, racks, pallets, lockers, tools, forklift 
trucks, CNC milling machines, ovens, a canteen, sink, toilets, and another room with a 
second lathe and grinding and milling equipment.  On the second lathe, employees 
machined ‘steel, aluminium, brass, plastics and PTFE’.  Workers considered there was 
a noise problem in this area and noted one of the milling machines had been eventually 
‘condemned’ by Stewart McColl because of a lack of guards.  Many workers operated 
the ovens on this floor in the fabrication process.  Apparently there was no extraction as 
such on at least one of the ovens on this floor.  
 
….round the fabrication, and you would maybe be doing a job, maybe cementing 
like the clear acrylics, you would actually go to start work and you could actually 
see the dust landing on it and you would have to tell him to stop sweeping up 
because all they were doing was agitating all the dirt in the place and you had to 
tell him to stop while you got your job done.  Because of them having no windows 
and no extraction, there was nowhere for it to go. (W2) 
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There were fans in the oven section where acrylic (and other sheets), PVC and poly 
carbonated sheets were processed.  The milling machine was also viewed as poorly 
guarded by the workers.  Heavy tools were stored on the racks and there was a practice 
in the company of rarely throwing out old equipment.  Also stored were the plastics 
materials.  Pallets stored in these rooms could be up to ½ ton, the employees reported, 
and there could be up to 12 in the store room.  Workers thought that up to 10 tonnes of 
pallets could be stored in one room.  One person only worked regularly in the racks 
area.  Boards were laid on beams on this floor and there were floor boards in a few 
places.  Manual handling was a problem for the workers on this and other floors.  The 
ceiling on the floor below this storage area ‘seemed displaced’ according to one 
worker’s testimony.  There were also ‘generally high’ noise levels experienced by 
workers on this floor.  Lighting was also described as ‘generally poor’.  The employees 
we spoke to were not aware of any HSE inspection of the floor.  Fumes entered this 
floor from the floor below which contained the coating shop and other processes.  Heat 
on this floor was considerable.  The floor did have a fire marshal and first aiders.  No 
accident book was seen by the workers interviewed on the floor. 
 
Second Floor 
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The second floor contained the general offices of ICL and Stockline, the personnel 
offices, accounts, computer rooms, storage space, toilets, a meeting room and a large 
open area.  The computer room contained a fan.  There were pillars on the floor.  The 
employees who visited this floor reported fumes and noted that windows were not 
opened because of the fume problem from elsewhere in the plant.  As one worker noted 
about the structure. 
  
But the thing was, see when they were doing that asbestos up there, the floor up 
in the top flat was full of holes and you could actually look down the holes and 
see the people working below you.  Seriously.  There was a couple of sprayers in 
there (W2) 
 
 
Third Floor 
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The third floor contained more storage areas which housed more tools, a paper store, 
plastic exhibition stands, paper records.  There used to be an electrician’s room on this 
floor which then became a store room for Andy Galloway’s materials.  A gas boiler was 
also situated on this floor.  The tool store contained lots of ‘big tools’ which often 
required 2 or 3 people to carry them in or out.  It was reported that the third floor was full 
of holes, covered in chip board and that there were ‘charred’ stairs to the roof and 
beams.  
 
Above this floor was the flat roof.  On this floor was an open ‘pipe’ from a ground floor 
booth and, when it snowed, snow from this vent sometimes spoiled products on the 
ground floor.  A few days prior to the disaster, Galloway and another person were 
cleaning the roof and people below complained of the smell from these cleaning 
substances.  The roof was coated with tar or paint.  
 
Fabrication Department  
 
General operators in the fabrication section noted major ventilation problems.  They 
sneezed from wood dust.  Woods used included poor quality plywood from Brazil.  
 
We used to come in and cut MDF. There was only one saw that had an 
extraction on it. (W2) That didn’t work properly. (W3) 
 
Workers provided vivid examples of the extent to which the fabrication department was 
suffused with particles from cutting (both plastics and MDF), which combined with the 
vapours.  They also noted a problem with extraction and other fans at various times 
especially when using solvents, cleaning agents and plastics.  At least 6 employees 
reported flu like symptoms consistent with polymer fume fever when using PTFE in 
processes.  They also noted various signs of respiratory distress when cutting plastics 
on occasion and observed that extractors sometimes did not work or did not work 
properly and there was an absence of any extraction in the dispatch area despite 
fume/dust problems.  Gloves had melted on occasions when exposed to chemicals and 
the employees here found no gloves were completely adequate.  Some 15 workers had 
apparently reported eye problems when exposed to various chemicals and dust or to 
foreign bodies in their eyes.  The workers’ accounts below reveal the full nature of work 
in that department   
 
There were no windows in the place.  There were two vents on the roof but he 
got them blocked up because they were letting too much heat out. (W2) 
 
Chemicals were used extensively in fabrication.  One worker described how he applied 
the liquid tetrahydrafuran in order to cement together pieces of plastic.  
 
The chemical would be poured from the 5 litre drum, the big blue drum, into any 
kind of container you could get your hands on.  There were containers put aside 
for that but if they weren’t there, it was like plastic cups out of the drinking 
machine, pour it in, depending on the job and the quantity you needed. (W1) 
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Frequently, during pouring, liquid would spill over workers’ hands. ‘You would probably 
get a paper rag and give a quick clean and move on’.  With the chemical in the 
container a worker would then take it to the workbench and apply it there with a brush or 
additional tools depending on the nature of the job.  A number of workers believed that 
the biggest hazards they encountered in fabrications were the chemicals in their raw 
state and the fumes given off when they were mixed with plastic and heated.  
 
My concern was that the chemicals were openly used.  Some people would be 
using different chemicals at more or less every bench.  And when some of the 
ovens were on with no extraction, that was another complaint. I felt my eyes with 
the heat and the fumes building up – it was almost unbearable. (W1) 
 
What compounded the problems with fumes was the fact that sheets of MDF were used 
in the oven to lay the materials against.  This created a burning smell that hit the back of 
the throat and stung the eyes.  Also, the pipe coming out of the oven was covered by ‘a 
bit of cloth and a jubilee clip’ (W1) to stop the fumes diffusing throughout the workspace.  
 
Coating Shop  
 
Workers in the coating department reported serious problems with dust, which resulted 
in part from the blasting process. 
 
…when the blaster door was open the dust just went everywhere.  There was no 
extraction for it…There wasn’t any fan or anything like that to extract the dust. Me 
personally, I felt that it affected my respiratory system. (W4) 
 
When I look back on it now, the chemicals I was working on, the shot blasting, I 
was breathing in the actual blasting.  When you blast stuff the shot turns to 
powder and you have to open the door to take the bit out that you have blasted. 
So you opened the door to the blaster and all this stuff came scooting out.  There 
was supposed to be an extractor inside the thing but I don’t think it was working 
right. (W1) 
 
The hose that went from the high pressure air pipe into the machine, the actual 
rubber hose, I don’t think was up to handling the force that was going through it 
because the shot was always basically making holes in it and would break up 
and the machine wouldn’t work right and you would have to trace back this whole 
hose to find out where the hole was.  And then when you found out where the 
hole was you had to press it again so you knew exactly where the shot was 
coming out.  And then the maintenance man would come down and cut the hose 
and put a bit of metal piping inside it and then put jubilee clips on it and tighten 
them up.  And that did until the next time a hole appeared which was pretty 
regular. It would happen basically every day that there were holes in these pipes.  
I think it was because it wasn’t the right hose for that high pressure shot blasting. 
They wouldn’t do anything about it.  They wouldn’t buy a new hose.  They just let 
you get on with it. (W3)  
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Yet the safety concerns that the workers had with regard to the blaster were not 
confined to dust and its effects.  Evidently, there were problems in respect of exposure 
to electricity.  
 
Some of the boys that were using the blaster used to get electric shocks off it 
when they were using it.  I think one actually got blown across the room. (W3) 
 
Sometimes we would be in at night and it was almost like a wee fireworks 
display, you know, with static…if it was maybe dark or the lights weren’t working, 
you could see it.  Like a spaceship taking off! Static charge.  And it would only be 
when somebody sort of put their arms into it that it was away, because there 
wasn’t a guard on it. (W4) 
 
When workers from other sections entered the coating shop they were forcibly struck by 
the serious problems with the dust and vapours.  
 
Sometimes you would go into the coating shop and when you opened the door, 
you would get a ‘yuuugh’ and you were gasping to get out of the place [because] 
you couldn’t breathe…They were spraying stuff and they were coating. What 
they used to have was these big tubs of powder, they attached a blower to it so 
that there was air getting blown through it.  As soon as you attached the blower it 
was all over the place…also they used to take parts out of the [back door] and 
burn the plastic off with a blow torch and all the fumes would blow in (W2).  
 
Spraying was identified specifically by several interviewees as a process which exposed 
workers to harmful substances.  Much of the spraying took place in booths, although 
this attempt to contain the hazard proved inadequate.  This was partly caused by the 
ineffectiveness of extractor fans.  
 
My booth extractor fan was up there [at the highest point], which I though was 
funny because what was it doing up there, it should be there [adjacent to the 
spraying]…See my overalls, they used to be covered in red primer…(W3) 
 
There was only one good extractor – I’s extractor – when he was spraying that 
was his booth. (W1) 
 
 
 90
 
Frequently, though, spraying took place in the open workshop, an occurrence which 
caused no little concern amongst workers. 
 
People would be spraying there and I was walking to fabrication the pathway 
would be designated, but sometimes people would be spraying and you were 
walking, so you were in contact.  Although there was an extractor there, there 
might be three or four people spraying, whoever was walking about would get it.  
They would breathe this in. (W1) 
 
…they did electrostatic spraying and what that does is make a cloud of plastic 
dust that has an electrical charge in it. (W2) 
 
…the electro-static was just like a powder you did was you put your electrical 
charger on it and then you just spray powder and it’s attracted to the component 
and then it was drawn out, up into a ducting and round the ducting into a box 
outside.  Obviously this was just a home-made box, basically a wooden box and 
it must have been when the fan was on you got to a point when no more air could 
get in.  So everything was coming out of the sides of the box and blowing back in 
through the roller shutter door into the factory. (W4) 
 
 
In addition to these processes, dirt coated parts were openly cleaned with a hose in the 
coating shop.  The result was not just an atmosphere full of particles but also floors and 
surface areas covered with dust and powder.  To one worker’s mind this constituted a 
serious hazard, 
  
If you flipped a dout (a cigarette butt) on that it could explode because the dust 
was like custard powder. (W3) 
 
 
Historically, there had been no restrictions on workers smoking next to these chemicals 
until, latterly, McColl called a halt to this practice. 
 
Believe it or not, you could smoke where you stood in the factory at that time and 
we were all smoking beside these chemicals – Genklene, other chemicals, the 
paints and all that. We were standing smoking.  And then it was when Stewart 
McColl took over he realised and he said that we would need to stop that. He 
must read up on it or something.  That was when he started the smoking ban. 
And basically what he did was put signs up ‘No Smoking’. (W1) 
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Curing in the gas ovens in the coating shop led to PTFE being burned off and the fumes 
would cause great discomfort and short-term acute illness.  Workers reported on the 
effects of PTFE polymer fume fever ‘flu’.  
 
It was really horrendous. F. Didn’t bother about PTFE [flu] and he didn’t tell us 
when he was putting parts in the oven to cure them.  It was only when we smelt 
the fumes and shouted, ‘F, have you put something in the curing?’ and he would 
go ‘Aye’. Wee I. would go like, ‘Get out of the road until it’s cured’.  When the 
oven cools down it means that the fumes are going to stop. (W5)  
 
 
The ovens themselves were regarded by workers as hazards. One had apparently been 
fabricated out of parts of a bin lorry.  
 
I think they got one of these skips you’ll see at the back of supermarkets. If you 
have boxes you put them in, press a button and it squashes into it, you know that 
sort of thing.  They converted it into an oven. [It was converted] in-house by Mr 
McC.  They got gas people to bring gas ovens in. (W2) 
But that isn’t as sinister as it sounds…I would have been more concerned about 
the other oven.  If somebody was to say to me about the ovens, the one that was 
home-made and the bought one, I would have been a lot more concerned about 
the bought one, because it was from the dark ages.  I don’t know how old it was. 
The door did not fit properly.  You could put your hands round about the door.  
So this thing wasn’t sealed.  The door rattled all over the place.  And what they 
used to do was this door would lift up and then they would drag the parts out and 
spray it on the front trolley while the oven door was open and the flames were 
there.  And what they used to do in the winter because there was no heating at 
all in there…was put the gas ovens on and have the doors open while they were 
working…in the coating shop it went from one extreme to the other – it was either 
so hot you couldn’t breathe, because of all of the different ovens (gas and 
electric) or it was absolutely freezing. (W4) 
 
 
The ovens also emitted particles which caused the workers considerable concern.  
 
There was a rotary oven, it was like a circular oven. It’s got wee dookits and a 
wee handle and it goes to each dookit and you used to put your parts in there, 
like nine dookits.  You would heat the parts up and then put in powder and it 
melts the powder and it turns it into a plastic coating rather than spraying. And it’s 
got to be a certain temperature before it melts, you know…There was a vent up 
on the wall next to this rotary oven which was supposed to be taking the powder 
away, you know, the powder that was floating about.  See when the sun shone, 
that’s when you knew what you were breathing in. We used to go, ‘Oh no, look at 
that! I’m breathing that in’. (W5) 
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This same oven apparently exposed workers to particularly serious risks of exposure to 
asbestos.  
 
There was no front door on that [oven], it was just a big square of asbestos 
sheeting to keep the heat in.  There was a door on it at one time but when I 
started working there it was just a bit of asbestos sheet in front of it.  You used to 
lift the sheet up, take the part out, shut the sheet down and dip your part and 
hang it up.  It was hundreds and hundreds of parts you were dealing with and 
you were always lifting the flap up. (W1) 
 
It is difficult to see how this repeated action of lifting and dropping the door would not 
have led to the asbestos being fractured or frayed.  If this was the case then the release 
into the atmosphere of potentially lethal asbestos fibres was highly likely.  Two workers 
report musculo-skeletal/back problems in the dispatch area.  Those workers engaged in 
sawing activities had lots of cuts.  Noise levels were high in many parts of the plant 
especially on the routers machinery and these workers specifically mentioned tingling 
hands.  Disposable ear plugs were purchased.  Most workers reported a poor sense of 
smell in the plant and nasal irritation.  None of the workers involved in the mapping 
exercise were aware of any health surveillance or occupational hygiene monitoring 
activity in the plant at any time. 
 
 
4.6 Body Mapping 
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A short body mapping activity based on the recollections of two employees 
provided the following information about adverse effects on employees that the 
workers had noted. 
 
  
 
Ex-workers described signs and symptoms consistent with exposure to some of the 
above substances and the known adverse effects related to those substances that exist 
in the scientific literature.  Workers interviewed reported widespread health problems 
that are quite consistent with exposure both to individual substances, mixtures of 
substances and working practices found within the plant.  Such descriptions also relate 
temporally to work in the plant and exposures on a particular day or week.  Many are 
acute effects and others are chronic effects that disappeared or were initially 
ameliorated by absence from the plant on longer holidays. 
What I found was that, it was like maybe when you left the place and you started 
to get some fresh air, you started spitting up.  I was coughing up a lot of black 
stuff.  And when you got home at night, you had to spend a good while cleaning 
out your nose and your sinuses.  You sort of had to blow your nose…where I 
used to find it worst was at the weekends because you weren’t in, and it seemed 
like your body was trying to get rid of it. (W1) 
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The most commonly cited effects were on the respiratory system. Some interviewed 
workers reported a series of health problems that they believed were related to the 
working environment.  These accounts can, in several instances, be cross checked with 
the risk mapping and body mapping accounts of work in the factory provided elsewhere 
in this report. 
 
Just trying to get a deep breath, trying to fill my lungs to capacity was pretty hard. 
My eyes got affected by I don’t know what it was, but when I started in there I 
found my eyes going yellow. I went to the eye clinic and I can only describe it as 
like my skin peeling from my eyeball.  Like a film.  I would try and take it away 
and I would put my finger in it or a cotton bud and it was just peeling off the 
eyeball.  I would say [that I had been working there] about eight or nine months, 
something like that.  I was pretty fit when I started there but I felt as if my health 
went downhill. (W4) 
 
…I went to get my eyes checked.  I got two globes in my eyes.  And the optician 
said that he had never seen this for ages and he went through the book and he 
said that it was highly unlikely, it’s only people in contact with UV light [that get 
this]. It’s usually elderly people living in Australia and that it was the first time he 
had seen anything like this.  He said that it could go over the pupils...(W5) 
 
Well, personally, I had tightness in my lungs.  Then I started getting pneumonia-
like illnesses and then I started getting pains in my lower back which would 
probably have been my liver or kidneys.  My back is sore just now, my back is 
killing me…I had asthma, but since I’ve not been there I’ve recovered from that 
and use my inhaler very, very seldom. (W2) 
 
I don’t have the same problems as (W2) but when I used to leave there at night, 
you went outside and if you had fresh air you would have this feeling of 
dizziness.  And then when you are off, you are spitting up stuff and constantly 
coughing and barking away.  The biggest thing I noticed in there was a guy who 
worked the blaster in the coating shop and he was often in the toilet boaking his 
guts up.  He looked the unhealthiest guy you had ever seen in your life – and his 
eyes.  They were always red and watery.  If you saw him now, he’s been away 
from there for about five years, you would never recognise him.  Totally different 
guy, looks a different colour, looks healthier, even sounds different, he actually 
sounds different. (W4) 
 
 
Workers reported a variety of symptoms in the coating shop included feeling light 
headed and having breathing problems and they noted a high turnover of labour in this 
shop. In the dipping and moulding plant, they were aware of coughing up black sputum 
when production was underway and again people left because of the working 
conditions.  Two workers report major problems with lungs and with dry skin and 
irritation.  Workers in the coating shop also reported heat fatigue.  Some workers also 
report tingling and numbness in hands after some processes. 
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The thing was as we were saying the last time we were here, anything that was 
painted in there, even more so in the coating shop, the fumes ripped it to shreds.   
You couldn’t keep anything painted in there.  If they painted anything in there, all 
the fumes that were kicking about the place, it just rotted them.  So all the pipes 
in there, all the lockers, anything at all that was metal, was rotten.  It’s like if you 
put a brand new locker in the coating shop within a couple of months it was bright 
orange with rust …..but see in the coating shop, if you went above head height 
the fumes were horrendous.  Absolutely horrendous.  
 
So when we used to do that you would walk into the coating shop, and see when 
you opened the coating shop door, you just went Ugh – it was almost as if 
somebody had grabbed you by the throat.  You know, when you walked in it was 
like somebody grabbing you by the throat.  And I’ve seen it many times, you are 
in that door and just turning and walking back out because there was no way I 
think I could have made it to that side 
 
Workers recalled how they and their fellows were affected by fumes from paint 
hardening in the oven in the coating shop.  They described the effect of using PTFE and 
polymer fume fever from the fumes. 
 
The first time I got it, it started at my ankles and crept up my legs. It’s a feeling 
that you are not well, that you are getting the flu…It comes up, up, up and then 
you feel stiff, you start to sweat and you start to get the shakes.  And see when 
you get the shakes, you are going like that, you can’t stop yourself.  Basically I 
was told it was because I smoked.  It always me and I. that got the PTFE [flu]. 
And one day the two of us got it at the same time.  And Stewart McColl found out 
about this and he said to Bill, ‘Any time anybody gets PTFE [flu] get them a taxi 
and take them home, no quibbling’.  And then one day I caught it and had to get 
out of the building, I couldn’t handle it, you know, what’s happening to me, you 
know. And I just walked out and went home myself.  You know he pulled me up 
the next day and said, ‘Why did you go away?’.  I said, ‘I wasn’t feeling well, 
that’s why I went away’. ‘I told you to wait for a taxi’. I said, ‘I just wanted to get 
out of the building, I wasn’t sitting there shaking and sweating.  I just wanted to 
go home’.  It makes you feel you just want to go to your bed. And that’s what I 
done when I went home.  It wears off after a couple of hours but the effect of it is 
horrendous.  I. will tell you. If you ever speak to I. about it, I’m telling you, he’s 
caught it that many times. I’ve had it maybe three or four times but I’ve maybe 
had the symptoms of it and not realised I’ve got it. Some days I didn’t feel well. I 
think that probably what it was.  I caught PTFE [flu] but not the full PTFE.  And I 
felt quite a lot of times during the day. (W5) 
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This section identifies major occupational health and safety problems in the workplace 
that concerned employees and led to attempts at the workplace to remove hazards.  
They have since used innovative methods such as mapping to describe and analyse 
those hazards in this report.  Millions of workers are made ill every year by stress, 
musculo-skeletal disorders, asbestos-related diseases, cancer, asthma.  Government 
and employers should prioritise the prevention of work related ill-health and establish an 
adequately funded worker-controlled occupational health system, available free of 
charge to all workers.  Workers injured or made ill by work get a raw deal and what is 
needed is “a just and effective system of civil and state compensation which maintains 
workers standard of living and addresses the burden of all illnesses caused by work, 
addresses gender inequalities and increases opportunities for the rehabilitation of those 
disabled by work” along the lines advocated by the Hazards Campaign Charter 
(http://www.hazardscampaign.org.uk/charter/newcharter.htm). 
 
Workers also depicted the condition of the factory cat which had been exposed to the 
same internal environment as they had. 
 
There used to be a cat in there, I don’t know if the cat was bought to scare the 
mice or rats – it’s an old building, that’s a possibility.  But the only way to 
describe that cat was that it fell to bits, and that’s not exaggerating.  The cat 
ended up with lumps of hair falling off. It had problems with its eyes, with its ears 
and you couldn’t touch it but it would scream in agony.  It wasn’t that old.  It was 
quite a scary looking cat. It was as thick as that pen, just skin and bone…(W2) 
 
 
 97
Section 5 The Management of Health and Safety at 
ICL/Stockline 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
We have seen no health and safety manuals, no group or plant specific safety policies, 
and no technical guidance that allows us to assess how effective the control of 
substances hazardous to health was in the plant from 1970s onwards, despite efforts by 
the workforce and the research team to obtain them.  This is precisely why the 
extensive evidence from workers themselves set out in this report is so crucial to 
understanding the extent of the risks that they were exposed to and to understanding 
the management of those risks.   
 
This section reproduces evidence from the testimonies of workers, which taken 
together, identify major problems with the management of health and safety at 
ICL/Stockline.  Following an introduction to the general legal duties of employers with 
regards to health and safety, the section explores the general approach to the 
management of health and safety in evidence at the plant.  A discussion of the more 
specific problems created by this general approach then follows.  Those problems are 
structured under the following headings: health and safety representation and 
communication, induction and training, risk assessment and personal protective 
equipment. 
 
 
5.2 Legal Duties of Employers 
 
Under the Health and Safety at Work Act (1974) every employer has criminal legal 
responsibility, so far as is reasonably practical, to ensure that nothing that happens at 
work that makes an employee ill or causes injury.  Employers must have an explicit 
policy, explaining how they will manage health and safety, and which specifies which 
manager is responsible for a specific area. In addition, it is a legal requirement that the 
employer prepares a statement of general policy on health and safety, ensures that 
minimum standards are being met and brings these to workers’ attention.  Additionally, 
employers must identify the hazards employees might face at work, assess the risk 
these hazards pose and detail the steps to be taken to prevent those risks as well as 
informing the workforce. 
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The previous section detailed the range of hazardous chemicals and substances 
workers at ICL/Stockline were routinely exposed to.  The regulations that are in place to 
protect workers exposed to such hazards are very clear about the monitoring and 
control measures that need to be in place, and about the health surveillance of workers 
that is necessary where there is a likelihood of such exposures.  Regulation 10 of 
COSHH stipulates that “the employer shall ensure that the exposure of employees to 
substances hazardous to health is monitored in accordance with a suitable procedure”.  
Employers also have a duty, under Regulation 11 to ensure that the effect on 
employees is carefully monitored:  “Where it is appropriate for the protection of the 
health of his employees who are, or are liable to be, exposed to a substance hazardous 
to health, the employer shall ensure that such employees are under suitable health 
surveillance.”  Where risks to health are identified as a result of exposures, employers 
must, according to Regulation 7 “ensure that the exposure of his employees to 
substances hazardous to health is either prevented or, where this is not reasonably 
practicable, adequately controlled” 
 
Employers are legally required to have in place effective health and safety policies, 
organisations, systems of work, risk assessments and control measures to remove or 
control the many hazards that are well documented in the plastics industry.  Health and 
safety systems of work, policies and practices must be appropriately documented and 
include proper audit and review mechanisms and a well defined and monitored health 
and safety supervisory system.  It is the legal responsibility of employers to ensure that 
staff are provided with adequate, appropriate, and regularly updated training, 
supervision, resources and time, to enable them to carry out work in accordance with 
the management systems, policies and practices set up by their employers. 
 
 
5.3 General Approach to the Management of Health and Safety 
 
The following recollections taken from workers’ testimonies together present a powerful 
indictment of the general approach to safety management at ICL Stockline and of the 
routine disregard to health and safety legislation and statutory regulations.  Most clearly 
of all, this section indicates routine serious breaches of COSHH regulations. 
 
 99
 
Cases of Management Failure to Respond to Health and Safety Complaints 
 
Case 1: Exposure to Chemicals 
 
There was a certain job we used to do.  It was like hand-held computers [and] 
we used to spray gold paint inside them.  It was to stop any interference when 
they put all the glass into them.  This gold paint was supplied by Trimite.  I 
would plug them all up, put plugs on certain parts that he didn’t want coated.  
And then I used to give them to [a fellow worker] and he would spray them, 
put them on the table, let them dry and then what I would do is take all the 
wee bits off them.  Then we’d send them back to the company and they would 
put all the parts inside the hand-held computers. 
 
But I was working with this stuff one day – I never had any gloves on – and all 
this paint was getting stuck to my fingers and up my nails and in my hair.  I 
never thought of looking at the actual tin that [this fellow worker] was using 
and it was only when I seen a skull and crossbow on the tin that I thought, 
‘There’s something wrong with the stuff we are using’.  So I took a closer look 
and I complained to Bill Masterton that I was getting a tingling feeling in my 
hands.  I complained for weeks and weeks. Bill’s like this, ‘Och, it’s just work, 
go and wash your hands every time you are finished using it.  I said ‘But I’m 
still getting the tingling sensation’ [after I wash my hands].  
 
So I read the actual thing on it and it says, ‘the downside effect of this paint is 
if it comes into contact with your skin is that you could get a tingling sensation, 
which is irreversible.  Irreversible on the tin! I’m like that ‘I’ve got this and it’s 
irreversible’.  So I pointed that out to Bill.  I said, ‘Look at the back of that tin, 
you should have told me before I started even touching that paint that I had to 
have gloves on, or special gloves, and see the smell of this stuff’. (W5) 
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Case 2: Ventilation 
 
What used to happen was, to start with, someone would raise a complaint [about 
dust, fumes, chemicals etc.] with whoever was there on the shop floor, the manager 
or the foreman.  They would try and quieten it down because I think they were 
honestly frightened to go and approach the management. And you know, more often 
than not, it never actually got to the management because they were frightened of 
him because he was a bully. (W2) 
So the foreman would try and pacify whoever it was.  You know, ‘here’s a wee fan 
and do this and that’. (W4) 
 
I started raising concerns because of [a fellow worker’s] health, and I spoke to 
management about them and I got told ‘The factory is the safest it has ever been, you 
don’t need to worry about these things’. I would say ‘Go and let me see the chemical 
sheets and stuff like that’.  They would say ‘You don’t need to see that, I’m dealing 
with that’.  So I started looking myself, and then we all started looking and we found 
lots of things that we didn’t know at first.  All these things that are used and stored 
here and every single one of them said ventilation, either ‘in a well ventilated area’ or 
‘a point of extraction’.  Every one of them mentioned this ventilation. (W2) 
 
I raised concerns about the [lack of] ventilation in the coating shop. Nothing was ever 
done about it…I spoke to Peter Ferguson and I said ‘I feel as if it is affecting my 
breathing’. H e said they would look into it and get something done, blah, blah, blah.  
About four years ago. (W3) 
 
 
 
Several workers detailed how management responded to problems with the 
temperature inside the building by blocking air vents. 
 
…somebody phoned the health and safety because they were freezing.  We had three 
little overhead heaters at our side of the building and absolutely nothing anywhere 
else.  And these three heaters were maybe only 2 feet wide but the building must have 
been 40 feet wide. This was a building that had no insulation either, so any heat just 
went out the roof, so he got the two vents in the roof blocked. (W2)  There was no 
windows in the place.  There were two vents on the roof but he got them blocked up 
because they were letting too much heat out.  The thing was there was one of the 
guys actually went to the health & safety about the heat.  I got the blame for it, you 
know.  It was me that got the blame.  It was nothing to do with me.  But somebody 
phoned the health and safety because they were freezing.  So you had three heaters 
that maybe covered at one wall and you had nothing else.  This was a building that 
had – there was no insulation either, you know, so any heat just went straight out the 
roof.  So there were two vents in the roof and he got them blocked up. (W2)  
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Workers were forbidden from opening doors to create a draughts on the grounds that 
the fumes would rise from the factory floor to the offices above.  One reported that a fire 
door specifically was locked in order to prevent the circulation of fumes, until a manager 
kicked it in.  Another worker, insisted that the lack of ventilation and the presence of 
fumes was the main hazard.  
 
All the years I was there…the fumes of the whole place, when that fan was on, 
got pumped up the stair and into the top floor.  They pumped out of one part of 
the building and into another part of the building.  The windows were actually 
sealed when the fumes were pumped.  There was no ventilation, the windows 
wouldn’t open, you couldn’t open the windows. (W2)  
 
Maybe a light wasn’t working and I. said he would go up and put a tube in.  On a 
light fitting, before you could change the thing, there might be two inches of dirt 
on top. (W3) 
 
Like the dirt that was on it was on it was kind of sodden as well because it had so 
many fumes.  If you laid something on a bench, say you were working on 
something, there was like a moss kind of thing, like a mixture of ply, MDF, plastic 
dust, fumes like aquamethane and  all in a mush. (W4) 
 
 
Interviewees also reported that working with some of the machinery proved dangerous. 
One recalled a serious injury that had happened in 1999 or 2000.  
 
…what happened was the machine was just so old it had cracked.  So I was 
using a sword blade like that, it hit the table, the sword blade shattered and it 
went in there in my hand.  So it caught an artery and it was skooshing blood all 
over the place...I ended up in the Western Coronary Care because my heart 
went into shock because I bled so much. (W2) 
 
 
Another recalled how a fellow worker had his finger ‘clawed to bits’ when he was ‘wiping 
stuff off a drill without any guard or anything’.  
 
When I started there [the chemicals] were just out in the open, then after a while 
we started getting in metal cabinets and he [McColl] was asking for them to be 
stored in these metal cabinets.  The Genklene we just left.  It sat outside [the 
door to despatch] in big barrels.  And they used a trough, like a cow’s trough, to 
put the parts in and degrease them.  That was just left there all the time, you 
know.  They would cover it, but the chemicals were still there, just cardboard on 
top of it. (W4).  
 
The troughs [two of them] would be 8 foot long…and maybe 18-24 inches wide 
and about 12-14 inches deep, something like that.  And they were half full, 
maybe even more. (W3).  
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Workers also reported that there had been serious problems with the gas pipes that ran 
throughout the factory. 
 
Somebody came in and condemned the gas pipes.  For about a week or two we 
had no gas.  The thing is we were led to believe it was the Health and Safety 
(Executive) because I know for a fact that somebody did complain because they 
were having odd job men [working on them]…one of the guys actually phoned 
the Health and Safety and pointed out that they had odd job men working on the 
gas pipes, shouldn’t it be somebody who is CORGI registered working on the gas 
pipes.  I’m not 100% sure if they came in, if they contacted them or what they did, 
but there was talk they came in around that time as well. (W2) 
 
 
What had prompted management to repair the pipes was the fact that they had rotted, 
in the opinion of workers, because of airborne corrosive pollution.  
 
The thing was that anything that was painted in there, even more so in the 
coating shop, the fumes ripped it to shreds.  You couldn’t keep anything painted 
in there.  All the fumes that were kicking about the place, it just rotted them.  It’s 
like you put a brand new locker in the coating shop and within a couple of months 
it was bright orange with rust. (W4) 
 
 
Workers believed that the trigger for condemning the gas pipes was the installation of 
the gas oven that was built out of ‘a skip’, which has since been reported as being 
composed of parts from a bin lorry. 
 
The guys that installed the gas for that told us that there was something wrong in 
there. (W2) 
 
They built the oven themselves…And then they had to get people in for the gas 
burners and I think that’s what it was.  I think it was them that noticed that 
something was wrong.  They condemned.  They actually cut the gas off.  They 
said, under whatever regulations they work under, that they found dangerous 
pipes, so they were going to disconnect them.  So they disconnected them and 
left. Then what happened was it was like the two handy men in the place, they 
were called out.  They started working on them to sort the leaks.  So it was like a 
spray they got and what they did was they would put the gas on and they went 
along the pipes spraying it all and identifying leaks.  And then they would fix 
them. But the pipes were never replaced (W4). 
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Those respondents with a detailed memory of the events surrounding the repair of the 
pipes, insisted that these pipes were in use up until the time of the disaster.  When 
asked ‘Is that pipe still there as far as you know?’ one worker replied, 
 
Aye. So they went through it trying to repair all the leaks and the people were in 
and out about a dozen times or something because they had to get these people 
back in to say there were no gas leaks.  So they would get the people back in, 
they would check whatever way they check them – still leaking, go away again.  
They [the handy men] would start working again.  So eventually, they found there 
were no gas leaks.  They painted the [pipes and put stickers on them and they 
got whoever it was back in again and they checked the pipes for no gas leaks 
and then started using the gas again.  So, I am assuming that, because of the 
people condemning it initially, whoever they were, they would have to be the 
people that OK’d it.  But in the meantime they were using somebody else to 
check for the gas leaks. (W2) 
 
One worker, when he commenced employment, was asked to drive a forklift truck, even 
though he did not have a licence.  In what appears to be a flagrant disregard for the law, 
the Managing Director insisted that he operate the vehicle.  
 
I told them that I didn’t have a fork lift licence and Stewart McColl says to me, 
‘Carry on, it doesn’t matter’.  I said, ‘I’m a bit concerned, do you want to put me 
through my licence because if you have an accident I’m going to get prosecuted 
for it’.  On numerous occasions I was asking him to get the brakes on the forklift 
fixed. I t was forever breaking down and the brakes were always going…the 
maintenance people would come in and sort it.  One of these guys told me that 
the truck I was using should have been condemned, but it was costing him too 
much money to replace fork lifts, so he would rather replace small parts on it.  
But on numerous occasions, I expressed my concern about the safety of the fork 
lift.  I was the guy who was having to drive it. (W3) 
 
 
According to several testimonies, it was only in the two years before the disaster that 
any attempt was made to improve health and safety practice. 
  
…there was no health and safety in the coating shop until Stewart McColl 
(Managing Director) took over.  I think he recognised that if anything went wrong 
here, he was going to get big claims against him.  So he tried to rectify health 
and safety matters… he used to send memos down…but it was not all that long 
ago that he started doing that.  Before that time when the Downies were in 
charge there was no health and safety in there (W5). 
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Apart from the bare minimum, it appears that protective equipment, however 
inadequately, came to be supplied only when Stewart McColl became Managing 
Director. 
 
Aye, when Stewart McColl came I got them. [Before then] I used to go to work 
with my denims on and I would get home and they would be covered in paint, my 
jumper would be covered in paint.  We had no overalls and we wore trainers. 
(W5) 
 
 
Although McColl apparently became ‘obsessed’ with health and safety matters, this 
preoccupation was never in response to the most serious concerns and complaints of 
employees. 
 
It was always, ‘What’s that lying there?  Get that moved away.  Stupid wee things 
like a pallet lying, you know.  He used to walk around the factory every morning 
and he would say to us, ‘It’s your problem, you do something about it. (W5) 
It was like maybe if somebody had dropped an empty crisp packet they were 
eating at lunchtime, he would say ‘What is that, why is that there?’ (W1) 
 
 
Workers insisted that this belated attention to health and safety practice did not lead to 
action over vapours, gasses, dust, temperature extremes or the effects of chemicals. 
Instead, in the words of one worker it amounted to instructions such as, ‘Keep the place 
tidy! Get things up on the walls!’  Other workers maintained that these measures were 
instituted only after the visit of the Health and Safety Executive which they recalled had 
taken place in June 2003. 
 
I think that after all the problems he [McColl] was having with health and safety 
he was trying to ensure that was happening.  Now he was trying to implement 
some things, but it was just cosmetic…He would put up signs saying “You must 
wear goggles”, “You must wear ear protection”, “You must wear gloves”, “You 
must wear visors”.  But if you’ve not got them how can you wear them? If you 
walked in the place and you would see all this stuff – it was cosmetic (W2). 
 
 
According to workers, the provision of necessary safety equipment was very often 
connected to HSE visits. 
 
Even more recently they built a fumes cabinet, you know, when the 
Health & Safety came in, which I think was 2003, the paint was still wet 
on it [when they visited] and she [the HSE Officer] actually commented 
on that (W2) 
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5.4 Health and Safety Representation and Communication 
 
Employers have legal responsibilities to ensure the provision and exchange of 
information and instructions that enable employees to be properly informed about risks 
and health hazards, and to provide the training to allow employees to understand 
information and instruction.  Those legal responsibilities are detailed under section 2 of 
the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and are repeated in many other subsequent 
health and safety regulations.  The Management of Health and Safety at Work 
Regulations 1999 specify requirements on risk assessment (a more detailed 
consideration of risk assessments follows), and the information that employers are 
required to provide to workers from the findings of any assessment.  In addition, 
employers have legal responsibilities to put formal mechanisms of consultation on 
health and safety matters in place.  
 
There are two principal sets of regulations that require workers to be consulted on 
health and safety matters.  The Safety Representatives and Safety Committees 
Regulations 1977 is for workplaces where trade unions are recognised for collective 
bargaining purposes.  The Health and Safety (Consultation with Employees) 
Regulations 1996 cover workplaces with no trade union recognition.  Given that there 
was no trade union recognition agreement at ICL Stockline in Maryhill, it appears that 
the factory would fall into the latter category.  Under the 1996 regulations it is the 
responsibility of the employer to ensure that a system for consulting workers on health 
and safety is in place.  In such a case, the regulations allow for the company to choose 
between a system of consultation through a safety representative elected by the 
workforce or a system of direct consultation with employees.  According to workers’ 
testimonies, there was no elected representative of employee safety at ICL/Stockline.  
This means that the company was obliged to consult directly with the workforce.  
Section 5(1) of those regulations stipulates that: 
 
Where an employer consults employees directly he shall, subject to paragraph 
(3), make available to those employees such information, within the employer’s 
knowledge, as is necessary to enable them to participate fully and effectively in 
the consultation.    
 
This information, according to HSE guidance must include information from accident 
books, and any assessments that have been made under COSHH regulations.  
Workers’ testimonies provide clear evidence that ICL Stockline’s organisation of health 
and safety representation fell well short of legal compliance.   
 106
At various times, different directors appeared to assume both direct and indirect 
responsibility for various aspects of health and safety as the accounts below 
demonstrate.  At a ‘supervisory  level’ Ian Mavers appears to have been the person 
given responsibility for numerous varied tasks including consulting the workforce on 
occupational health and safety but all power seemed to be exercised by those above 
him and from whom he had to gain approval for action.  According to workers, Ian 
Mavers was,  
 
…the first contact and then it was more or less up to him to pursue it, or if 
you felt it was a matter that you wanted to pursue you would have to go 
to the management upstairs. (W1) 
 
 
Mavers was described as a jack-of-all-trades ‘the quality cum first aid-health guy’. 
Informality of practices, the absence of procedure and the lack of expertise and 
authority on Mavers’ part, led to idiosyncratic and highly questionable responses to 
worker complaints.  Workers frequently objected to the excessive fumes and vapours 
which caused serious discomfort. One recounted, 
 
I was actually breathing it in. It was like hitting the back of the throat and 
the eyes and I complained a few times about my eyes.  The answer I got 
[from Ian Mavers] was, ‘You should go outside for five minutes and come 
back in’. (W5) 
 
 
Being instructed to leave the building allowed workers some relief, albeit briefly, from 
unbearable fumes.  One other remedy proposed by management served merely to 
exacerbate the problem workers experienced with fumes.  
 
…if anybody complained about the fumes what they were given was a 
fan, you know a desk-top fan, and what that used to do was blow the 
fumes away from them to somebody else.  So if I said ‘this stuff stinks’, 
he would give me a fan and it would blow over to someone who wasn’t 
complaining, so you didn’t mind. (W2) 
 
 
According to workers, the factory’s accident book was kept by Margaret Brownlie, the 
company’s Financial Director who was killed in the disaster and she ‘was the only one 
allowed to see it or go near it’. (W1) Workers’ testimonies also indicate that, contrary to 
the minimum legal requirement, management apparently failed to provide its workers 
with a prepared statement of general policy on health and safety.  
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It is common practice in occupational hygiene studies that wish to establish what past 
practices and conditions were in a plant to draw on management, technical and worker 
observations of those conditions.  No occupational hygiene monitoring was done in the 
plant according to several former employees.  No records of any monitoring exist 
anywhere else as far as we could ascertain.  Occupational health services in the UK are 
limited. HSE’s medical division has been heavily depleted across the UK.  In many 
workplaces, a part-time occupational physician, usually a GP, is employed. Workers 
recalled how they only ever received warnings about the dangers of contact with certain 
chemicals from fellow workers and once they were on-the-job, but never in advance and 
as a precaution from supervisors or managers.  
 
In overall terms, management of health and safety appears to have been characterised 
by an informality and laxity that left workers vulnerable to the vagaries of those 
responsible for its implementation.  There was clearly no system of health and safety 
consultation in place that could be regarded as complying with the 1996 Regulations.  
One worker summed up the lack of representation and adequate communication of 
information from management: 
  
There was absolutely nothing [in the way of formal consultation between 
employer and employees] no health and safety committee…If I 
remember right, there was a notice on the wall about Factory Acts or 
something, you know, but that was about it really. If the company had a 
policy regards safety or [specific hazards] in all the  years I was there 
nobody ever said to me anything about it. (Interview Laurence Connolly 
Snr. 16 January 2006) 
 
 
5.5 Health and Safety – Induction and Training 
 
The health and safety training, instruction, supervision and communication systems and 
practices operating appear to have been seriously deficient.  The external training 
record of the senior managers in occupational health and safety has not been disclosed.  
Yet HSEs Managing Health and Safety Guidance 2003 leaflet, widely available to 
employers, explicitly states that the employer, with regard to competence should 
‘provide the means to ensure that all employees including your managers, supervisors 
and temporary staff are adequately instructed and trained’.  This principle is 
underpinned by the responsibilities specified in all of the main health and safety laws, 
including the 1974 Act and 1999 Regulations.  HSE advice on health and safety training 
was produced in a user-friendly leaflet for employers and managers in 2001 and this 
was reprinted in 2004 (INDG 345 reprinted 8/04 C235).  The leaflet, with regard to who 
needs health and safety training, states that employers “do!” (ibid p.3).  The leaflet adds 
that an employer’s managers and supervisors ‘may also need training in the specific 
hazards of your processes and how you expect the risks to be controlled” and that 
training records should be kept and monitored (ibid p.3 and p.7).  
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During induction, at the commencement of employment, it is a legal requirement under 
COSHH regulations for employees to receive training on the nature of the chemical and 
substance hazards that will be encountered in task performance.  Regulation 12 of 
COSHH stipulates,  
Every employer who undertakes work which is liable to expose an employee to a 
substance hazardous to health shall provide that employee with suitable and 
sufficient information, instruction and training…. the information, instruction and 
training provided under that paragraph shall include -  
(a) details of the substances hazardous to health to which the employee is liable 
to be exposed including -  
(i) the names of those substances and the risk which they present to 
health, 
 
(ii) any relevant occupational exposure standard, maximum exposure limit 
or similar occupational exposure limit, 
 
(iii) access to any relevant safety data sheet, and 
 
(iv) other legislative provisions which concern the hazardous properties of 
those substances… 
 
In addition, instruction and training must provide significant findings of the risk 
assessment; the appropriate precautions and actions to be taken to ensure the safety of 
the employee and other employees at the workplace; the results of any monitoring of 
exposure and health surveillance. 
 
Regulation 13 of the 1999 Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 
requires every employer to ‘ensure that his employees are provided with adequate 
health and safety training’. 
 
The testimony of former employees working in fabrication indicated that management 
provided very limited, if any, guidance on the nature of hazards, protection and 
appropriate health and safety procedures.  For example, when asked whether he was 
given a specific health and safety talk on commencement, one replied. 
 
No, not towards any of the chemicals. Health and safety would involve the 
machines and how to operate them, but it had nothing to do with the materials or 
anything like that we were working with. (W1) 
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Workers’ testimonies revealed an absence of health and safety instruction both on 
commencement of employment and thereafter throughout the period of employment. .  
 
[A month in] 2003 was when I started.  No, there wasn’t any induction… I never 
got any training for anything in the powder coating bit.  We were supposed to but 
x, who had been there for [many] years, he was just showing me what to do… 
There was a First Aid guy, Ian Mavers, you went to him if anything happened but 
that was all we were told. (W6) 
 
My concerns were with the chemical side of things, you know, you were given 
whatever chemical it was, “this is what you use to stick these bits together”.  
That was as much information that you got.  And you would say “how do I use it” 
and they would say “Well, I’m not sure”.  It was just a case of you had to sort of 
get on with it.  There was no training on the hazards and what you had to do to 
protect yourself.  None whatsoever. The only training – it would be a case of like 
if they started somebody new and it was a job that I had done before they might 
set you to show the person how to do that job.  How could I give anybody advice 
on hazards when I didn’t know they existed?’  You got a pair of steel toe-capped 
boots and that was the only protection you got. (Interview, Laurence Connolly 
Snr. 16 January 2006) 
 
 
5.6 Risk Assessment 
 
Employers have a duty to ensure that formal, recorded, risk assessments are made.  
The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 require employers to 
assess the risks created by working so as to identify the measures they need to have in 
place to comply with their duties under health and safety law.  As such, the assessment 
provisions of the Management Regulations are superimposed over all other workplace 
health and safety legislation including the general duties in the Health and Safety at 
Work Act.  In practice this means that employers have to assess risks before they begin 
any new work.  In ICL/Stockline this requirement might cover the fabrication or coating 
of a ‘new’ product, where the processes involved might differ from others that had been 
assessed.  For example, a ‘new’ one-off product may involve chemicals or paints not 
used in other products and for which no previous assessment has been made.  
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Many of the other specific regulations such as COSHH stipulate that work cannot be 
started using hazardous chemicals and substances (including many of the substances 
highlighted in the previous section) work before the risks they carry have been 
assessed and the means to control those risks have been put in place, and the risks 
have been properly communicated to the workforce.  Supplementing responsibilities 
under these overarching regulations in place at the time were requirements to do 
specific things under the other regulations - Manual Handling Operations Regulations, 
1992/2002; Personal Protective Equipment at Work Regulations [PPE], 1992; Display 
Screen Equipment Regulations [DSE], 1992/2002; Noise at Work Regulations, 1999; 
Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations [COSHH]; Control of Asbestos 
at Work Regulations, 2002. Whilst all of these can be seen to apply to the ICL/Stockline 
factory, given the nature of the production process, those regulations pertaining to 
hazardous substances (COSHH) have particular significance. 
 
Employers, then, are legally responsible for assessing the risks in a workplace and 
ensuring that this process is adequately carried out.  In the main, a risk assessment will 
be carried out be employers themselves, but in circumstances where employers may 
lack the confidence to do so, then competent, external sources can be utilised.  It is 
instructive to draw attention to a factor involved in risk assessments that the HSE 
considers is important for their effectiveness.  
 
Remember to consult and involve your workforce.  Your employees and their 
representatives know first hand what the risks in the workplace are and will often 
be able to offer practical solutions to controlling them.   
 
 
Under the Management Regulations and COSHH Regulations, a record of every 
assessment is required in circumstances where five or more people are employed, 
while in relation to the Noise and Asbestos Regulations there is no limitation by 
workforce size.  In cases where there may be delays after the assessment before the 
significant findings can be recorded as, for example, in the case of air quality which 
would certainly apply to ICL/Stockline, the regulations state that there should be no 
undue delay in recording.  
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At ICL/Stockline all the workers interviewed were unaware of any risk assessments 
being undertaken by management during their years of employment.  Not only, as we 
have seen, was there an absence of workforce consultation on the identification of risks 
and hazards, but no workers recalled ever having been involved in the specific process 
of risk assessment.  Even after the HSE visits workers saw no evidence that a risk 
assessment had been undertaken, let alone that daily or weekly lists of activities had 
been prepared.  On at least one occasion employees put specific requests to 
management under the regulations.  
 
I asked for them [the documentation that the company was required to keep 
under COSHH regulations] because I was not well.  I went up to them and said 
‘Could I get copy of the COSHH assessments of these sheets?’  ‘What do you 
want them for?’ ‘Well, it’s just to help my doctor in case one of these [chemicals] 
has gone to my lungs’. ‘I’ll have to see Peter’.  ‘Right, no bother’.  ‘Peter will get 
them organised for you’. He never did it so I badgered and badgered him. ‘Oh, 
these things take a couple of days to run off a copy’.  That was over three years 
ago. 2001, probably around August/September.  And he never gave me them. 
(W7)  
 
 
5.7 Protective Equipment  
 
The key piece of legislation in relation to the use of protective equipment in the 
workplace is the Personal Protective Equipment at Work Regulations 1992.  The main 
legal responsibilities codified by the regulations are the duties employers have to supply 
personal protective equipment and that it used at work wherever there are risks to 
health and safety that cannot be adequately controlled in other ways.  The regulations 
specify the PPE that must be provided to guard against the following hazards that were 
typically found at ICL Stockline: chemical or metal splash, dust, gas and vapour, 
temperature extremes, spray from spray guns, skin infection, disease or contamination.  
PPE should be appropriate for the task and for the substances to which it is applied.  
Those standards are detailed in the Personal Protective Equipment Regulations 2002.  
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Employers also have the legal responsibility to ensure that workers are adequately 
trained in the use of PPE, that equipment is well maintained and that suitable 
replacement PPE is always readily available.  Notwithstanding the obvious hazards, 
particularly in the coating and fabrication departments, all respondents insisted that 
management for many years had neglected to provide important items of protective 
equipment.  
 
Well, when you started you got a pair of steel toe-capped boots and cotton 
overalls and that was the only protection you got. (W2)  
 
At the start, there was no gloves, no visor, no gloves.  Again, you were just sitting 
down, people walking about.  Depending on what chemicals and what kind of 
plastics other people were using, you would stay clear because it would affect 
whoever, with the vapours off the chemicals and the plastics. (W1) 
 
 
Workers noted the consequences of working without the provision of basic personal 
protective equipment. 
 
When they were dipcoating the parts, the tank that was used to dipcoat was just 
brought into the main area.  It wasn’t like put into a room where it was sealed off 
from everybody else.  They just dipcoated in the middle of the coating shop.  So 
that stuff was airborne as well. (W4) 
 
When I started in there, I wasn’t spraying then, I was just cleaning the metal 
materials that came in with a chemical called Genklene.  It is pretty nasty – when 
you breathe it in, your eyes water.  If you splashed that in your eyes then you 
would know all about it. (W1) 
 
It’s like a long burning sensation in your eyes. And then after a while, I don’t 
know what happens, but it wears away.  But I don’t know if that’s done me any 
damage to my eyes.  You know, you think you are OK till later on. (W3) 
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It was only in the years immediately preceding the disaster that management started 
supplying equipment, and even then workers raised questions regarding the 
effectiveness and comfort of items.  
 
If you worked on a timescale and me being there 13 years, once I started to 
complain then one or two things did start to creep in.  Like you were given a 
mask [but this was after] about 10 years.  But I might as well have been given a 
Halloween mask because I didn’t know what I was using and I didn’t know if the 
mask was any good for it.  I think it did make a difference because I felt before I 
had the mask and I was using the chemicals, I used to go out sometimes feeling 
sickly, feeling light-headed, not feeling too well, and when I wore the mask I 
didn’t have these symptoms.  You know, not as bad, as there were some days I 
did, but not as bad. It would depend on what chemicals you were using.  So I did 
feel the mask did help but I don’t think it eliminated it because a lot of times you 
could be in there and I might be six feet away and have my back to people 
working with chemicals…you would have your mask on but I wouldn’t know what 
chemicals you were working with, so I would be only six feet away from these 
chemicals behind me, with no protection. (Interview Laurence Connolly Snr. 16 
January 2006)  
 
 
According to workers’ testimonies, those in the coating shop only received masks ‘at the 
tail end’, that is only in very recent times.  They reported also that some colleagues 
never wore goggles and used gloves only occasionally. 
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Over and again workers commented on the shortcomings of the limited protective 
equipment that was provided.  The gloves supplied apparently were deficient in a 
number of respects.  
 
They had cotton gloves for the heat, but when they were painting or that they 
used to take their gloves off…I can never remember I. having goggles on. (W4) 
The only person I ever saw with gloves was the fellow using the blaster. (W2) 
 
Even the gloves they used for blasting, the blaster buffed them away in no time 
at all. It used to blast holes in them.  Everybody used to wear the same set, like 
gauntlets…if you wanted to go in and blast a wee bit of a job you were working 
on, you would wear the same gloves that somebody had been sweating in for 
hours. (W4) 
 
There was a lot of heavy lifting…like the valves. As well as lifting them these 
things were like 300 degrees hot.  So they would be put in an oven to get to 
temperature and then you would have to grab them and carry them out, it might 
be 6 feet or less, but you had to grab them, turn and put them onto this spray bit, 
spray them and then lift them and move them to somewhere else.  No insulated 
gloves – cotton gloves, like gardening gloves, and no other protection (W2). 
 
Then they gave us gloves and they weren’t even chemical gloves.  They used to 
melt, all the fingers used to fall off them.  Put the gloves on and you would be 
working with whatever and then maybe you would be using the cement for the 
glue and the finger had been stuck to the part…So they just made life awkward. 
More hassle.  They were just melting onto your hand. (W2) 
 
 
As has been demonstrated in detail, working conditions should have caused 
management to pay close attention to ensuring that workers were sufficiently protected 
from hazards.  An important aspect of this would have been to have both provided 
effective protective clothing and to have provided the necessary conditions that allowed 
the wearing of protective clothing comfortably.  However, illustrative of the deficient 
practice was management’s tolerance of workers ‘stripping off’ in an environment where 
the heat became intolerable instead of taking steps to ensure comfortable working 
conditions.  
 
Remember it was so warm at that back bit [of the coating shop] that people used 
to strip to the waist – mind x, y, wee z as well. (W5) 
 
X used to come out with a pair of shorts on because it was so warm it was the 
only way you could sort of get through the day. (W1) 
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On the rare occasions that workers were provided with personal safety equipment, the 
working environment of the plant often made the use of this equipment unbearable. 
 
Well this mask that I was asked to wear, I’m not joking, when I was spraying it 
was like a bumble bee mask.  That’s what it reminded me of, the face of a 
bumble bee.  Sticking away out here, two vents to take the fumes away, 
something like that.  The sweat is actually running down your face and it’s going 
in your eyes, you can’t see what you’re spraying.  And I complained to Stewart 
McColl about it. I said, ‘I can’t wear that, I’ll just wear the wee white mask or just 
a wee painter’s mask’. ‘Health and safety says you can’t wear it, you’ll need to 
use this bumble bee mask’.  I was forced to use it. (W1) 
 
 
As recounted above, workers using the degreaser Genklene frequently experienced the 
chemical splashing into their eyes.  It should be stressed that this exposure to this 
chemical hazard was entirely preventable.  
 
But, as I say, I don’t know how many times I’ve splashed this stuff into my eyes, 
simply because I had no safety glasses. (W3) 
 
 
One interviewee provided an instructive suggestion for verifying worker claims of the 
general lack of protective equipment.  
 
I don’t know how much of the footage that you saw of the actual day the blast 
happened.  If you ever get a chance to see any of that you look and see how 
many people came out there with safety equipment.  A fireman commented, ‘Did 
everybody say “Oh there’s a blast, wait until I take all this safety gear off before I 
run out”’.  Nobody came out with anything on, absolutely nobody. When a 
building blows up you don’t have time to go and change.  You will see, I think, X 
and Y had a pair of cotton overalls. (W4) 
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5.8 Summary 
 
In practice many of the procedures (and the lack of safety critical procedures) detailed 
in workers’ evidence are likely to have constituted serious breaches of the 
ICL/Stockline’s legal responsibilities.  Those likely breaches can be summarised as 
follows.  
 
First, at ICL/Stockline, known highly hazardous substances, materials and processes 
were used and employees have provided accounts that indicate, in many different 
respects, such substances at various times were not controlled at all by engineering 
methods.  Indeed in several instances, there was no extraction or proper local exhaust 
ventilation systems available at all.  Later visits by HSE inspectors reveal that enclosure 
of some dangerous processes to prevent exposure to fumes and dust were entirely 
absent as evidenced by HSE requirements for such enclosures to be introduced.  
 
Second, legal requirements to provide the PPE necessary to protect workers appear to 
have been seriously neglected.  In a number of instances, workers were initially 
provided with no protective equipment at all and then were provided with masks or 
gloves but not apparently with associated information, instruction, training and 
supervision. Neither was PPE maintained nor used in a satisfactory manner or suitable 
for the purpose. 
 
Third, whilst management may have provided the regulator with COSHH assessments 
and risk assessments, workers’ testimonies indicate that risk assessments were not 
conducted.  Indeed, none of the workers we interviewed recalls ever having been 
involved in a former risk assessment to their knowledge.  Workers reported that, even 
when the results of COSHH assessments were requested, management failed to supply 
them to workers. 
 
Fourth, and following the previous point, the lack of provision of basic health and safety 
information and the lack of formal mechanisms of consultation with workers indicate on-
going lack of compliance. 
 
Fifth, there appears to have been a complete lack of training provision that would have 
provided workers with the necessary knowledge and awareness of the hazardous 
substances and environments to which they were exposed.  
 
There is from an external health and safety professional perspective, little sign in the 
accounts provided to us of a systematic approach to health and safety within the plant. 
Indeed, the evidence we have strongly indicates a systematic absence of legally 
compliant formal health and safety procedures at ICL/Stockline which cumulatively 
exposed the workforce to a wide range of serious risks to their health and severely 
compromised safe working practices at the plant.  
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Section 6 Regulation - Health and Safety Executive 
 
This section begins by introducing the wider context for the regulatory role, in particular 
drawing attention to the pressures that the HSE currently find itself under, before 
exploring issues of inspection and investigation, with reference to the detailed account 
of one former worker at the plant. 
 
 
6.1 The Health and Safety Executive 
 
The HSE has never been granted the resources to act as any kind of police force for the 
UK workplace despite being the lead enforcement agency for a criminal Act, HASAWA, 
and related regulations. Breaches are crimes, however, and should be treated with the 
same seriousness and subject to the same scrutiny as other criminal acts..  Indeed, 
there are currently fewer HSE inspectors in the UK than traffic wardens in central 
London.  4,545 staff were employed in 1994. Since then, numbers have fluctuated, but 
total staff has never surpassed this high point.  Over the decade between 1994 and 
2004, budget pressures forced resources even lower.  On 1PstP April 2004, there were  
4,019 HSE staff in post.  However, only 1,483 of those were front line operational 
inspectors.  Resources are therefore spread thin for an inspectorate that is that it is now 
enforcing in more workplaces than previously, but with fewer resources (Hazards 
August 2006). Inspections, meanwhile, are in freefall. Figures obtained by Hazards 
show the provisional 2005/06 inspections figure for FOD has reached a record low, 
down from 55,195 in 2004/05 to just 46,032. This is almost 40 per cent lower than the 
corresponding figure for 2001/02. At the same time At the same time the number of 
workplaces enforced by HSE has risen dramatically, up from 525,841 in 2001/02 to 
598,385 in 2004/05 with a corresponding impact on the frequency a workplace can 
expect to see an HSE inspector. In 2001/02 that would suggest a workplace inspection 
frequency of once every 7 years. By 2004/05 this had dropped by over a third to barely 
once every 11 years. In 2006, this was set to dip below once every 13 years. 
(Uhttp://www.hazards.org/commissionimpossible/comeclean.htmU ) 
 
This is why premises such as the ICL/Stockline factory are very rarely subject to routine 
inspections.  As O’Neill (2006) has noted, the rate of inspection in the Field Operations 
Division of the HSE has reduced dramatically so that premises that could have 
expected on average one inspection every 6.99 years in 2001/02 could only expect one 
inspection per 10.84 years in 2004/05.    
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When HSE are able to conduct investigations in the course of routine, active 
inspections, or following incidents that have been reported to them, their primary, often 
sole, concern is with locating source problems and recommending remedial measures, 
if they deem any are required, in order to prevent future occurrence of such an event.  It 
is widely accepted in HSE policy and practice that inspectors neither enter premises in 
order to seek out violations of health and safety law, nor respond to the vast majority of 
observed or known offences by resort to formal enforcement action.  Employers are, 
wherever possible to be offered advice, consultation and negotiation before 
enforcement action is taken.  In other words, the work of the HSE is structured around a 
‘compliance’, rather than a ‘strict enforcement’ model of regulation (Pearce and Tombs, 
1990; Tombs and Whyte, 2007).  This effect is amplified as investigation and inspection 
criteria have been tightened considerable as a result of recent policy changed and 
resource constraints, meaning far fewer serious incidents are now investigated and 
when routine inspections do occur, they are not entire workplace inspections, but limited 
to prescribed priority risks.TP20PT 
 
Except in the case of the most egregious safety offences, enforcement action is invoked 
only where processes of persuasion, negotiating and bargaining, often over a very 
protracted period, have proven 'unsuccessful'.  For the HSE, law is, indeed, the ‘last 
resort’ (Hawkins, 2002) when it comes to the discovery, investigation, and response to, 
health and safety offences. 
 
The compliance approach has been consolidated by a government agenda that ensures 
the HSE’s acceptance at a corporate level of the need to take into account regulated 
industries’ commercial constraints and the need to balance regulatory goals with the 
economic ‘health’ of the nation (Tombs and Whyte, 1998).  There are therefore 
important political pressures that have acted to construct HSE as a body which must 
cooperate with and advise industry rather than as a law enforcement agency (Pearce 
and Tombs, 1998).   
  
Those assumptions that underpin the work of the HSE act to structure the day-to-day 
relationships that regulators have with duty holders.  This is indicated in evidence from 
the research that inspectors consistently fail to examine the role of senior company 
officers in relation to deaths at work (Bergman, 1994: 97).  Inspectors regard 
managements rather than workers as their primary point of contact in regulated 
workplaces.  Inspectors are normally reluctant to meet with workers to discuss matters 
confidentially or to use workers’ complaints as a basis for questioning employers’ 
systems of safety management (Whyte, 2006).  This approach often causes problems 
for workers who contact the HSE directly when their concerns are not being taken 
seriously in the workplace, since the HSE are reluctant to investigate complaints without 
revealing the identity of workers or the precise nature of the complaint (Whyte, 2000).  
                                                 
TP
20
PT See Hazards 99: http://www.hazards.org/enforcement/whatgorilla.htm 
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The compliance approach to regulation structures the regulatory strategies of front-line 
inspectors during visits to, and inspections of, premises.  An approach that engages 
with workers rather than managements in the first instance – contradicts the 
‘compliance’ approach that the HSE adopts to regulation, an approach that rests, above 
all else, upon securing the co-operation of managements.   
 
 
6.2 Regulating Health and Safety at ICL/Stockline 
 
Employees identified a range of serious injuries and incidents that had occurred at 
ICL/Stockline over the years which together indicate that the company had a record 
meriting ongoing monitoring and inspection.  As this report has already noted, we have 
evidence from the interviews to show that over a decade or more, at least 13 employees 
attended the Western Infirmary for emergency treatment.  In addition there have been at 
least 6 over-three day incidents.  The injuries sustained at the factory that we know 
suggest a poor safety record for a relatively small undertaking.   
 
We know that a worker’s complaint about health and safety management at the plant 
was made to HSE in 1999.  Our understanding is that HSE issued an improvement 
notice and two notices early in 2000s.  In 2003, HSE visited the plant again in response 
to a request from an employee.  From this evidence we can therefore conclude that the 
HSE was aware of the poor health and safety record of this plant and was alerted to 
poor safety practices on two occasions by employees in the 5 years preceding the 
disaster.   
 
The anti-trade union stance taken by management at ICL/Stockline should also have 
made the HSE vigilant about the firm’s health and safety management, not least since 
HSE research confirms the academic consensus that trade union organised workplaces 
are at least 50% safer than non-organised workplaces (for a discussion of this evidence, 
see (James and Walters, 2005).  Indeed, the anti-trade unionism and lack of legally 
required consultation and open discussion evidenced earlier in this report provides good 
reason to suspect that there were likely to be particular health and safety issues worthy 
of investigation at ICL/Stockline.  Those problems should have been picked up by HSE 
visits to the plant, particularly after HSE was contacted directly by employees about 
issues that they clearly felt they could not be resolved through existing safety 
management and consultation systems. 
 
It is clear from the evidence of the workers that ICL/Stockline management received 
advance notice of visits to the factory by the HSE.  
 
When they told us to tidy the factory up that was when you knew they were 
coming.  Half hour shut down and then it was a clear up.  It didn’t matter what 
you were doing – stop it. About 10-15 people would all be cleaning up.  It wasn’t 
a great workshop, it wasn’t as if we had a huge area, it got cleaned up quite 
quickly. (W1)  
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On one occasion, an HSE Inspector noted when arriving at the plant, that a ventilation 
hood still had wet paint on it. 
 
Although the HSE has statutory powers to make unannounced visits, it is common 
practice to give such warnings to managements, typically justified by HSE as allowing a 
more efficient use of time and resources.  Workers’ experiences reported in other 
industries, however, is that managements use this opportunity to deal with the most 
visible evidence of breaches before the HSE arrive (see for example, Watterson and 
LaDou 2003) 
 
It appears that the HSE did not apparently conduct any field testing of exposures to 
fumes and dust at ICL/Stockline but, according to workers’ testimonies’, apparently 
carried out a walk through survey of certain parts of the plant on its various visits.  HSE  
also, as we note in the previous section, relied on paper audits provided to it by the 
company.  The lack of ongoing audit and assessment by the company indicated in this 
report is something that HSE inspectors would only pick up if this matter was discussed 
in detail in meetings with the workforce.  
 
The lack of PPE equipment the HSE also stated that “a disposable paper dust mask 
would be suitable for work activities giving rise to small quantities of dust” yet made no 
reference whatsoever to the type of dust generated or its volume (HSE letter Bowie to 
Ann McKechin MP 24 September 2003).  The evidence given in interviews was that for 
many jobs there was considerable dust and fume generated, and in circumstances were 
there were multiple hazardous chemical and dust exposures simultaneously. 
The statement by the HSE that a paper mask was suitable for any type of ‘dust’ is 
extremely worrying and incorrect.  It would surely not have been HSE’s conclusion had 
they been fully aware of workers’ experiences of the management of chemical and 
substance hazards at ICL/Stockline detailed in previous chapters of this report. 
 
Those regulatory issues are explored in more detail now, with reference to the 
testimony of one ICL/Stockline worker who had particular experience of contact with the 
HSE.  
 
 
6.3 A Worker’s Experiences of the Regulation of Safety at 
ICL/Stockline 
 
In this extended interview a worker, Laurence Connolly Snr., recounts in full his 
involvement with the HSE, beginning with the initial contact he made with the body 
when he raised concerns regarding the health and safety practices at ICL and workers’ 
exposure to hazardous substances.  It is important to emphasise that this is not the 
testimony of an embittered malcontent.  Laurence was a committed and skilled worker 
who had served ICL Stockline for some 15 years, leaving the company’s employment 
only three weeks before the disaster. 
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While in other sections of the report it has been necessary to preserve the anonymity of 
respondents, Laurence made clear his willingness to be identified.  The interview is 
reproduced as a verbatim transcription except where indicated, and minor amendments 
have been made in the interests of clarity and in order to facilitate the flow of the 
testimony.  
 
‘Well, they (the HSE) had been in before I got in contact with them.  I didn’t know 
why they were in, we never ever got told why these people were in, they were 
just people, get the place cleaned up, people coming in we were told.  It wasn’t 
till after that we knew who they actually were.  I couldn’t remember the exact 
dates [I first made contact] but for me it was when Laurence [his son and fellow 
worker] started taking not well and it seemed to be every time he came back to 
work, the work made a couple of errors or something and he would be back off 
sick again and things like that.  That was when I started looking into it, you know, 
the environment, the chemicals and the different stuff’. 
 
‘I found out through my contact with the MP, Ann McKechin, that the HSE had 
actually been in prior to me complaining and they had actually set some sort of 
notice on them, an improvement notice.  None of us knew anything about that, 
that was all sort of news to us.  But that had been a couple of years prior to me 
contacting them. I think it was 2003 [June 2003]. It was actually through her I got 
the letters and the dates and stuff, it was actually her that passed them on to me. 
[The improvement notice was] to do with chemicals at first.  It was something to 
do with chemicals, something to do with the COSHH regulations.  I don’t know 
exactly why or what they had to improve on or whatever. It was 2003 when I got 
them involved, that’s what it was, and it was like a couple of years before that, 
round about 2000/1, now when I think about it [the HSE’s earlier involvement].’ 
 
‘I didn’t even know, as I was saying to you, that Health & Safety were coming in 
or anybody was coming in, it was like the day before we were told “clean up, get 
the place tidy, put things away, hide things away out of the road” for somebody 
coming in.  But they didn’t always tell us who it was, it wasn’t maybe till likes of 
the people had been in, done their visit – as far as we were concerned it might 
just have been a new customer and he was wanting to have a look round the 
building just to see what it was like and see what we did.  But then it would 
maybe be the day after that we would find out that was the Health & Safety were 
in, that was the Insurance people that was in, that was a customer that was in.  It 
would only be after the people visited that we would actually find out who they 
were.  We would never find out before who they were.’ 
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Laurence’s contact with HSE began in 2002 due to concerns about the health of his 
son, a fellow worker at ICL/Stockline. 
 
‘I decided to get the HSE involved because of my son’s ill-health.  That was the 
start of it.  My son took not well and he took pneumonia and then he came back 
to work and then took it again and just had constant ill-health.  I asked in the 
work, you know, about the stuff they were using and different things because, for 
me, there seemed to be a link.  Every time he came back from work he took not 
well again.  I couldn’t find out anything in the work so I started looking on the 
Internet and I started finding out some bits and pieces myself.  And then when I 
started reading it, it became very frightening because a lot of the problems that 
Laurence has had and is still having, you could actually read through these data 
sheets on all these chemicals and it’s telling you some of the effects that they 
can have on you.  At the same time, they are telling you that you should be 
wearing certain types of masks, certain types of gloves, impervious overalls, all 
these sort of things.  We never got anything like that.  The way it worked in the 
coating shop you got a pair of overalls and a pair of boots.  This was just a plain 
pair of cotton overalls.  We didn’t get any protective clothing whatsoever.  I mean, 
if I went to work I used to go to ASDA and buy three quid denims because they 
were ruined after a couple of weeks.  A pair of steel toe-capped boots.  Then 
gloves appeared, sort of latex gloves, but when you went near any of the 
chemicals the fingers used to fall off.  They used to actually dissolve so they 
were actually more a hindrance than anything else.  They were more problems 
than not having them’.  
 
‘To start with I phoned them up hoping to get some advice but I never really got 
any.  This was somewhere around the middle of 2002. I don’t know how many 
times I actually did phone them.  I mean, Laurence (my son) was phoning them 
as well.  So between the two of us there might have been a dozen, two dozen 
phone calls.  I don’t know.  We just wouldn’t let go, we just wouldn’t leave it and 
eventually we did, in my opinion, shame them into coming in.  It wasn’t a case of 
me phoning up and saying “I find a problem” and them saying “We’ll have a look 
at this and see what we can do for you”.  This went on for months. I had to keep 
contacting them and then there was that day, all of a sudden there was “Get this 
fumes cabinet built” and I got stuck in it.  Then [in June 2003] two Inspectors 
walked in that day and that was how I found out the Health & Safety had come 
in’.  
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Not only did Laurence have no warning of the HSE visit that had been prompted by his 
contacts, but, without his permission, he was revealed as a whistleblower by the HSE 
inspector during the visit. 
 
‘One of them asked me my name and I told them. I was in the cabinet at the time 
and the Inspector said to me, “You’re the one who phoned, I’m x and gave me 
their card and said to me that if there’s any more problems in future just to give 
them a ring.  The MD and sort of acting manager [Stewart McColl and Ian 
Mavers] were there at the time. I was gobsmacked that I had been identified.  I 
had absolutely nothing to say at that point in time.  I was just shocked’.  
 
 
From the outset, HSE had tried to persuade Laurence not to remain anonymous and to 
allow them to give his name to management.  After some pressure, and because of the 
seriousness of the health problems he was experiencing, Laurence’s son decided to 
allow HSE to use his name.   
 
‘The thing was confidentiality was one of the problems I had trying to get them to 
come in.  They said it would be a lot easier for them if they had a name that they 
could give to the company.  And what actually happened was, because of 
Laurence’s ill health, he decided that the only way he was going to find out 
anything was to give his name.  He actually gave them permission to use his 
name.  It’s in one of the letters.  They [management] decided, in their wisdom, 
that that was me. Stewart McColl just smirked.  He had a wee sort of grin.  He 
never said anything, which I’m quite sure he wouldn’t have done in front of them.  
Mavers - it didn’t seem to really make any difference to him’. 
 
 
The assumption that the complaint was made by Laurence caused tensions in his 
relationship with management. 
 
‘McColl’s general attitude towards me totally changed, you know, from 13 years 
of never once getting warned about my work, never once questioned about 
anything that I had done, more often than not the only question I would be asked 
was “I wonder if you could help us, do you know about this, do you know about 
that”?  Then all of a sudden it changed and it was a case of anything they could 
find wrong, you know, they sort of started nit-picking and it could be the silliest of 
wee things.  You would get a sheet of material through and it would have a chip, 
and this was coming from Stockline, nothing to do with me, but I would get the 
blame because it was chipped.  And I’m saying “Wait a minute, I’ve not done 
anything to that yet”.  “You must have cut it” and I’m saying “It’s a sheet of 
material, I haven’t touched it”’. 
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‘It was just silly things.  I ended up arguing one day with Nicky Downie [who] 
ended up as a sort of manager, perhaps Workshop Manager or some title like 
that.  He decided that he was going to have a go at me about my work and I just 
wasn’t for that.  I mean, I had worked in there for 13 years and I had worked in 
other places as well.  20 years experience.  If I had done something wrong and 
somebody was saying like “You made a mistake there, you did this, you did that” 
then fair enough, I’ll stand and I’ll take the medicine.  But I had done nothing 
wrong and I wasn’t having it’.  
 
‘I think other people expected this to happen.  People knew what Stewart McColl 
was like and I think they just expected it.  It was total nit-picking.  I couldn’t get 
my holidays when I wanted, it didn’t matter when it was, it was always clashed 
with somebody else or something.  They put a chart up on the wall, so I checked 
the chart, nobody is off, I’ll take that, then he is going to change the chart 
because I put in for my holidays, he is going to change the groupings.  Things 
like that’.    
 
‘A couple of things occurred [that led to the HSE becoming involved].  One winter 
the heating was terrible, really, really bad, and one day I got dragged up to the 
office for some reason, and Stewart McColl, MD, decided to have a go at me 
about health & safety in the place.  And he said to me “Tell your pals down the 
stair that they don’t need to worry about how cold or how warm it is in there, it’s 
within the regulations”.  I didn’t understand what he meant.  So I goes down the 
stair and I was talking to one of the guys and I was saying to him “He just had a 
go at me about the heating in the place” and he went “Oh, that’s probably my 
fault”.  I said “What do you mean?”  He said “I phoned the Health & Safety about 
the temperatures in here and told them the place was freezing”.  So, going on the 
assumption of that, the Health & Safety phoned him and told him that one of his 
workers had complained and that was why he had a go at me.  There were one 
or two coincidences.  I mean, as I was saying to you about the fumes cabinet 
thing, I was there 13 years and never did they ever attempt to give us any sort of 
fumes cabinet to do any of the gluing or cementing.  Then all of a sudden it 
became number one priority for the two builders to get this thing built.  So, within 
an hour of me getting put in the place, two people came in from the Health & 
Safety and asked me personally “Was this better for me?”.  So, you know, I 
mean, it’s strange how these things happen, likes 13 years of getting nothing and 
then all of a sudden you get this fumes cabinet’.  
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Laurence reported a lack of consultation between HSE and workers at the plant. 
 
‘There was no communication.  The only way I found out about the visits was 
when I actually started speaking to Ann McKechin and she started sending 
letters to them and she was getting responses from them.  They would never call 
a meeting with the workforce and say ‘We had a visit from the HSE four months 
ago, and they’ve asked us to do x, y and z, and we have done this now’.  They 
would never do anything like that.  They would never consult the workers 
regarding any working practice or anything.  There was no consultation with the 
workers regards health & safety, working practice or anything.  Nothing.  The 
only time they consulted the workforce was if they got a new job and they didn’t 
know how to do it and they would try and nip your brains about how to do the job.  
That’s the only time.  That’s the only way they would consult the workforce’.  
 
 
The lack of consultation with HSE inspectors was of particular importance, due to the 
lack of communication by management of the outcomes of HSE visits. 
 
‘But we never received any communications from the company or the HSE 
before or after their visits. I tried after the visit of the Health & Safety, and even 
after I left the place to get information.  I mean, I still kept, up to within maybe a 
week of the disaster, I was still phoning the Health & Safety trying to get them to 
tell me if it was safe for me, if these chemicals were doing me any harm.  And not 
once did that ever get anybody from the Health & Safety to respond and tell me if 
the chemicals.  Even after I left the place I still, you know, I tried to contact 
[named HSE Inspector] and I tried maybe within the three weeks of my leaving, 
up to the disaster, maybe three or four times I phoned the Health & Safety in that 
period and [this Inspector] was either at meetings or she was out or she was this 
or that and she never ever returned my calls’. 
 
 
The only time Laurence did experience the HSE approaching him at ICL/Stockline was 
when they revealed his identity to management and asked about the complaint he had 
made. 
 
‘The only thing the HSE Inspectors asked me when they visited was, “Was it 
better for me?” when that fumes cabinet was built.  That was all they asked me. I 
don’t know if they were speaking to anybody else.  To my knowledge they didn’t 
speak to anybody else and they didn’t call a meeting of the workforce.  I don’t 
know what the HSE inspectors asked management on their visits.  I don’t know if 
they asked about consultation between management and the workforce.  I don’t 
know if they asked the company because the company wouldn’t tell us.  And 
subsequent to that, in the correspondence between Ann and HSE, there’s no 
mention of that.  As far back as 2000/01, which is referred to, although they are 
not on inspection reports, there’s nothing about any form of consultation’.  
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Apart from this meeting, the only contact Laurence had with HSE was following a 
request he made under the Freedom of Information Act.   
 
‘The only time that they have actually tried to speak to me was after I put a letter 
in asking for details under the Freedom of Information Act.  Then they did send 
me a letter saying that because all the information had been sent to the police, 
they did not have any to give me.  Two weeks after that my son told me “Look, 
I’ve just had a letter from my lawyer” and in it there were all the details about me 
and the visit they had made.  Bits had been blanked out, so it was very hard to 
read but it did have my name on it and other names.  So I actually phoned 
Stewart Campbell’s office [HSE Director Scotland]  in Edinburgh and tried to 
speak to him because I wasn’t happy about this.  On the front of the letter they 
stated that the Data Protection Act was the reason why they blanked out people’s 
names but they had sent my details with my name to somebody else.  Although it 
might be my son’s lawyer it was definitely about me.  And the Health & Safety, in 
their letters, they did refer to me as Senior and him as Junior’.  
 
‘So I contacted Stewart Campbell’s office and he was away on holiday at the 
time.  So then I tried to contact Stewart North at the HSE in Glasgow.  Within 
about half an hour of me phoning my mobile phone rang and it was Stewart 
North.  He said “I hear you have been trying to contact me”.  I said “Oh it’s not 
before time, I’ve been trying to contact you for months now”.  And he went “We 
have been trying to get a hold of you and we couldn’t get you”.  I said “Well, how 
long did you try today, how many phone calls did you make today to try and get 
me?”.  He went “One”.  I said “Funny how half an hour ago I phoned Stewart 
Campbell’s office and within half an hour of me phoning you phone me.”  He said 
“Oh it’s about your complaint.  All we were trying to do was do you a wee favour”.  
I said “But a couple of weeks ago you sent me a letter telling me you didn’t have 
any information.”  “No, we don’t have”.  I said “How can you send that out”.  “I’ll 
have to look into this and I will get back to you but I would like to apologise”.  But 
he never ever did get back to me.  Somebody in there had made a mess of it and 
they were just trying to sort of see what I was going to do about it.  That was it.  
That’s the only time I’ve ever got any response out of them, when I phoned 
Edinburgh.  Any time I phoned the Glasgow Office they weren’t in, couldn’t talk, 
they don’t know.  That was all you ever got’.  
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According to some ex-workers, the changes made after HSE intervention were by and 
large cosmetic changes. 
 
[As a result of the HSE’s involvement] if there were any changes they were very 
minor, if anything, you know.  Stewart McColl was, I would say, in the last sort of 
few years, it’s not that he was safety-conscious, he was a great one for putting 
up signs for safety first, you know, wear gloves, wear this, wear that, wear the 
next thing.  I would say it was more like a cosmetic thing, you know.  There were 
lots of signs all over the place and for somebody walking in, whether it be a 
customer or whoever, then they would see all these safety signs or whatever. 
When he took over as the MD of – see he used to just be in charge of Stockline – 
but then he took over as ICL and that gave him sort of control of the whole place, 
the day to day running of it.  Then he started to make things look better, if you 
know what I mean, a wee bit tidier and a bit cleaner’.  
 
‘I would say even in the coating shop, a lot was cosmetic as well.  I mean, the 
practices didn’t change, you know.  Before Stewart McColl took over they were 
doing the same jobs as when he was there.  You know, there wasn’t a change in 
the working practice, if you know what I mean.  It might have looked different. 
The thing was if you walked through the coating shop and there could be a 
canister there, and all the different things that could go wrong, that paint or 
whatever it was could be lying there, lying opened with whatever solvents lying 
about it.  But then if there was an Irn Bru bottle then he would go absolutely 
bananas.  It was things like that.  Chemicals could lie all over the place and that 
wasn’t a problem.  But if you had a bottle of water or a bottle of Irn Bru on your 
bench then that was a major health and safety issue’.  
 
‘After the HSE visits things they did put in some storage cupboards, but they 
were never locked or anything – you could do whatever you wanted with it.  I 
could take a 5 gallon drum [of x] out of the cupboard, and I could leave that lying 
on my bench.  If there was a bottle of Irn Bru beside it he would come down and 
go bananas about the bottle of Irn Bru “Get that in the bin”.  This didn’t change 
after the HSE visits’.  
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Laurence’s recollection was that the ‘walk throughs’ made by HSE Inspectors on their 
visits were brief and lacked thoroughness.  
 
‘How do you look at something individually?  Do you actually stop and have a 
proper look?  You might have a glance and look at something on the way past.  
How many of the HSE inspectors knew that one of the ovens used to be a bin 
lorry?  They must have walked past that.  If they knew that was a bin lorry, I’m 
quite sure they would have said “Wait a minute, that’s a bin lorry”.  They might 
have done something.  Did these people actually know what they were looking 
for?  The last time I saw the Health & Safety come in, it was in a wee room and 
that’s the only place I saw them.  If they were outside and they had a look at 
machinery I wouldn’t see them doing that because of the layout of the building.  It 
was like, if they were beside you, you could see what they were doing, but then 
they would move on to another part of the building, or they might not have gone 
into another part of the building, you wouldn’t know, just because of the layout of 
the building.  You would only see them where you were working.  They were in 
our department for two minutes, that was all, absolutely minutes.  They weren’t 
there for any length of time’. 
 
‘To my knowledge the HSE never did an investigation of air quality. But that was 
one of the things I had asked them.  When I spoke to the Health & Safety, when I 
started to read up on a lot of these chemicals, a lot of them will tell you about [the 
importance of] the point of extraction, you know, or general extraction.  Well, we 
didn’t have any extraction in there whatsoever.  So I asked the Health & Safety 
about this.  So they knew prior to coming in.  To my knowledge they never 
attached or used a meter or monitored the air quality’. .  
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In the 10 month period between June 2003, when this HSE inspection took place and 
April 2004, when LC left ICL’s employment, Laurence was not contacted by the HSE 
there were, to the best of his knowledge, no further visits made by the HSE to the 
factory and no obvious attempt to ensure the effectiveness of the fumes cabinet.  
 
‘I still wasn’t happy and I contacted Ann [McKechin] who was still in the process 
of trying to get some details or answers or whatever out of them.  She was just 
getting letters that weren’t really telling them anything at all. In that period I 
contacted the HSE a couple of times and said that I wasn’t happy.  I said “Why 
won’t anybody tell me was it safe, was it not safe or whatever?”  I had asked 
them a few different things but they never ever contacted me.  I can’t remember 
them ever sending me any letters or anything or explanations.  I wanted to know 
about the chemicals, which had been the whole idea of me contacting them to 
start with. I think one time somebody said to me that the proper things were in 
place or something along these lines.  Well, I pointed out that I had read all the 
data sheets which called for at the point of extraction and impervious gloves and 
other different things.  I said “There is no way that any of that was in use the day 
that you came in so how can you say that the proper practices are in place?”  But 
I never got a response to that.  Between when I left in April [2004] and May, 
when the disaster happened, I contacted Health & Safety because I was just livid 
with them and I wanted answers.  I contacted them and – nothing’.  
 
 
6.4 Summary 
 
In summary, the evidence that we have from this testimony highlights several key 
problems with HSE’s approach to regulating safety at ICL Stockline.   
 
First, the HSE failed to recognise the nature of industrial relations at the plant and the 
potential problems that employees might face if management discovered that they had 
approached HSE with complaints about health and safety.  This failure is summed up by 
the readiness with which HSE inspectors revealed the identity of Laurence in full view of 
the managers he had complained about.  This episode revealed at best a staggering 
naivety on the part of HSE and, at worst, collusion with management that risked 
compromising workers’ employment status. 
 
Second, HSE failed to recognise the importance of keeping lines of communication 
open with workers as well as with management.  Laurence Connolly’s testimony 
demonstrates HSE’s failure to have communicated with workers either before or after 
regulatory contacts with ICL/Stockline.  This failure meant that workers were denied 
important information gathered by HSE relating to their employers’ compliance with the 
law and relating to the risks to which they were being exposed.  HSE’s abject failure in 
this respect disempowered workers in their efforts to improve health and safety 
conditions at the plant.    
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Third, HSE inspections were, according to this testimony, too superficial to comprehend 
the complexity and gravity of the hazards that workers were exposed to in the plant.  
Thus, it appears that key features of the risks that workers were exposed to (air quality 
and the integrity of purpose built equipment in the plant itself) were barely investigated.  
The need for a more comprehensive approach to the ongoing inspection of safety 
critical features of safety management and the management of hazards is supported by 
the evidence provided by workers in this report.  Only comprehensive testing of known 
process hazards and full communication with workers would have improved HSE’s 
ability to identify the key problems at the plant. 
 
Fourth, and following the previous point, the ability to identify health and safety 
problems during HSE ‘walk-through’ inspections would certainly have been limited by 
the advance warning that preceded visits and afforded management the opportunity to 
make a quick health and safety make over.     
 
All of those features of HSE’s approach to regulating safety at ICL/Stockline stem from 
the ‘compliance’ regulatory philosophy adopted by HSE outlined in the introduction to 
this section in which the trust and co-operation of managements is the primary aim of 
the regulatory process.  This brief exploration of the regulatory issues relating to 
ICL/Stockline reveals the fundamental contradiction that exist in a system of regulation 
that is heavily biased towards the protection of managements’ right to manage, even 
where this involves a serious compromise of workers’ safety and health.   
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Section 7 Other Regulatory Aspects 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In this section of the report, we consider other aspects of the broader regulatory 
framework.  Having examined the Health and Safety Executive’s role, responsibility and 
actions in relation to ICL/Stockline it is necessary to consider those of other regulatory 
agencies.  This section begins by considering the range of regulatory responsibilities 
that fall under the remit of the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency and Glasgow 
City Council, before exploring issues relating to building control in some detail. 
 
 
7.2 The Regulatory Role of the Scottish Environmental Protection 
Agency 
 
The Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) is responsible for pollution 
prevention and control, and for the investigation of environmental protection laws and 
enforcement of breaches of those laws.  SEPA is likely to be involved in factories where 
there are chemicals and substances being used or stored that may present a risk of 
major hazard, or if the release of chemical or the use of substances such as asbestos is 
likely to present a danger to public and environmental health outside the factory.  
 
The only work carried out by SEPA in connection to ICL/Stockline in Maryhill appears to 
have begun and ended on the 11PthP May 2004, the day of the explosion.  On this day, 
SEPA gave the emergency services permission to remove “special waste” [asbestos] 
before the necessary three day notification period.  It also advised the emergency 
services that asbestos waste could be safely stored overnight in the containers they 
proposed to store it in and that an asbestos removal company would be able to dispose 
of the waste. 
 
Over and above this advice to the emergency services, a SEPA memorandum dated 
11PthP May 2004 (written by Douglas King, Waste Specialist II, Glasgow Team and sent to 
Malcolm Mathers, Directorate of Operations) records two telephone conversations on 
the day of the explosion.  Both conversations took place between Dr Helen Irvine, 
Consultant in Public Health Medicine, Glasgow Health Board and Douglas King of the 
SEPA Glasgow Team.  The first call from Dr Irvine was to inquire whether the SEPA 
had regulated or had been aware of Stockline Plastics. 
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The following extract from the memo gives the detail of the second call. 
 
Dr Irvine asked whether or not SEPA would investigate the site retrospectively to 
establish whether or not the activities undertaken by Stockline Plastics required 
some level of authorisation or not.  D King suggested to Dr Irvine that she 
formally wrote to SEPA with the relevant information gathered during her 
investigation.  Dr Irvine took exception to this comment, and stated in an abrupt 
manner that a letter was hardly appropriate when people had died and 50 people 
had been injured.  D King tried to explain what he meant by recommending this 
course of action, however Dr Irvine became increasingly annoyed and would not 
allow him to explain. 
 
 
Dr Irvine’s inquiries raised an important point here in relation to the need for a 
retrospective investigation into ICL/Stockline and the environmental hazards posed by 
their storage of chemicals and harmful substances.  The question has been answered 
by subsequent events.  SEPA were not involved in the wider investigation into the 
disaster, were not kept informed of the investigation and were not asked to contribute in 
any way.  In a Freedom of Information response dated 13PthP June, 2005, SEPA notes 
that, 
 
“[T]o date SEPA has not received a report on the explosion from the HSE nor a 
request for input.  The HSE is the lead enforcing authority for the Stockline 
Plastics site as there has been a serious accident resulting in fatalities.  We have 
not investigated retrospectively whether the activities undertaken by Stockline 
Plastics at the Maryhill site fell under legislation for which SEPA enforces.  Our 
interest in such a site would be in relation to pollution control matters rather than 
health and safety which is the remit of the HSE.” 
 
 
This response raises wider questions in relation to the co-ordination of regulatory 
authorities generally.  In fact, the investigation after the 11PthP May explosion took a 
normal course.  It is very rare for SEPA to conduct joint investigations with HSE into 
such incidents.  Perhaps more significantly, given the joint interest that those agencies 
have (for example both agencies are jointly responsible for enforcing some regulations 
such as COMAH) it is rare for investigation information and information that relates to 
enforcement activity and prosecutions to be passed between the agencies (Tombs and 
Whyte, 2007).  ICL/Stockline provides a good example of the importance of closer 
collaboration between regulatory authorities.  As this section has noted, the explosion at 
ICL/Stockline involved potential hazards to public health and environmental safety and 
SEPA were required to give advice on those hazards to the emergency services.  Yet 
SEPA had no records on the chemical and substance hazards that might be contained 
within the site.  SEPA would certainly have been in a stronger position to offer advice 
had it possessed some prior knowledge of the factory. 
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7.3 The Regulatory Role of Glasgow City Council 
 
Relevant local authority regulatory responsibilities that apply to health and safety issues 
at the ICL/Stockline site are administered by two departments of Glasgow City Council.  
Environmental Protection Services are responsible for enforcing some public and 
environmental health regulations and Development and Regeneration Services are 
responsible for building control and public safety regulations and planning and 
development control. 
 
Normally, Glasgow City Council would not have responsibility for enforcing public health 
and environmental health regulations or conducting investigations into a factory such as 
ICL/Stockline, unless it had received a complaint from a member of the public.  In a 
response to a Freedom of Information request, dated 3PrdP August 2005, the City Council 
confirmed that the relevant sections (the Public Health Unit and Asbestos Unit) had no 
record of any complaints from the public or records of inspections and investigations in 
relation to ICL/Stockline. 
 
Any significant changes to buildings would require the prior approval of Glasgow City 
Council to ensure that proposed building work complies with the relevant building 
standards regulations.  A building warrant is required if alterations are likely to affect the 
structural soundness of a building, drainage, ventilation and health and safety aspects 
of the alteration.  A warrant is also required for most demolition work and for the change 
of use of buildings.  Planning permission is a separate procedure which covers more 
significant building work and is normally required when the alteration is likely to have an 
impact upon on the local neighbourhood and community. 
 
In the same Freedom of Information response detailed above (dated 3PrdP August 2005)  
Glasgow City Council confirmed that it made no visits, inspections or investigations with 
regard to building control prior to 11PthP May 2004.  There is no record of any building 
warrant applications having been lodged for the site and Glasgow City Council had no 
record of any previous planning history in the form of planning permissions or 
enforcements.  This is confirmed by the investigations made by Dr. Stirling Howieson 
detailed below. 
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7.4 Research into the Factory Premises (Grovepark Mills) and 
Building Control 
 
In this sub-section we examine issues relating to the built environment of the factory 
premises and to building control regulation. In particular, this sub-section draws upon 
the expertise and research of Dr. Stirling Howieson (Department of Architecture, 
University of Strathclyde).  In the first part, Dr. Howieson presents a summary report of 
his involvement in the BBC Scotland programme ‘Frontline Scotland’ which was 
broadcast on 5 October 2004. On the basis of the extant knowledge, Dr. Howieson 
made a number of observations regarding the structure of the building and some of the 
reasons for its possible collapse.  It should be emphasised that these comments do not 
pertain to the causes of the explosion but attempt to provide some insight into the 
possible reasons why the building collapsed so readily.  In the second part, Dr. 
Howieson reports on research he conducted into the records held by various public 
bodies on modifications made to the building. 
 
 
7.4.1 Why did this factory collapse? 
 
‘In mid-September 2004 I was approached by the BBC (Frontline Scotland) and 
asked whether I was willing to comment on the evidence they had gathered 
regarding the collapse of the  Stockline Plastic factory in Maryhill.  At a 
subsequent meeting on 20PthP September I was shown a 3D simulation that their 
graphic technicians had prepared and a set of building plans purporting to 
illustrate the layout and basic constructional techniques.  The question was 
posed as to whether the factory could simply have collapsed under its own 
weight, given the amount of materials being stored on the upper floors.  
 
The programme makers also presented anecdotal evidence from the factory 
workers’ testimonies, suggesting that the building was showing evidence of being 
under considerable structural stress: 
 
1. The ground floor joists had for many years been reinforced with a large 
number of steel supports (ACRO props) situated in the basement.  These 
adjustable scaffolding poles had no foundations and were supported on 
the "bare earth" solum. 
2. Several floors were reported to be "bowing" (mid-span joist deflection) and 
plywood sheeting had been laid in many areas to either spread the load or 
level the floors. 
3. At least one slapping had been made in the external brick supporting walls 
to facilitate a new fork-lift loading bay. 
4. Cracking to brickwork walls at an external corner on the top floor, 
suggested structural movement (external wall leaning out). 
5. There was a suggestion that a water course ran underneath the factory 
and that the night before the collapse saw a high level of rainfall. 
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Given the above evidence I felt able to make the following comments : 
 
1. The building (constructed before the advent of professional structural 
engineers) appeared to be of structural masonry walls with a number of 
mid-span cast iron/steel columns supporting a central row of beams which 
in turn supported half the load on the floor joists.  
2. Anecdotal evidence strongly suggested that the building was under 
considerable structural strain from additional live loads (palletised 
materials/gas ovens etc) which were producing (possibly combined with 
high hygro/thermal fluctuations) significant mid-span deflection in the 
timber floor joists. 
3. It was likely that mid-span joist deflections on the ground floor had led to 
additional temporary supports being installed in the basement to 'shore up' 
the joists which were struggling to cope with new applied live loads from 
materials storage and large scale gas ovens.  The installation of ACRO 
props however, would normally be considered as a temporary measure.  
4. Given the possibility of flood water entering the solum and undermining 
the ACRO prop footings it was possible that this, in itself -or as a 
contributory factor - could have led to progressive and catastrophic 
structural collapse’.   
 
 
7.4.2 Further Investigations and Evidence in Relation to Building Control  
 
‘Following the Frontline Scotland broadcast on 5th October 2004 I was 
subsequently contacted by academics at the Universities of Strathclyde and 
Stirling, who were undertaking an independent investigation into the 
circumstances surrounding the disaster and was invited to make further 
comments on the structural integrity of the building and whether there was any 
evidence of problems that would have been sufficient to warrant pre-emptive 
remedial measures. 
 
‘Despite there being a paucity of information regarding the building’s construction 
there was evidence from the workers’ testimonies that relatively major structural 
alterations had been carried out to the building during the previous 20 years [16]. 
Such work was of a scope and scale that would require a Building Warrant.  A 
search of the records held by Glasgow City Council, Environmental Protection 
Services, Building Control and Public Safety was then undertaken.  A letter from 
Glasgow City Council dated 25th May 2005 confirmed that there was no record 
of any application for a Building Warrant being submitted after 1981 (other than 
an unprocessed application lodged in 1993 no.1310 which was for storm 
damage) and all drawings before this date would have been passed to the City 
Archivist located in the Mitchell Library.  
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‘A subsequent search on 6th June 2005 of the Mitchell Library archive of all 
applications pertaining to any work contained within the boundaries of Grovepark 
Street, Hopehill Rd and North Woodside Road failed to find any warrant covering 
structural slappings or any alterations to the Stockline/ ICL factory’.  
 
Two conclusions can thus be drawn: 
 
1. Any works to the factory were carried out without submitting for Building 
Control or Planning approval.  
2. An application for Building Warrant was submitted but not recorded and all 
drawings/records have subsequently been lost’. 
 
‘The implications of scenario 1 are profound. It is almost inconceivable that the 
managers of a major manufacturing company dealing in hazardous materials and 
processes would make major structural alterations to their factory - which was 
already appeared to show signs of structural stress - without commissioning an 
architect or structural engineer.  Engaging a building professional would have 
provided the opportunity to assess the ability of the structure not only to 
accommodate any new load paths resulting from the alterations, but also to 
assess the current performance of the building in terms of existing load paths, 
excessive deflections and structural movement’.  
 
‘Cutting and removing areas of external loadbearing brickwork results in the dead 
and live loads being redistributed via the new lintel to the surrounding brickwork.  
This may have required the brickwork surrounding any new slapping to be 
reinforced.  As the new fork lift loading bay was reportedly two stories high, the 
redistribution of loads could have been a significant factor compromising any 
safety margins’. 
 
 
7.5 Dr Howieson’s Conclusion 
 
‘Although the specific trigger that resulted in the collapse of the factory has not as 
yet been made public [at the time the of Dr. Howieson’s investigations], the 
question remains as to why such a factory - which was clearly demonstrating 
symptoms of structural stress under increasing live loading conditions - was 
allowed to accommodate a variety of hazardous processes with a high explosion 
risk?  The anecdotal evidence from the workforce points to the management 
adopting a "running repairs" strategy to floor joist deflections and cracking 
brickwork, rather than undertaking a detailed structural assessment of the 
building’s capability to support live loads from material storage.  The reports that 
the ground floor had been "held up" with temporary ACRO props (scaffolding 
poles) for many years, provides further proof of this somewhat haphazard 
approach to structural safety’. 
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The most likely trigger for the collapse remains an explosion, which blew out an 
area of external wall.  As all external wall areas are loadbearing (floors and roof 
loads) the loss of any wall area - particularly on the lower floors - would result in 
the progressive and catastrophic collapse of the entire building.  Where there is a 
risk of explosion a framed structure is now required to ensure that in the event of 
such, the removal or displacement of an external brickwork panel will not result in 
similar progressive structural collapse’. 
 
 
Dr. Howieson noted that the full enquiry which would examine the forensic evidence 
would no doubt provide a clearer picture of the mechanics of the collapse.  His own 
investigations into the structure of the building and building control did however 
stimulate a number of observations and raise several questions which the inquiry would 
be expected answer, as follows:  
 
‘1. If relatively major structural works have in the recent past been carried out 
to the factory, why is there no evidence of a Building Warrant? 
2. Did the management carry out any risk assessments as to whether the 
building structure could support the additional loadings from palletised 
materials and new processes? 
3. Why were the repairs to the areas of the building that were clearly 
showing structural stress (floor deflections) of a makeshift nature? 
4. Given that these structural problems were evident to many of the 
workforce why did the management not engage a structural engineer to 
undertake a use and condition survey? 
5.  Why was a factory, which was clearly demonstrating symptoms of 
structural stress, allowed to accommodate a variety of hazardous 
processes with a high risk of explosion? 
6.  Who was primarily responsible for ensuring that the structural integrity of 
the factory was regularly assessed and what statutory/executive agency is 
responsible for ensuring such inspections occur?’ 
 
 
7.6 Further Investigations 
 
‘After further investigations it appears that in 1993 an application for a Building 
Warrant (no. 1993.1310) was submitted to cover "storm damage" to the ICL 
factory.  It does not appear that any warrant was however either issued or 
discharged (normally signifying completion of the works to the agreed standard).  
There is reportedly a file note saying that storm repairs do not require a warrant.  
I have requested that Building Control confirm that this is the case, in writing.  No 
drawings can be found either at Building Control or at the Mitchell Library’.  
 
The outcome is thus as expected. Building Control have no records of any 
warrant applications and thus any significant alterations to the factory (slappings 
for fork lifts etc) undertaken over the last 25 years, as reported by the workers 
[16] have been "illegal".  
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If this work had been done properly and professionals employed to undertake 
calculations it would have increased the likelihood of an Architect or Structural 
Engineer being allowed the opportunity to view the building and identify any 
shortcomings in the structural integrity re: the imposed loadings/ beam 
deflections and 'ACRO' props in the basement.  Any alterations appear to have 
been done without any specialist engineering input that would have calculated 
the loads on the new steel/concrete RSJs/lintels. 
 
The implication seems clear.  If this was the cavalier attitude taken by the 
management to such an important area (statutory duties regarding building 
regulations) we can conclude that it is likely to have been symptomatic of their 
approach to health and safety in general. 
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Section 8 Conclusions and Recommendation 
 
 
Introduction  
 
In the years prior to the catastrophic and deadly Stockline explosion in May 2004 there 
was extensive and damning evidence of serious health and safety concerns regarding 
work processes, health and  safety management and health and safety oversight at the 
plant.  
 
Accounts from former workers reveal basic health and safety measures including 
training, personnel protective equipment, occupational hygiene controls and monitoring 
and provision of information were frequently either inadequate or entirely absent, 
creating serious risks of injury and acute and chronic work related ill-health. Injuries and 
occupational health problems including frequent cases of polymer fume fever provided 
concrete evidence that this was a real and ongoing concern. 
 
The legally required health and safety consultative processes with the workforce were 
not in place. The management culture actively discouraged worker participation, 
including any attempt to raise concerns about health and safety.  
 
The building itself was neither safe nor suitable for the purpose, amplifying the risks 
already inherent to poorly managed, high risk processes.  
 
Oversight by statutory authorities was inadequate and allowed a continuation of work 
processes in unacceptably hazardous conditions. Problems remained unresolved and 
clear breaches of health and safety law remained unprosecuted. 
 
The Need for a Public Inquiry  
 
Regulation and Management of Health and Safety in Scotland  
 
The systematic failures that led to the ICL/Stockline explosion raise key questions about 
the regulation and management of workplace health and safety in Scotland and the 
working conditions and employment relations in such companies. 
 
• How can a modern system of health and safety regulation permit the 
routine exposure of workers to chemicals that are known to be deadly 
under conditions where they are denied basic information and protective 
equipment? 
• How can those exposures be tolerated and even encouraged by 
managements in plants such as ICL/Stockline? 
• How can the experience and knowledge of workers be treated with such 
disdain by a management that was clearly aware of the risks that they 
were exposing their employees to? 
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• How can the full litany of poor health and safety practices not have been 
understood properly and acted on appropriately by HSE inspectors when 
they visited the plant?    
• How can whistleblowers such as Lawrence Connolly fail to be protected – 
and indeed be made more vulnerable - by HSE intervention?   
• How can a militantly anti-trade union plant such as ICL/Stockline escape 
the scrutiny and surveillance to ensure that it is legally compliant with 
health and safety and employee consultation regulations and laws? 
 
 
Those are questions that we should not expect to be asking in Scotland at the beginning 
of the 21PstP century, but they are questions that do need to be answered if we are to 
understand why Scotland has such a poor health and safety record.  The authors of this 
report are aware that the problems we have identified in this plant are not unique or 
isolated conditions.  The routine risks to which workers were unnecessarily exposed are 
particularly acute at ICL/Stockline, but collectively we have knowledge of similar 
conditions that are replicated at very many workplaces up and down the country.  The 
questions outlined above, therefore do not only pertain to the circumstances 
surrounding the event of the 11PthP May 2004, but raise questions that are clearly in the 
public interest. 
 
As this report has outlined, there are fundamental questions about the role that HSE 
played in the regulation and oversight of the plant that could not be investigated 
thoroughly in the criminal case brought against ICL.  Since the HSE played a leading 
role in the investigation and subsequent prosecution, we would not expect a thorough 
inquiry into the role of the agency.  Neither would it be appropriate for the agency to 
conduct such an investigation in the context of a criminal case.  This may be something 
that is conducted subsequent to the completion of criminal proceeding, as an internal 
exercise by the HSE, but a full review of the HSE’s role in the regulation and oversight 
of the plant can only be undertaken by a full public inquiry. 
 
 
Prosecuting and Punishing Corporate Crime in Scotland  
 
There are also fundamental questions about the decision to prosecute in the 
ICL/Stockline that bear upon the more general issues of prosecution for serious cases 
of corporate crime in Scotland.  In our view, only a public inquiry can answer those 
questions.  In the case of the ICL/Stockline prosecution, it is not known at the time of 
writing this report why, or on what basis the prosecution opted for charges under the 
Health and Safety at Work Act (1974), as opposed to a prosecution for the common law 
offence of corporate homicide.  It is likely that this decision was influenced by the 
general pessimism in the Scottish legal profession about such prosecutions following 
the successful appeal against Transco’s prosecution for corporate homicide in June 
2003.  In the Transco appeal the court ruled that although the offence of corporate 
homicide was admissible in Scotland, that in the case of Transco such a charge was 
inadmissible.   
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The case was also significant since the court ruled that companies can be prosecuted 
for the offence of ‘culpable homicide’ and indicated that the legal test that must be met 
was less strict in Scotland compared with England and Wales. Nonetheless the cost of 
the prosecution of Transco, combined with the crown’s failure to secure a prosecution 
created a climate in government and in the wider legal profession that undermined 
support for the prosecution of such cases.   Only a full scale public inquiry can 
investigate the following issues in relation to how decisions are made to prosecute 
corporations for committing the most serious offences.  
 
First, why was there no decision to prosecute for the offence of corporate homicide in 
this case? The key problem in the Transco case was that the criminal actions or 
inactions of those in positions of sufficient authority could not be identified in a way that 
could trigger corporate liability.  Yet in smaller companies like those prosecuted for the 
ICL/Stockline explosion, a charge of corporate  homicide is more easily brought since 
the conduct of an individual with sufficient authority and responsibility for the offence 
can be used to construct corporate criminal responsibility. As we have detailed in this 
report, the level of knowledge of the day to day operation of the plant, and the degree of 
senior management/director negligence that this implies a prima facie case for 
corporate manslaughter.  There may have been complications in relation to the death of 
key senior managers in the explosion.  But this would not present a legitimate barrier to 
prosecution for such an offence. 
 
Second, there also remain questions about whether the prosecution of individuals in 
positions of authority (either under the Health and Safety at Work Act or for the more 
serious offence of homicide) might have been appropriate in this case.  Notwithstanding 
the fact that key senior managers in this case are deceased, the level of day-to-day 
oversight by other key senior managers/directors suggest that there should have been a 
prosecution for a homicide offence or under section 37 of the Health and Safety at Work 
Act.  The key issue of public interest here is how to ensure deterrence when the owners 
and senior managers are able to hide behind the corporate veil to avoid punishment for 
very serious offences.  The ICL/Stockline case raises once again the issue about 
whether it is appropriate to prosecute individuals and/or the company for serious safety 
offences.   
 
There therefore remain wider questions of public interest about the way that more 
serious safety offences should be prosecuted.  All of those questions identified above 
are made more significant in light of the government’s new Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act that passed through Parliament in July 2007.  It is crucial that 
we understand how the new law might be applied in relation to prosecutions for 
offences such as are found in the ICL/Stockline case.  Those questions are complex 
ones and are of such immediate public importance that they are most appropriately 
dealt with in a full public inquiry. 
 
 142
 
Most offences that are prosecuted under health and safety law, will, no matter how 
serious, incur a fine.  Fines following health and safety convictions are notoriously low.  
The average fine in the UK for a prosecution of a health and safety offence following a 
fatality is less than £45,000.   This level was reflected in the sentencing of the two 
companies successfully prosecuted for the ICL/Stockline explosion.  The total fine of 
£400,000 works out at £44,000 per human life, or much less if the number of serious 
injuries is taken into account in such a reckoning.  The first problem, then, is that fines 
for health and safety offences use an ‘inchoate’ mode of reasoning; that is, they do not 
reflect the gravity of the harm cause.   
 
Such fines are also often very small when taken in comparison with the profits of the 
companies they seek to penalise.  So, even the £15m record fine levied on Transco Plc 
in August 2005 amounted to less than 0.16% of the company’s turnover in 2004.  This is 
the numerical equivalent of a fine of £40 to someone earning £25,000 a year, typically 
lower than the level of fines imposed by local authorities upon local citizens who allow 
their dogs to foul public spaces. The problem with the current system of punishment as 
it applies to companies such as ICL/Stockline is that fines neither reflect the gravity of 
the offence nor the ability of the offender to pay.   
 
The Centre for Corporate Accountability has proposed a formula for a unit fine that 
would take account of the gravity of the offence and ability to pay.  In this formula, the 
courts would set a percentage at a level that would reflect the seriousness of the 
offence.  This percentage would then be applied to an average of either the turnover or 
the profit of the firm over three years in order to determine the level of fine.  Such a 
system would be an obvious way to bring fines into line with the purpose of imposing 
punishments that are proportionate to the offence and to the offender’s ability to pay.   
 
Moreover, because fines are levied on the organisation generally, rather than targeted 
at a particular group within the company, those costs can be absorbed by the 
organisation as it sees fit.  The costs of even the largest fine might be offset against a 
particular budget heading (they might result in cuts to running or maintenance costs that 
may even worsen the management of safety in an organisation), or they may be passed 
onto customers and clients in the form of price rises, or to suppliers by reducing the 
market value of a product.  The costs of fines may even be passed onto workers - those 
most endangered by safety offences - in the form of wage cuts or adverse changes in 
working conditions.   One solution developed by lawyers in the US is to impose fines 
upon the value of the firm, rather than upon its running costs.  ‘Equity fines’ enable the 
courts to order offending companies to issue a set number of new shares in the firm that 
are place in a fund administered by a state-controlled compensation fund.  This system 
punishes those that benefit the most from corporate offending (owners and 
shareholders) and avoids redistribution of corporate punishments to the most vulnerable 
groups. Such a system could greatly improve corporate criminal accountability, 
particularly when punishing small firms like ICL/Stockline.   
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We have set out here two options for the reform of the system of sentencing 
corporations that commit serious health and safety offences.  There are a much greater 
range of corporate punishments that are in use in other jurisdictions that could be useful 
to the courts.  The ICL/Stockline case starkly reveals the weaknesses in the limited 
range of option that are currently available to the courts.  Again, those are options that 
we believe can only be explored adequately by a full public inquiry which has the remit 
to do so.   
 
Only a Public Inquiry Can Explore those Questions  
 
All of the questions that we raise here were not, nor could have been, answered in a 
court hearing that lasted a few days and was consumed by the fine detail of legal 
procedure.  Neither are they questions that are likely to fall within the scope of a Fatal 
Accident Inquiry.  In any case, the criminal court is not the place to explore such 
questions of wider public interest.  We therefore conclude that it is imperative that the 
First Minister sets up Committee of Inquiry into the ICL/Stockline explosion with a remit 
to consider the regulation and management of health and safety in Scotland to establish 
the broader lessons that we can learn from this tragedy. 
 
 
PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS  
 
The key recommendation of this report is for a full public inquiry into the circumstances 
surrounding the ICL/Stockline tragedy that has a remit to explore more generally the 
management and regulation of health and safety in Scotland.  We would not wish to 
pre-empt the findings of such an inquiry.  However, the evidence from this report does 
allow us to draw some preliminary conclusions about some key general problems with 
the regulation and management of health and safety, and propose some solutions that 
should be explored by a full public inquiry. 
 
1. Problem – the role of agencies such as the HSE in inspecting, regulating and 
enforcing health and safety laws has proved limited and inadequate in an agency 
lacking leadership, staff and resources as well as powers to do their job. The role of the 
HSE in inspecting all aspects of the plant that merited attention and effectively enforcing 
the legislation, on the basis of the employees’ accounts, has been highly problematic 
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The Health and Safety Executive currently faces two forms of pressure from 
government that is likely to make routine inspections and regulatory contacts even less 
frequent than they are at the moment.  First, as we have noted in this report, real terms 
reductions in the Executive’s budget will mean yet further reductions in the number of 
inspectors and the number and quality of inspections and investigations they are able to 
make.  Second, the introduction of the Hampton Report, based upon the idea that there 
remain too many regulatory burdens placed upon British businesses, will provide 
political justification for even fewer regulatory visits and a reduction in enforcement 
work.  For example, the government’s new Compliance Code, which, at the time of 
writing this report is out for consultation, states that it seeks to implement the Hampton 
principle that “no inspection should take place without a reason.”  In our view, the key 
problem with the regulation of ICL/Stockline was that the company felt no regulatory 
burden at all.  Indeed, the evidence that we have leads us to the conclusion that in the 
absence of strong workforce representation, this is a company that could have been 
incentivised into compliance only with regular HSE visits and regulatory interventions. 
 
Solution in Scotland and beyond –  
 
• Contrary to the current direction in government policy, HSE should be adequately 
resourced and empowered to conduct its duties.  At a minimum, we propose that 
HSE is funded to a level sufficient to ensure that each workplace employing 10 
people or more can expect at least one inspection per year.  
• Review of how HSE Scotland and the HSC in the UK operates. An urgent need 
for sufficient inspectors with the time, resources and training to inspect, monitor 
and effectively enforce the laws in factories like Stockline. There may be a 
powerful argument for the HSE field inspectorate to be devolved rather than 
reserved in Scotland to ensure full national accountability and scrutiny.  
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2. Problem – Our report reveals that in plants such as Stockline, workers are 
exceptionally well informed about the work they do and can identify both hazards and 
solutions to those hazards yet they often remain powerless. With no rights for trade 
union roving safety representatives to check on such plants and no effective means to 
ensure proper consultation between employers and non-unionised employees on health 
and safety matters, the workforce were effectively cut adrift. 
 
Solution in Scotland and beyond –  
 
• Rights of workers, in trade unions and non-unionised – need to be extended and 
their position more effectively protected when they raise health and safety 
concerns. Roving trade union safety representatives would ensure greater 
monitoring of SMEs like Stockline. Small and medium sized firms (SMEs) have 
been recognised by HSE itself in various reports as a sector where 
implementation of COSHH and other measures has been poor. 
• Extended rights for safety reps, in line with the Hazards Charter, on stopping 
hazardous work processes are needed too including the right of such reps to 
issue provisional improvement notices. Improved and effective consultation rights 
on occupational health and safety – and related protection - for employees in 
non-unionised workplaces are also critical. Employment Tribunals should extend 
Interim Relief measures to workers dismissed for Health and Safety matters.  
 
 
3. Problem – lack of clarity in relation to who should be prosecuted for serious 
corporate offences and how they should be prosecuted.  The UK Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act is not specific to Scotland and fails to allow 
individuals to be prosecuted even when they are shown to be culpable of serious 
offences. 
 
Solution in Scotland and beyond  
 
• A Scottish Corporate Killing Act is needed with individual director, senior 
manager accountability.  This Act should also ensure that assets reclamation is 
both possible and fully enforced for those employers who kill, injure and make 
their workers ill. The latter has been applied in England with regard to employers 
creating asbestos hazards and should be fully operationalised in Scotland. 
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4. Problem – Occupational health and safety in Scotland and beyond has been 
constantly downplayed in policy agendas.  There are too few occupational physicians 
and occupational health nurses working in HSE in Scotland to pursue the serious 
occupational health problems reported by the Stockline workers. What resources there 
have been have all too often been diverted into workplace health promotion initiatives in 
Scotland or in the rhetoric of partnership working that has produced little evidence to 
show any impact. 
 
Solutions in Scotland –  
 
• An independent, securely funded and properly resourced Scottish Hazards 
Advice Centre should be set up, along the lines of the Greater Manchester 
Hazards Centre, to offer advice and information and advocacy to workers in all 
workplaces, whether unionised or not. 
 
 
• The evidence in this report also suggests an urgent need for: 
 
• An institute to deal with toxics use reduction in UK along the lines of the 
institute in USA. This body would advise governments, employers and 
employees on how to reduce exposures to and use of toxic substances in 
workplaces thereby reducing worker and environmental hazards. 
• Improved systems for reporting and recording known and suspect 
occupationally caused and occupationally-related diseases including 
cancer registries that automatically recorded all the occupations of 
patients. 
• Further development of occupational health and safety education 
programmes for workers on action research and risk and body mapping. 
This research has demonstrated the value of worker participatory action 
research in exposing hazardous working conditions when governmental 
agencies - through a lack of time, staff, resources, commitment and policy 
- have failed to do so. 
• Independent occupational health services in primary care and NGO 
settings  
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5. Problem - the failure of key regulatory agencies to provide a co-ordinated approach 
to health and safety regulation at ICL/Stockline in a way that could have alerted those 
agencies to the serious problems at the plant. 
 
Solutions in Scotland and beyond –  
 
• Need for development of effective policies and procedures to link HSE with 
Scottish Government Health bodies specifically on occupational health and 
safety. 
• Statutory requirements for information on workplaces where problems have been 
identified to be shared across agencies, particularly SEPA and HSE.  
• Development of a proper, effective multi-disciplinary Scottish occupational health 
service that covers all employees in the country and had prevention as its core 
principle.  
• End to dissipation of funds in wider workplace health promotion initiatives and re-
orientation of such bodies to focus on major occupational disease and 
occupational injury activity in conjunction with a strengthened HSE  
• Action to draw on lessons of ICL/Stockline. Data indicate a long history of injury 
and worker ill-health. Mechanisms to put in place to ensure such data and 
reports are picked up and acted upon, as a matter of course, by regulators and 
health bodies. This goes beyond acting on sentinel events as the scale of 
problems at ICL/Stockline indicated extensive problems.  
 
 
6. Problem – opacity in the accountability processes within the financial information. 
 
Solutions in Scotland and beyond –  
 
• Small company audits 
• Changes in Company legislation regarding the provision of useful information to 
al stakeholder groups. 
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Appendix 1 Company Shareholders 
 
 
 
 
ICL
Plastics
Ltd 
Shareholders 
Dec 2006 
 
C Downie 
23,992 
JH Downie 4 
NC Downie 4
RA Fergusson 
10,000 
JS McColl 
1,300 
 
ICL 
Tech 
Limited 
 
 
Sharelholders 
Jul 2006 
 
ICL Plastics 
Ltd 
15,000 
 
ICL Plastics 
Limited 3,000 
 
C Downie 2 
Stockline 
Plastics 
Limited 
 
 
Shareholders 
July 2006 
 
ICL Plastics 
Ltd 30,000 
 
JS McColl 
5,000 
 
Easter 
Road 
Plastics 
Limited  
 
Shareholders
July 2006 
 
ICL Plastics 
Ltd 2,998 
 
C Downie 2 
 
Norplast 
Limited 
 
 
 
Shareholders
July 2006 
 
ICL Plastics 
Ltd 2,999 
 
C Downie 1 
 
 
Brisbay 
Limited 
 
 
 
Shareholders 
Jan 2007 
 
ICL Plastics 
Ltd 18,275 
 
JM Flaskett 
3,225 
 
Plastics W 
Graham 
Limited 
 
 
Shareholders
July 2006 
 
ICL Plastics 
Ltd 3,000 
 
EA North 
1,000 
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Appendix 2 Trade Name of Products Reportedly used at 
ICL 
 
 
Ciba Geigy DY 219 
Durapipe Solvent cement 
KoKleber HF 303 
REN HY 97 
Rencast Vantico – listed as an irritant 
Rilprim 104 A/B – may be a primer. The product Rilprim P23 V40 contained 2 methyl 1 
propanol; methyl isobutyl ketone; 2-ethoxyethanol; 1-butanol; heavy aromatic petroleum 
naphtha and epoxy resins. Canadian data sheet for 2002 notes that the product is a 
severe irritant, may be harmful through skin absorption, may cause respiratory tract 
irritation, allergic skin irritation, should be used with LEV and PPE needed included 
safety goggles and impervious gloves. Where airborne exposure is likely, a NIOSH 
approved respirator was recommended. 
Tinuvin 
Tensol No 70 UN 1133 (MSDS draft from Bostik Australia March 2004) contained 
styrene, polyester resin and talc. . Australian data sheet for Tensol noted need for use 
in a well ventilated area. “If mechanical ventilation is sued it should be suitable for use 
with flammable materials”. Australian labelling references to product as ‘harmful by 
inhalation, irritant to eyes, respiratory system and skin, flammable and do not breathe 
vapour’. 
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Appendix 3 Information Sheet and Consent Form 
 
                                                                               
 
Information Sheet to Accompany the Consent Form          
 
 
Project title: 
‘An exploration of working conditions, health and safety and related matters in the 
ICL/Stockline plant (Glasgow), based on interviews with workers, risk mapping and 
secondary research’. 
 
Invitation paragraph: 
You are being asked to consent to the use of your interviews in an anonymised form in 
the report being prepared on the above project. The report will be made publically 
available 
 
What is the purpose of the project? 
The purpose of the project – conducted by independent researchers based at 
Strathclyde and Stirling Universities and Scottish hazards groups - has been to examine 
aspects of the working environment, industrial relations practices, finances and health 
and safety conditions and policies in the plant, the company and wider plastics industry.  
The findings will be published in a report planned for 2006 which will be available to the 
public. 
 
Do you have to consent? 
No.  It is up to you to decide whether or not to consent.  If you do, you will be given 
this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form 
 
What are the other possible disadvantages and risks of giving consent? 
We are not aware of any risks attached to consent as any information you provide will 
be anonymised and your name will not be cited anywhere in the report. 
  
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
The report will help to document more fully the conditions that existed in the Stockline 
plant prior to the explosion, and to put on record observations from those employees 
directly involved over many years in the operation of the factory. This may contribute to 
a better understanding of working conditions and better control of hazards in similar 
establishments in the future, and may also contribute to pressure for a public enquiry 
into the Stockline explosion and the role of the employer and government agencies in 
events leading up to that incident. 
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Contact details: 
 
Professor Phil Taylor, Department of Management and Organization, University of 
Stirling, FK9 4LA 
Phone: 01786-467312  Email: philip.taylor@stir.ac.uk 
 
After 1 February 2006: 
 
Department of Human Resource Management, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, G1 
1XU 
Phone: 0141-552-4400 
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Appendix 4 Timeline of Incidents/Complaints as Reported by 
Workers 
 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
1994 
 
 
            
1995 
 
 
 F. Stott (MD) 
‘anyone trying 
to start a union 
won’t be here 
long’  
          
1996 
 
 
            
1997 
 
 
 
 ongoing 
employee 
requests for 
chemical 
gloves, overalls 
         workers 
fitting gas 
oven – told 
co. that gas 
pipe was 
 unsafe 
1998 
 
 
            
1999 
 
 
 
 complaints to 
HSE from 
employees 
locked & 
unusable 
safety exits  
  old m/c 
collapsed – 
fabrication 
employee 
cut - taken 
to Western 
Infirmary 
  fabrication 
employee 
phoned 
HSE re. 
cold 
    
2000 
 
 
 
 HSE served 
Improvem’t  
Notice  
(COSHH 
assessment) & 
2 Prohibition 
notices (saw 
guards 
  despatch 
employee, 
no licence 
told to use 
fork-lift by 
S. McColl 
  despatch 
employee 
sent to eye 
clinic (‘skin 
peeling’). S. 
McColl 
involved 
  despatch 
employee  
raised 
concerns - 
coating 
shop 
ventilat’n  
with P. 
Ferguson 
inspection  
of fans  (by 
whom?) 
co. told  
‘useless’ 
2001 
 
 
 
       fabrication 
employee 
asked 
personnel 
manager to 
see COSHH 
Regs. 
    
2002 
 
 
 
     coating shop 
employee – 
doctor 
recorded his 
illnesses 
    fabricat’n 
workers 
phoned & 
wrote to 
HSE re. 
problems 
 
2003 
 
 
 
    fabrication 
employee 
to test if 
illness 
work-
related – S. 
McColl 
refused to 
restart 
unannounce
d visit by 
HSE to 
factory after 
employee 
‘concerns’ 
 HSE visits 
factory 
(fumes 
cabinet just 
built) 
A.McKechin 
first writes 
to HSE (no. 
of letters 
Aug-Dec.) 
  HSE 
confirms 
2000 
Imp’m’t 
Notice 
was self-
assessed 
 
2004     explosion 
at factory 
       
